Tooele Associates Limited Partnership v. Tooele City : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Tooele Associates Limited Partnership v. Tooele
City : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George M. Haley; Chris R. Hogle; Cory Talbot; Holme, Roberts, and Owen; Attorney for Tooele
City.
Bruce R. Baird; Bruce R. Baird, P.C; Paxton R. Guymon; Lauren Y. Parry; Miller Guymon, P.C;
Attorneys for Tooele Associates.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Tooele Associates v. Tooele City, No. 20100504 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2389
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TOOELE ASSOCIATES 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a 
Washington limited partnership, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
TOOELE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-
Appellant 
Appellate Case No. 20100504 
District Court No. 060919737 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT TOOELE ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
Appeal from the Interlocutory Order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Dated June 3, 2010, Honorable Randall N. Skanchy, District Judge 
George M.Haley (#1302) 
Chris R. Hogle (#7223) 
Cory Talbot (#11477) 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Tooele City 
Bruce R.Baird (#0176) 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, P.C. 
2150 S. 1300 E. 5TH Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801)328-1400 
Paxton R. Guymon (#8188) 
Lauren Y. Parry (#11420) 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
165 South Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5600 
Attorneys for Tooele Associates t*f, 1 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN - 7 2011 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TOOELE ASSOCIATES 
LIMITED PARTNERSfflP, a 
Washington limited partnership, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
TOOELE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-
Appellant. 
Appellate Case No, 20100504 
District Court No. 060919737 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT TOOELE ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSfflP 
Appeal from the Interlocutory Order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Dated June 3, 2010, Honorable Randall N. Skanchy, District Judge 
George M.Haley (#1302) 
Chris R. Hogle (#7223) 
, Cory Talbot (#11477) 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1 Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Tooele City 
BruceR.Baird(#0176) 1 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, P.C. 
2150 S. 1300 E. 5TH Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801)328-1400 
Paxton R. Guymon (#8188) 
Lauren Y. Parry (#11420) 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
165 South Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5600 1 
Attorneys for Tooele Associates 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES hi 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS iv 
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS.... 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 18 
ARGUMENT 20 
I. THE VERDICT IS CONSISTENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 20 
A. If a Verdict Can be Read Harmoniously, Even if Such Reading is 
Strained, it Must be Harmonized and Judgment Entered Upon it 20 
B. Tooele Associates' Interpretation Harmonizes the Verdict and Should 
be Adopted 21 
i. The Verdict is Consistent 21 
ii. Any Interpretation of the Verdict Which Preserves the City's 
Breach of Bond Agreement Claims Cannot be Reconciled with 
the Jury's Factual Findings and Overall Intent 26 
iii. The "as stated in Question 2" Descriptor in Question 3 Does Not 
Limit the Jury's Finding of Waiver to the Development 
Agreement 31 
C. Because Tooele Associates' Interpretation Harmonizes the Verdict, 
Judgment Must be Entered Upon the Verdict 37 
i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. ALTERNATIVELY, BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND FACTS AND 
APPLIED LAW TO MAKE ULTIMATE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS, THE 
VERDICT MAY BE INTERPRETED UNDER RULE 49(b) AND 
JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR TOOELE ASSOCIATES 39 
IE. THE CITY'S CLAIM THAT IT CAN INVOKE PARAGRAPH 18 OF 
THE BOND AGREEMENT AS THE "DEATH PENALTY" TO ESCAPE 
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES WAS NOT PART OF THE "CASE AS 
SUBMITTED" TO THE JURY 44 
CONCLUSION 53 
ADDENDUM 54 
ii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Babcockv. General Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002) 41 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985) 1,20 
Brighamv. Moon Lake Elec. Assoc, 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970) 40 
Can v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995) 39 
Clinton Physical Therapy Services, P.C. v. John Deere Health Care, Inc., 
714 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 2006) 1 
Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 47 P.3d 76 40 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of'Utah, 939P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) 1 
Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991) 3, 40 
Gallickv. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) 3 
Griffin v. Matherne, All F.2d911 (5th Cir. 1973) 44 
Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6 P.3d 583 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) 39 
Holbrookv. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 20 
Int 'I Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 
626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981) 20 
Lavoie v. Pac. Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48 (2nd Cir. 1992) 41 
Medley v. State, 162 P.2d 881 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1945) 37 
Norrisv. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d (9th Cir. 1999) 1 
Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, 989 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1999) 2 
Perdoni Bros., Inc. v. Concrete Sys., Inc., 35 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) 44 
Redmond v.Soscha, 837 N.E. 2d 883 (111. 2005) 1 
iii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3rd Cir. 1991) 41 
Stanton by Brooks v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 718 F.2d 553 
(3rd Cir. 1983) 41 
State v. Dilboy, 999 A.2d 1092 (N.H. 2010) 41 
Utah Medical Prod, Inc. v. Searcy, 958P.2d228 (Utah 1998) 2 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 358 P.2d 81 (Utah 1960) 21, 37 
Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) 40 
Constitutional Provisions: 
Utah Constitution, Article I §10 20 
Rules: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 49 39-41,43-44 
Other Authority: 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).. 39 
(Note: full recitations of Article I §10 of the Utah Constitution and Utah R. Civ. P. 49 are 
set forth verbatim in the Addendum to this Brief.) 
iv Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No.l: May the Jury's Verdict be read harmoniously, mandating the entry of 
a judgment that effectuates the Jury's mixed findings of fact and law and overall intent? 
Standard of Review: Although no Utah appellate court appears to have directly 
addressed the standard of review to be employed,1 the issue presents a question of law 
that should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the District Court. Drake v. 
Industrial Comm yn of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). "[Wjhether two verdicts are 
legally inconsistent is a question of law. As a result, a District Court's order granting or 
denying a new trial based on a claim of legally inconsistent verdict is subject to de novo 
review." Redmond v. Soscha, 837 N.E. 2d 883, 895 (111. 2005). To protect the substantial 
right to a jury trial, a court must, whenever possible, read a jury verdict as being 
harmonious and enter the verdict rendered. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co,, 701 
P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Utah 1985). 
The District Court did not make a discretionary determination granting or denying 
a motion for a new trial. Rather, the issue is whether, as a matter of law, the District 
Court properly found the Jury's Verdict to be irreconcilably inconsistent, leaving it no 
other choice but to order a new trial. Even when a District Court's discretionary 
1
 Other courts have applied de novo review. See Clinton Physical Therapy Services, P.C. 
v. John Deere Health Care, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 2006); Norris v. Sysco 
Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999). 
1 
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determination is underpinned by a question of law, the decision is reviewed for 
correctness. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, ^ 5, 989 P.2d 1073. 
Preservation of Issue No. 1: Issue No. 1 was presented to the District Court and 
preserved for appeal when it was briefed by both parties, argued during hearings on post-
trial motions, and addressed in the District Court's Memorandum Decision. 
Issue No. 2: Should the Verdict be interpreted under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(b) when 
the Jury made ultimate legal conclusions, was instructed to apply the law, and applied 69 
Instructions in rendering the Verdict of mixed questions of fact and law? 
Standard of Review: Both interpretation and application of a rule of procedure 
are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, % 5, 989 
P.2d 1073 ("interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the 
trial court's decision for correctness"); see Utah Medical Prod., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 
228, 231 (Utah 1998) (application of rule of procedure is a question of law). 
Preservation of Issue No. 2: Issue No. 2 was presented below and preserved for 
appeal when it was addressed during oral argument on post-trial motions, and was ruled 
upon in the District Court's Memorandum Decision.3 
Issue No. 3: In harmonizing the Verdict, should the District Court view the 
answers from the Jury's perspective, thereby limiting the harmonization analysis to the 
2
 [R. 24264-24310; R. 22884-22913; R. 22566-22606; R. 22935- 22968]; [R. 23008, 1-
22-2010 Hearing]; [R. 23110, 2-4-2010 Hearing]; [R. 23295, 4-19-2010 Hearing]. 
3
 [R. 24276-24279]; [R. 23110, 2-4-2010 Hearing at pp. 19, 61-63]; [R. 23295, 4-19-
2010 Hearing at pp. 73-79]. 
? 
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"case as submitted" - to the exclusion of arguments, pre-trial motions, rulings and issues 
not submitted to the Jury? 
Standard of Review: Issue No. 3 does not appear to have been addressed directly 
in any state or federal case. In the seminal jury verdict interpretation case of Gallick v. 
Baltimore & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the jury's 
findings of fact were consistent in light of the jury instructions and in the context of the 
entire special verdict." Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Gallick, 
372 U.S. at 121). This is a question of law that should be reviewed for correctness. 
Preservation of Issue No. 3: Issue No. 3 was presented below and preserved for 
appeal when it was submitted to the District Court in briefing, argued during hearings on 
post-trial motions, and ruled upon in the District Court's Memorandum Decision. [R. 
24287, 24290, 22947]; [R. 23008, Jan. 22, 2010 Hearing at pp. 35-36, 46]. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This case involves a multi-million dollar dispute between 
Plaintiff/Appellant Tooele Associates ("TA"), a property developer, and Defendant 
Tooele City (the "City") regarding the Overlake development project in Tooele, Utah. In 
the early to mid 1990s, TA and the City formed a cooperative relationship - both eager 
for TA to undertake the massive 7,500 home master-planned development project within 
the City's boundaries. Over the next few years, the parties entered into a series of 
mutually-beneficial agreements regarding the project. Shortly after entering the 
Development Agreement, various disputes arose which eventually crippled the parties' 
working relationship, resulting in both parties asserting various claims against each other. 
3 
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Course of Proceedings. TA initiated this action by filing a Complaint in 2002.4 
Over seven years the parties engaged in extensive litigation and discovery - more than 50 
depositions and numerous motions. By the time the case was ready for trial the parties' 
claims were essentially reduced to complex claims and defenses for breach of contract 
and breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. [R. 21845- 21860]. After a 
three-week trial in June 2009 the jury returned a verdict form answering 33 questions 
and, ultimately, awarding TA $22.5 million in damages and the City a partially offsetting 
total of $1.82 million. The "net" award was $20,680,000.00 in favor of TA. 
Disposition Below. After post-trial motions and hearings the District Court 
entered a Memorandum Decision, dated June 3, 2010, concluding that the jury's findings 
were "irreconcilably inconsistent" and declaring a mistrial. Permission to appeal the 
District Court's interlocutory order was granted, resulting in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The mutually-beneficial beginnings 
On October 25, 1994, TA purchased approximately 2,760 acres of raw land (the 
"Land"), of which approximately 800 acres were located within the City and 
approximately 1,960 acres were located in Tooele County. With encouragement from the 
City, TA pursued development of a master planned community of over 7,500 residential 
units, commercial development, a town center, golf course and related master-planned 
4
 The original suit filed by TA related solely to park impact fees, a claim that was later 
dismissed. The parties entered a standstill agreement regarding that claim until the 
standstill was ended by the City filing its counterclaims in 2004. After the City filed its 
counterclaims TA asserted claims related to the City's various breaches of the 
Development Agreement and bad faith. [R. 24334, Transcript Vol 3, 640-42]. 
A 
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development to be called "Overlake." TA intended to sell developed lots to qualified 
builders who would construct homes for resale to customers. [R. 24333, Transcript5 
Vol. 2, 164-74, 275-76]. 
Through multiple meetings, TA and the City discussed how development of 
Overlake could be mutually beneficial. The City was positive and enthusiastic about the 
project. [Id. at 168-69, 178-82]; [R. 24332, Transcript Vol. 1, 117, 124].6 
On November 15, 1995, the City and TA took their first formal step to implement 
their plans by entering into an "Annexation Agreement." [Exhibit 210]. The City 
received numerous benefits from TA under the Annexation Agreement, including: 
• Annexing approximately 1,880 acres of Overlake into the City, thus increasing 
the City's base for ad valorem property taxes. 
• Obtaining 30 acres from TA for the City's new Wastewater Treatment Plant 
(the "Treatment Plant"), plus necessary easements for the Treatment Plant.7 
• Obtaining 686 acre feet of water rights from TA. 
• TA agreeing to and later setting aside 584 acres for schools, a fire station, 
roadways, parks and other public services. 
• TA agreeing to purchase up to 2.25 million gallons per day of treated 
wastewater from the City's Treatment Plant over the next 20 years. 
5
 "Transcript" refers to the written transcript of the trial; and "Exhibit" refers to the 
exhibits used at trial, unless noted otherwise. 
6
 The former Mayor of the City, testifying that he "jumped high" and tried to encourage 
TA to come to Tooele. He also described the parties' relationship as "good" and that 
development of Overlake was a "win-win situation." 
7
 The Annexation Agreement did not address what the City would pay for this acreage. 
Later, as part of the Development Agreement, TA deeded this land to the City for no 
monetary consideration, but instead for other benefits, namely, culinary water. 
5 
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• TA agreeing to and later performing the construction, maintenance and 
management of an 18-hole public golf course (the "Overtake Golf Course"). 
• TA agreeing to and, later, constructing a main culinary water line connecting 
existing City service to the Treatment Plant. (TA paid half of the cost of this 
water line.) 
[Exhibit 210]. 
On June 1, 1996, the City and TA entered into the Land Application Agreement/ 
Funding Agreement (the "Funding Agreement"). [Exhibit 100 at 102]. In the Funding 
Agreement, TA repeated its agreement to purchase the treated wastewater from the City's 
new Treatment Plant over the next 20 years. This commitment, in part, provided a source 
of funds for repayment of a Bond issued by the City which was necessary for 
construction of the Treatment Plant and which further allowed the City to qualify for 
grant monies from state and federal sources to pay for construction of the Treatment Plant 
and a water reuse system. [Id.]; [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 208-11]. The Funding 
Agreement also benefited the City by saving it the time and significant expense it would 
have incurred had it been forced to discharge wastewater into the Great Salt Lake. [R. 
24337, Transcript Vol. 6, 1492, 1498-99 (irrespective of Overlake, the City needed a new 
wastewater treatment plant, and the agreement with TA provided the "best cost benefit 
alternative")]. In sum, the City most likely would not have been able to afford its much-
needed Treatment Plant but for TA. 
In July of 1996, TA began constructing the infrastructure needed to support 
Overlake. At the time, the City's building inspector and engineer discussed with TA that 
the north side of 2000 North (which TA was building to connect to its first plat of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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residential lots [see Map, Exhibit 681, attached hereto as Addendum F]) would not need 
to be improved until development occurred on the adjacent land, which was not owned 
by TA. More importantly, the City agreed that the south side of 2000 North (even though 
it was owned by TA) did not need to be fully improved8 at the time because the adjacent 
land was not being developed at that time. [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 273-74, 320]. 
Similarly, Mayor Pendleton agreed that full street improvements were not required to be 
built on the west side of 400 West as part of a subdivision known as "Plat IB" because it 
was unclear at that time what was going to be done with the adjacent property. [Id. at 
285-87]. These agreements were consistent with the City's policy at the time. [R. 24334, 
Transcript Vol. 3,700-05]. 
On October 3, 1996, the parties entered into a Bond Agreement for Overlake 
Phases 1A and IB. [Exhibit 220]. The purpose of the Bond Agreement was "to 
guarantee the proper completion of the improvements and the payment of the Fees 
covered" and "to avoid the harmful effects" of improperly completed, undeveloped, 
and/or unproductive infrastructure and improvements. [Exhibit 220, <| 2]. In essence, if 
TA failed to complete public improvements to the City's satisfaction, the City was 
provided with a built-in mechanism to cure the failure (i.e., "calling" the bond and using 
the proceeds to pay for completing the public improvements). TA also conveyed to the 
City a Trust Deed on real property owned by TA to secure TA's performance under the 
Bond Agreement. [Exhibit 220]. Under the Bond Agreement, the parties agreed that 
"should [TA] Fail to Perform its responsibilities . . . in any degree, [TA] agreed to 
8
 "Public improvements" for these streets are curbs, gutters and/or sidewalks. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compensate CITY for all costs, including incidental Costs, related to [TA] Failure to 
Perform its obligations . . . to the extent that such costs are not adequately covered by the 
[funds recovered from the sale of the security]." [Exhibit 220, ^ 10]. The Bond 
Agreement and the Trust Deed (as security) were approved by the City Attorney and the 
City. [Exhibit 220, signature page]. The Bond Agreement was amended as various 
phases of the Overlake Development were approved. [Exhibits 267, 268, 282, 293,449]. 
Upon receiving final plat approval, in November 1996, TA began construction of 
the first plat of residential lots - Phase 1A for 55 lots. [Exhibit 192, Plat for 1A]; [R. 
24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 267-68]. To accommodate the City's immediate need for the 
new Treatment Plant, and with the expectation of soon having a comprehensive 
development agreement with the City, TA conveyed the 30-acre site to the City for the 
Treatment Plant in August, 1997, without any payment from the City. 
To determine whether there would be adequate culinary water for the Overlake 
project at build-out, Gerald Webster, the City's Engineer, prepared calculations of the 
City's culinary water rights and water resources, and determined the City had more than 
enough culinary water and culinary water rights for the full development of Overlake. 
[Exhibit 551]. Those calculations were furnished to the City Council, other City officials 
and TA in August 1997 and were relied upon by TA in binding itself to significant 
obligations to the City related to Overlake. [Id.; R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 236-37]. 
A few months later, on December 18, 1997, TA and the City entered into a 
comprehensive "Development Agreement for Overlake Project Area" (the "Development 
8 
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Agreement"). [Exhibit 100]. The City received numerous benefits from TA under the 
Development Agreement, including, but not limited to the following: 
• All of the benefits derived from the Annexation Agreement and the Funding 
Agreement which were incorporated into the Development Agreement. 
• Water rights for approximately 686 acre feet of water. 
• One-half of the cost of extending the main trunk lines for culinary water. 
• Easements for a variety of purposes. 
• The commitment from TA to purchase up to 2.25 million gallons per day of the 
Treatment Plant's treated wastewater over the next 20 years. 
• TA's payment of water, park and sewer impact fees. 
• TA's donation of 30 acres for the Treatment Plant. 
• TA's agreement to construct and maintain all sewer lift stations in Overlake. 
• Improvements of streets, curb, gutter and sidewalks in Overlake. 
• TA's commitment to sell to the City up to 150 acres of park sites in Overlake at 
the greatly reduced price of $5,000 per acre. 
• Construction of the 18-hole Overlake Golf Course, for public use. 
• TA's commitment to donate 7 acres to the City for public facility sites. 
• TA's commitment to set aside 97 acres for purchase by the Tooele County 
School District. 
• TA's commitment to donate 66 acres for construction of 17 storage lakes 
needed to store treated wastewater from the new Treatment Plant. 
[Exhibit 100]. 
In exchange for the many benefits provided by TA, the City undertook the 
obligation of providing all required culinary water to Overlake: 
A. Water Provided By the City. In consideration, and as a requirement 
for Annexation of the Overlake Project Area, [TA] has conveyed to the City 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
perfected water rights for 686 acre feet of culinary water. As the demand for 
culinary water [ ] required to meet the culinary water needs of the Overlake 
Project Area at eventual build-out is anticipated to exceed the Water Rights 
being conveyed to the City by [TA], the City is willing to take all reasonable 
actions necessary to provide the culinary water required to meet the needs 
of the Overlake Development Plan at build-out, including but not limited to 
water rights, water source development, storage capacity, and major 
distribution line capacity. 
B. Reservation of Water Capacity. The City shall take all reasonable 
actions to provide sufficient availability and capacity of culinary water 
necessary to allow the completion of the Overlake Development Plan. 
[Id. §§ VI.l.A-B (emphasis added)]. 
The City's representations that public improvements 
in Overlake had been accepted as complete. 
From 1996 to 2001, TA developed plats in Overlake, including Phases 1A, IB, 
1C, ID, IE, IF, 1G and 1J. [Pre-Trial Order, Incontroverted Facts § IV.C.xii]. With 
respect to Phases 1 A, IB, 1C and 1G, an engineering firm, Forsgren Associates, Inc. 
("Forsgren"), performed all inspections during construction of public improvements for 
the City (but paid by TA).10 
On December 8, 1997, Forsgren delivered a letter to City Engineer Webster, 
stating that the improvements in Phase 1A were complete [Exhibit 114], and delivered an 
almost identical letter regarding the improvements in Phase IB three weeks later. 
[Exhibit 123]; [R. 24335, Transcript Vol. 4, 758-59]. Webster "certified" that the 1A and 
9
 The City's obligation to "provide" culinary water for no charge is contrasted with its 
obligations to "sell" other types of water, such as wastewater. [Exhibit 100, f V.l.A, E]. 
10
 [Exhibits 109, 113]; [R. 24339, Transcript Vol. 8, 2019, 2039 (the City entered an 
agreement with TA wherein TA would pay Forsgren to be responsible to essentially act 
as the City's inspector)]; [R. 24337, Transcript Vol. 6, 1515]. 
10 
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IB improvements were complete by signing the second page of the letters stating that: "I 
accept on behalf of Tooele City the wet utilities, roadway surface and curb and gutter in 
[Phase 1 A/Phase IB] Overtake Development." [Exhibits 114, 123]. Subsequently, the 
designated City Inspector issued passing inspection reports for the improvements in 
Phases 1A and IB. [Exhibit 124]. 
Accordingly, in December 1998, TA and the City entered into an "Amendment to 
Bond Amendment" which reduced the bond amount for Phase IB to the 20% warranty 
level, which could not have occurred unless the Phase IB improvements were complete. 
[Exhibit 108 at 6]; [Exhibit 625 §§ 7-19-12 and 7-19-35]. On November 19, 1998, the 
City Inspector issued a passing inspection report for subdivision 1C also certifying that 
the public improvements in 1C were complete. [Exhibits 138, 140]. 
On September 22, 1999, TA received a letter from Curt Morris, the Assistant City 
Attorney whom it had been instructed to work with, addressing the City's "position" 
regarding the status of building permits and phased development of subdivisions, and the 
effect on Overlake. [Exhibit 25]. Mr. Morris concluded in the letter that "[t]he public 
improvements are considered to be complete" for Phases 1A, IB and 1C. [Id. at 2-3]. 
Mr. Morris repeated these representations by signing additional letters and making notes 
that the improvements had been accepted in November 1998 and by stating that the bond 
amount required for subdivisions 1A, IB and 1C would be reduced to "20% until final 
warranty inspections" indicating that the bonds would be reduced to warranty level. 
[Exhibit 127]; [R. 24341, Transcript Vol. 10, 2463-64]. 
11 
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In sum, during the first few years of development, TA invested approximately $10 
million in public improvements in Overtake [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 325-26], and 
City representatives, including the Engineer, Inspector and City Attorney, assured TA 
that the public improvements constructed as of that time were accepted as complete. 
The City's Antagonism toward Overlake and 
the City's Material Breaches of its Contractual Obligations. 
As described above, the City and TA initially worked cooperatively to move the 
development of Overlake forward. However, on January 1, 1998, the City's 
administration changed when Charlie Roberts became the new Mayor [R. 24332, 
Transcript Vol. 1, 134] approximately three weeks after the Development Agreement was 
executed. Under Mayor Roberts, the City adopted a new "slow-growth" policy to restrict 
residential development within the City and, critically, proposed an ordinance limiting 
the culinary water commitments of the City to Overlake and other residential 
development projects. [Exhibit 553]; [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 182-83, 248-54]; [R. 
24334, Transcript Vol. 3, 457]. 
While the City took the significant benefits of each of its agreements with TA, 
after 1998 (and worsening over time) the City's new administration engaged in a 
systematic pattern of depriving TA of the benefits TA was to enjoy under those 
agreements, especially the water rights that the City desired to allocate to commercial 
development. [See footnotes 11-17 infra; R. 24333, Vol. 2, 250]. Significantly, soon 
after entering the Development Agreement, new surveys and studies conducted by the 
City revealed that the City was not in as good of a position regarding culinary water 
12 
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rights as it previously thought, receiving estimates that "if the population continues to 
increase as predicted, the City will not have enough water associated with their existing 
municipal water rights to meet its needs by 2011" and discovering that the "waters of 
Tooele Valley are considered to be fully appropriated." [Exhibit 561 ^[ 13-14]; [Exhibit 
553]. The City determined it would rather use its water resources for commercial 
development instead of fulfilling its commitments to Overlake. [Exhibit 561 <[ 11; R. 
24333, Vol. 2, 249]. Accordingly, performance of the Development Agreement would 
become increasingly burdensome for the City as its water increased in value over time -
estimated (at the time of trial) at over $15,000 per each new lot approved for 
development. [R. 24334, Transcript Vol. 5, 1083-87]; [R. 24339, Transcript Vol. 8, 
1980-84]; [R. 24334, Transcript Vol. 3, 646]; [Exhibit 562]. 
The City's change of attitude affected most City officials and staff, making it 
extremely difficult, and in some instances almost impossible, for any progress to take 
place in Overlake. In nearly all of its dealings with the City after 1999 TA faced conflict 
and antagonism from the City, including: 
a. The City not acting on requests submitted by TA in a timely fashion; 
b. The City refusing to conduct or continue meetings necessary for development 
and refusing to provide complete "punch lists" for the improvements12 
11
 [R. 24334, Transcript Vol. 3, 443 (City waited five months to respond to the request 
for an extension)]; [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 364 (City waited over eighteen months 
to respond to requests for approval of assignment of Development Agreement)]; 
[Exhibits 114, 117 (City Council adopted a resolution that improvement of Phase 1A had 
been accepted as complete three years after advising the improvements were complete)]; 
[R. 24335, Transcript Vol. 4, 880-81 (a review process that typically takes three to four 
weeks was prolonged by the City for more than eight months)]. 
13 
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c. The City applying ever-changing standards to TA's public improvements 
required by the Development Agreement and Bond Agreement, stating it should 
construct improvements one way and then refusing to accept the improvements 
until they were constructed another way;13 
d. The City not raising complaints regarding the public improvements at the 
time of construction, instead reserving its complaints for litigation;14 
e. The City engaging in disparate treatment, harassment and imposing standards 
not applied to other developers;15 and 
f. The City using its governmental and police powers to undertake several 
actions and pass ordinances and resolutions designed to thwart TA's ability to 
develop additional real property within Overlake.16 
[Id. at 852-53 (requested meetings not held)]; [Exhibit 156-57, 160 (requests for 
complete punch list never satisfied as City continually claimed it could add to the list)]. 
13
 [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 346-47]; [R. 24334, Transcript Vol. 3, 700-05 (contrary 
to City's later position, at the time of construction the City's Chief Building Official and 
Director of Community Development understood that the City did not require full road 
width construction on collector streets in order for improvements to be accepted, nor was 
acceptance conditioned on council approval)]; [R. 24335, Transcript Vol. 4, 755-57 (the 
City changed its standards; the City inspector first instructed that no improvements were 
required at the time on the west side of 400 West, but subsequently changed the 
requirement, demanding that improvements be completed before additional plats would 
be approved)]; [R. 24338, Transcript Vol. 7, 1810-11 (City created new development 
requirements after this suit was filed which were not in the Development Agreement and 
were not required when Phases 1A-1J were approved)]. 
14
 [R. 24340, Transcript Vol. 9, 2383]; [R. 24341, Transcript Vol. 10, 2648 (City did not 
reduce its claims regarding incomplete street improvements to writing until around time 
litigation commenced)]; [R. 24341, Transcript Vol. 10, 2620-24 (despite City's claims in 
litigation, former City inspector assigned to Overlake was unable to identify anything that 
TA failed to do which harmed the City, concluding: "they done [sic] a good job")]. 
15
 [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 329-33, 336-45]; [R. 24338, Transcript Vol. 7, 1808 
(inconsistent enforcement of standards)]; [R. 24335, Transcript Vol. 4, 863-67 (City 
required a Master Plan of all 7,000 lots left in Overlake before processing a plat for 183 
additional homes, which requirement would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, had 
not been requested in the past, and was not required of other developers)]; [R. 24337, 
Transcript Vol. 6, 1437-39 (disparate treatment)]. 
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It was not until after trial that the City claimed the Development Agreement was to 
receive the "death penalty" due to certain incomplete public improvements - several of 
which the City had previously represented were complete as of November 1998 [Exhibit 
132, "Overtake Subdivision Completion Deficiencies" dated October 12, 2005]; [R. 
24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 309-16]. The City asserted this claim even though it never 
called TA's bonds to complete the public improvements. [R. 24339, Transcript Vol. 8, 
I960]. The City took no action to enforce the Bond Agreement (which was a built-in 
mechanism to complete or cure any alleged problems with the public improvements), nor 
did the City otherwise act in a manner consistent with its later claim that TA breached the 
Bond Agreement. The City sought to justify (or be excused from) its numerous breaches 
of the agreements by asserting an argument contrived - after the fact - that TA had failed 
to complete public improvements. 
16
 [R. 24335, Transcript Vol. 4, 873-74 (after adopting a resolution that the City would 
allow development of property owned by third parties if the application was submitted 
by, and property developed by, TA, the City adopted a contradictory resolution that it 
would not be receptive to requests of TA to develop properties owned by third parties)]; 
[Exhibits 332, 517 (the City passed a resolution denying the requested assignment of 
portions of the Development Agreement without providing TA or Perry companies notice 
of the City Council meeting at which the resolution was adopted, and without requesting 
information necessary to consider the assignment)]; [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 395]; 
[R. 24334, Transcript Vol. 3, 420-21]; [R. 24335, Transcript Vol. 4, 830-31]. 
17
 Despite the City's claims at trial that it was "concerned" with the security of the trust 
deed bonds approved by the City Attorney the City never investigated its "concerns" to 
determine if the City was under-secured, never requested a subordination agreement, 
never requested a substitute bond, and otherwise failed to take any action demonstrating 
that the City's "concerns" were real. [R. 24339, Transcript Vol. 8, 1960-71]. 
15 
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The Jury Verdict 
In rendering the Verdict, the Jury was asked to follow and apply 69 Jury 
Instructions. [R. 22172-22271; Addendum B hereto]. The jurors also answered 33 
questions on a form labeled "Special Verdict Form" (the "Verdict"), 29 of which were 
mixed questions of law and fact in which the Jury was asked to apply the law to its 
findings of fact (only four questions were purely factual determinations). [R. 22161-
22168] [Addendum C hereto]. 
In the portion of the Verdict dealing with TA's claims and the City's defenses the 
Jury found that the City materially breached the Development Agreement and the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, each in eight specific ways. [R. 22162-22164, 
Verdict Question 1]. The Jury also found that TA materially breached the Development 
Agreement in two ways,18 but that the City had waived its claims and defenses for such 
material breaches. [R. 22164-22165, Verdict Questions 2(b), 2(e) and 3]. 
In the portion of the Verdict dealing with the City's claims, the Jury found that TA 
failed to fully complete public improvements, but did not find that such failure was a 
material breach of the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreement. [Id Questions 
2(a), 6 and 7]. The Jury found that the City should be compensated for the improvements 
The Jury found that TA materially breached the Development Agreement "by failing to 
comply with the requirements for the approval of subdivision plats and site plans and all 
other applicable ordinances, resolutions, policies, and procedures of Tooele City, pursuant 
to Sections III.G and XVII of the Development Agreement. . ." and for "failing to pay 
amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overtake Golf Course...." Crucially, the Jury 
specifically found that TA did not commit a material breach for any alleged failure to 
complete public improvements. [See R. 22164, Verdict Question 2(a)]. 
16 
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that TA failed to folly complete, i.e., the difference between substantial performance and 
complete performance. [Id. Questions 9-10]. 
Accordingly, the Jury found the City's material breaches caused $22.5 million in 
damages to TA, and that the cost to folly complete the public improvements that TA had 
substantially completed is $1.75 million.19 [R. 22161-22168, Questions 4-5, 9-10]. Prior 
to excusing the Jury the District Court did not suggest that the Verdict was inconsistent or 
send the Jury back for further deliberation. Likewise, neither party objected to the 
Verdict or suggested it was inconsistent. [R. 24343, Transcript Vol. 13, 2964-66]. 
After substantial briefing and three hearings the District Court issued a 45-page 
Memorandum Decision and Order ("Memorandum Decision"), concluding that "the 
findings of the jury are irreconcilably inconsistent," striking the Verdict, and declaring a 
mistrial. [R. 24264-24310] [Addendum A hereto]. 
In addition to analyzing the alleged inconsistencies in the Verdict, the District 
Court ruled that despite TA's alternative argument that the Verdict should be construed 
as a general verdict with interrogatories pursuant to Rule 49(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Verdict should be interpreted as a special verdict under Rule 49(a). [R. 
24276-24277]. Further, in a section of its analysis titled u[t]he Intent of the Drafters is 
19
 The $1.75 million does not reflect the City's evidence of the alleged cost to finish the 
remaining improvements which was only $550,000 (approximately 2.7% of the amount 
put into Overlake). [R. 24342, Transcript Vol. 11, 2910]. The Jury was presented 
conflicting evidence as to the value of the Trust Deed Bond due to first and second 
position deeds which were implied to have been paid down or paid off but the obligation 
that would have been ahead of the City in priority was about $1,200,000. [R. 24339, 
Transcript Vol. 8, 1965-73]. The Jury's $1.75 million award to the City was the 
appropriate amount to satisfy both the City's unsubstantiated bond concerns and to take 
the public improvements from substantial completion to foil completion. 
17 
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Immaterial to a Resolution of the Inconsistency/' the District Court noted that its efforts 
to harmonize the Verdict required an examination only of what was before the Jury as 
part of their deliberations. [R. 24290]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is the obligation of a court to protect the right to a jury trial by harmonizing a 
jury verdict if at all possible. If there is any way to view a case that makes the jury's 
answers to the verdict consistent with one another, the court must resolve the answers 
that way, even if the interpretation is strained. Here, the Verdict can be harmonized, 
without even straining, as follows: 
(1) The Jury found that both parties breached the agreements (the City materially 
breached the Development Agreement and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
and TA committed both non-material and material breaches of the Development 
Agreement and a non-material breach of the Bond Agreement) [R. 22162-22166, 
Questions 1, 2, 6 and 7]; 
(2) The Jury found that the City waived its claims and defenses that TA materially 
breached the agreements [R. 22165, Question 3]; 
(3) As a result of the City's eight material breaches of the Development 
Agreement and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, the City caused $22.5 
million in damages to TA [R. 22162-22166, Questions 1, 3-5]; and 
(4) Even though the City waived its claims and defenses of TA's material breaches 
of the agreements, the Jury intended that the City receive the difference between TA's 
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substantial performance and complete performance of the public improvements ($1.75 
million) [R. 22166-22167, Questions 6-10].20 
Alternatively, the Court erred in ruling that the Verdict should be interpreted under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), rather than Rule 49(b), because the Jury not only 
performed the function of fact-finder, but also made ultimate conclusions of liability and 
applied 69 Instructions to resolve mixed question of fact and law. In ruling that the 
Verdict is to be interpreted under Rule 49(a), the District Court erred when it focused on 
the title of the Verdict form and the litigants' intent to label the Verdict as a "special 
verdict," without considering the Jury's actual function in this case. The Jury was 
instructed by the District Court to find facts and apply the law, which it did in rendering 
ultimate conclusions of liability on issues such as breach of contract and waiver. 
Accordingly, the Verdict is more akin to a general verdict with interrogatories under Rule 
49(b), rather than a special verdict limited to findings of fact under Rule 49(a). As a 
"general verdict," TA clearly prevailed and should have been entitled to judgment. 
Finally, the District Court erred in making the City's "death penalty" argument 
regarding the application of Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement central to its 
conclusion that the Verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent. The City's "death penalty" 
20
 While $1.75 million is not a small sum of money, it is not "substantial" in light of the 
totality of the Overlake project. The sum must be considered in context, as it accounts 
for less than 8% of the damages that the City inflicted upon TA, approximately 17% of 
the $10 million that TA already spent substantially completing the public improvements, 
less than 9% of the $20 million already put into Overlake [R. 24333, Transcript Vol. 2, 
325-26], and an almost infinitesimal fraction of the total Overlake project. 
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claim or defense was not submitted to the Jury, and should not be included in the 
harmonization analysis. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that the Verdict is consistent, reverse the 
District Court's order, and remand with instruction to enter the harmonized Verdict as a 
judgment in favor of TA. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE VERDICT IS CONSISTENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. If a Verdict Can be Read Harmoniously, Even if Such Reading is Strained, 
it Must be Harmonized and Judgment Entered Upon it. 
The right of a jury trial in civil cases is guaranteed by Article I, § 10 of the Utah 
Constitution. Int 7 Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 
P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981). To protect this substantial right, a court must, whenever 
possible, read a jury verdict as being harmonious and enter the verdict rendered. Bennion 
v. LeGrand Johnson Const Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985) ("Where the 
possibility of inconsistency in jury interrogatories or special verdicts exists, the courts 
will not presume inconsistency; rather, they will seek to reconcile the answers if possible 
. . . . If the jury's answers can be read harmoniously, they must be read harmoniously"') 
(emphasis added). "It is not enough that the verdicts appear to be inconsistent. Rather, 
the verdicts must be both inconsistent and irreconcilable for [a] court to remand for a new 
trial or otherwise overturn the jury's verdicts." Holbrook v. Master Prot Corp., 883 
21
 "Presumptions and intendments cannot be indulged in to establish a contradiction or 
inconsistency in the findings or answers of a jury to special interrogatories, the 
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P.2d 295, 299 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In sum, there is a tremendous presumption in favor 
of preserving jury verdicts and entering judgments reflecting the jury's overall intent. 
B. Tooele Associates5 Interpretation Harmonizes the Verdict and Should be 
Adopted. 
i. The Verdict is Consistent 
The first step in the harmonization analysis is to consider the plain language of the 
Verdict. TA's interpretation of the Verdict (see page 18 above, in the "Summary of the 
Argument") is consistent with the Verdict's plain language. 
A key issue is whether the answer to Question 3 of the Verdict (where the Jury 
found that TA proved "Tooele City waived its claims and defenses, as stated in Question 
2, that [TA] materially breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond 
Agreements" "") can be read harmoniously with the answer to Question 8 (where the Jury 
fiirther found that TA did not prove "that Tooele City waived its rights to claim that [TA] 
did not complete public improvements in Overtake required by the Development 
Agreement and the Bond Agreements"). (Emphasis added). This issue is easily resolved 
by reading Question 8 as it is written - that the City did not waive "its rights to claim that 
[TA] did not complete public improvements in Overlake required by the Development 
Agreement and Bond Agreement" - rather than by taking it a step further and inserting 
presumption being always to the contrary." Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. 
Nelson, 358 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1960). 
22
 The phrase "and/or Bond Agreements" was added to Question 3 so that in the event 
Question 3 was answered "Yes," the City's claims and defenses under the Bond 
Agreement were both waived. [See R. 24341, Transcript Vol. 10, 2745-47]; [R. 24342, 
Transcript Vol. 11, 2824-26]. 
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language that the City has not waived claims of breach of the Development Agreement 
and Bond Agreement. (Emphasis added). 
Presumably, the Jury read the plain language of Question 8, which is silent as far 
as "breach," as only asking whether the City waived its right to recover the cost to 
complete the public improvements, i.e., the difference between substantial performance 
and complete performance. By answering "no" to Question 8 and awarding the City the 
cost of completing the improvements under the Bond the Jury found that even if the City 
waived its claims and defenses of material breaches of contract TA should still fully 
perform its contractual obligation (to bring the public improvements from substantial 
completion to full completion). Question 3 is the only question expressly addressing 
whether the City waived its claims and defenses of material breach of either the 
Development Agreement or the Bond Agreement. The Jury's answer does not conflict 
with any other answers on questions regarding waiver. The Court is not required to 
delete the "or" from "and/or Bond Agreement" in order to harmonize the response to 
Question 8 with any other response in the Verdict. 
This interpretation is supported by the Jury Instructions, particularly the following: 
23
 The District Court's interpretation was that the Jury found the City also waived its 
claims of non-material breach of the Development Agreement related to incomplete 
public improvements. [R. 24301 ("The jury further found that Tooele City had proven 
non-material breaches of the Development Agreement, by failing to complete public 
improvements, SVF Section II, Question 7(d), but these non-material breaches are 
waived by the operation of the jury's finding to SVF Section I, Question 3.")]. 
Regardless of whether non-material breaches were waived by Question 3, the Jury 
intended the City to be awarded completion damages under the theory of substantial 
performance. Further, the Jury specifically found that TA's alleged failure to complete 
the public improvements was not a material breach. [Verdict Question 2(a)]. 
22 
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Jury Instruction 30: Material Breach. You must decide whether there was a 
material breach of the Development Agreement... A breach is not material 
if the party's failure was minor and could be fixed without difficulty. [R. 
22204 (emphasis added)]; 
Jury Instruction 31: Partial Breach. If one of the parties to a contract did some 
but not all of the things it promised to do under that contract, then the other 
party may recover damages related only to what the party failed to do 
under the contract. [R. 22205 (emphasis added)]; 
Jury Instruction 35: Substantial Performance. [TA] claims that even though it 
did not do everything exactly as the Development Agreement required, it 
substantially performed the Development Agreement, and therefore, is 
entitled to a ten-year extension of the Development Agreement's term and 
to recover from Tooele City . . . [TA] can only recover under the 
Development Agreement if it substantially performed all of its obligations 
under the terms of the Agreement. 
[TA's] failure to do everything exactly as promised under the 
Development Agreement does not prevent it from recovering damages 
unless (1) it willftilly departed from the terms of the Development Agreement; 
(2) it acted in bad faith; or (3) its variance from the strict and literal 
performance of the Development Agreement involved more than technical or 
unimportant omissions or defects. [R. 22209 (emphasis added)]; 
Jury Instruction 63: Performance Excused by Material Breach. Tooele City 
contends that it was excused from performing its remaining obligations under 
the Development Agreement because of [TA's] conduct in failing to complete 
public improvements. In order to establish this as a justification for not 
performing Tooele City's remaining obligations under the contract, Tooele 
City must prove that [TA] breached an important part of what [TA] had 
promised to do. . . . That is, Tooele City would be excused from performing 
if [TA's] conduct in failing to complete public improvements related to an 
essential part of the Development Agreement. On the other hand, if [TA] 
breached only a minor or unimportant part of the Development 
Agreement, Tooele City would not be excused from performing. 
He * # 
. . . If you find that [TA's] conduct was unimportant in relation to what 
[TA] had promised to perform, you must find Tooele City was required to 
continue to perform, although Tooele City may still be entitled to 
compensation for the breach. [R. 22265 (emphasis added)]. 
23 
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Interpreting the responses to the Verdict questions with the Jury Instructions it is 
clear the Jury found that TA's failure to fully complete the public improvements was a 
"technical or unimportant omission or defect/' was "minor and could be fixed without 
difficulty," and was not a willful act or done in bad faith. Rather, it was the result, at 
least in part, of the City's "active interference." Otherwise, the Jury would not have 
found TA's breach to be non-material which would have excused the City's performance. 
[See R. 22162-22164, Questions 1 and 2(a) (in which the Jury did not excuse the City's 
performance and expressly found that TA's failure to complete public improvement was 
not a material breach)]. 
The Jury was further instructed that TA's failure to do everything exactly as 
promised did not prevent it from recovering damages from the City, which is consistent 
with the Jury's damage award against the City of $22.5 million even though the Jury 
found that the public improvements were not fully completed. [R. 22165-22166]. The 
Jury's finding that the City should still receive $1.75 million for incomplete 
improvements is explained by the "partial breach" and "performance excused by material 
breach" instructions that the Jury may award the City "damages related only to what [TA] 
failed to do under the contract," even if TA's deviation from the public improvement 
requirements of the agreements was minor and not enough to excuse the City's continued 
performance. [R. 22167]; [R. 22205, 22265, Instructions 31, 63]. 
The substantial performance instruction (Instruction 35) is the key to making sense 
of the Verdict. The Jury could not have found that TA should recover $22.5 million in 
damages, that TA was entitled to a ten-year renewal of the Development Agreement, that 
94 
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TA was entitled to assign a portion of the Development Agreement to another party and 
that the City materially breached the Development Agreement by refusing to approve 
applications for new subdivisions unless it concluded that TA had substantially 
performed its obligations and was entitled to continued performance from the City. [R. 
22162-22164, Question 1]. The Jury's award of $1.75 million to the City to complete 
public improvements (a curable, non-material breach of the Development Agreement and 
Bond Agreement) is consistent with the Jury's finding of substantial performance. 
Prior to trial the District Court determined that the issue of whether or not TA 
substantially performed the agreements was to be resolved by the Jury. [R. 20834 J^ 3]. 
While the drafters' intent is not controlling to a Verdict harmonization analysis, the 
parties and the District Court presented the issue of substantial compliance/performance 
to the Jury by way of Question 1(c): If the Jury found that TA was in substantial 
compliance, then the Jury would determine the City's denial of the extension was a 
material breach, but if the Jury found that the extension denial was not a material breach, 
it would find that TA had not substantially complied. [See R. 24341, Transcript Vol. 10, 
2768-71].24 Thus, because the Jury found the City's denial of the extension was wrongful 
and a material breach, it necessarily follows that the Jury found TA substantially 
complied/performed. [R. 22162, Question 1(c)]. 
24
 Deleting a separate question on substantial compliance/performance, arguing: "it's 
really part of the extension argument... If we are in substantial compliance as of 12-17-
07, then essentially by definition the denial of the extension was wrongful." Both the 
District Court and counsel for the City agreed that the question of substantial compliance 
would be most properly addressed by asking whether the failure to extend the 
Development Agreement was a material breach. [R. 24341, Transcript Vol. 10, 2768-71]. 
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In sum, the Verdict is consistent. By answering "yes" to Question 3 the Jury 
found that the City waived all claims and defenses that TA materially breached the 
agreements, meaning the Jury found the City's performance was not excused and that TA 
is entitled to recover damages. This is also consistent with the Jury's finding that the 
City engaged in bad faith and "actively interfered" in TA's efforts to complete the public 
improvements. [R. 24302-24303]. By answering "no" to Question 8, the Jury found that 
the City preserved the right to claim and receive compensation for the cost of fully 
completing the public improvements - i.e., the difference between substantial and 
complete performance - which was expressly permitted by the Instructions. When 
interpreted with the Instructions, this view not only renders the Verdict consistent on its 
face, but also confirms that each answer on the Verdict was deliberate, reasoned, and 
reflective of the Jury's intent that both parties be made whole by awarding TA $22.5 
million in damages, while also ensuring the public improvements would be completed. 
ii. Any Interpretation of the Verdict Which Preserves the City's 
Breach of Bond Agreement Claims Cannot be Reconciled with the 
Jury's Factual Findings and Overall Intent. 
The District Court correctly concluded that the theory that the City preserved its 
claims and defenses of material breach of the Bond Agreement cannot be reconciled with 
the Jury's specific factual findings that the City "actively interfered" with TA's 
completion of the public improvements: 
The City's argument that a consistent reading of the SVF Section I, 
Question 3 and SVF Section II, Question 8 leaves Tooele City's claims 
for breach under the Bond Agreement still viable, vitiates any jury finding 
on these specific issues related to the public improvements. The jury was 
instructed in Jury Instruction 33 that Tooele City cannot by a willful act 
?6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or omission make it difficult or impossible for TA to perform under the 
terms of the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreement. . . .' 
Tooele City cannot actively interfere with [TA's] ability to complete the 
public improvement as these findings in Section I clearly seem to 
indicate, and then receive the benefit of such a breach, or a defense, under 
the Bond Agreement that failure to complete public improvements is a 
breach by [TA]. Such a result is inequitable and contrary to the 
obligations of parties under covenants of good faith and fair dealing. 
[R. 24303]. The findings of "active interference" by the District Court refer to the Jury's 
findings that the City materially breached the Development Agreement and the Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the following ways related to public improvements: 
• By "requiring [TA] to complete public improvements to standards that are not 
found within the Development Agreement, the approved construction drawing, 
the Bond Agreement or the City's Ordinances and or that are not required of 
other similarly situated developers" [R. 22163, Question 1(h)]; 
• By "slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the public improvements" 
[Id., Question 1(e)]; 
• By "misinterpreting and misapplying its own public improvement ordinances 
in relation to the Overtake Project Area's subdivisions" [Id., Question 1(f)]; 
and 
• By "refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions that public 
improvements within the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions were complete" 
[Id., Question 1(g)]; 
The District Court further concluded that the Jury was not presented with 
information allowing it to make a reasonable distinction between the waiver of breach of 
contract claims or defenses based upon the public improvement requirements of the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreement, as argued by the City: 
. . . the obligations are similar in nature, to reach the conclusion that the 
jury made a distinction between the two when it comes to the obligation 
of performance or breach is a difficult and tenuous distinction. While it 
may very well be a distinction with a difference, public improvements. 
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and their completion are common to both the Development Agreement 
and the Bond Agreement. Such a commonality makes it difficult for the 
Court to have any confidence that the jury was able to distinguish 
between the two in the contested fashion that would render the jury's 
findings consistent. 
[R. 24306]. 
The District Court's point is well-founded as neither the Verdict nor the 
Jury Instructions distinguish the public improvement requirements of the two 
agreements or provide any logical basis for finding that the City preserved a claim 
of breach based on incomplete public improvements under one agreement but not 
the other. The Instruction on the City's claims of breach, as proposed by the City, 
did not differentiate between the various agreements, instructing: 
Tooele City claims that [TA] breached the Development Agreement and 
its amendments, the Annexation Agreement, and the Bond Agreements 
and their amendments by not performing its obligation as follows: 1. By 
failing to complete the public improvements in each phase of the 
Overlake development, except for Phase 1 A, in accordance with the terms 
of the Annexation Agreement, the Development Agreement and its 
amendments, and the Bond Agreements and their amendments.... 
[R. 22201, Instruction 27]. 
There was no evidence at trial that the public improvements required of the Bond 
Agreement are different in any way from the public improvements required by the 
Development Agreement. Both agreements required construction of public 
improvements illustrated on the same documents. [R. 24305-06]. However, the City 
applied amorphous policies and procedures which were not included in the documents 
governing the timing and manner for completing the improvements. [R. 22163, Question 
1(a)]. Even if there were any differences between the public improvements required 
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under the two agreements, the Jury found that the City was holding TA to standards that 
were "not found within the Development Agreement, the approved construction 
drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City Ordinances." (Emphasis added); [R. 22163, 
Question 1(h)]. In other words, the Jury determined the City was "hiding the ball" and 
making it unreasonably difficult for TA to satisfy the ever-changing demands of the City 
to have the improvements deemed "complete." Id. 
Hence, there is no basis for a distinction between the requirements of the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreement. Further, since the Jury found that 
neither agreement provided TA with the standards necessary to "complete" the public 
improvements, the Jury could not have found that the City preserved its claims of breach 
under either agreement, let alone one but not the other (as the City argues). 
The City further argued that if its claim for breach of the Bond Agreement is 
preserved by Question 8, then, based on the finding of non-material breach of the Bond 
Agreement in Question 6, the City was authorized to kill the Overlake project. The City 
bases its argument on a pre-trial ruling (which was not made known to the Jury) 
regarding Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement. Not only did the City fail to bring this 
argument of the alleged "death penalty" of the Bond Agreement to the Jury's attention 
25
 The City did not reveal to the Jury that it claimed Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement 
gave the City the right to permanently withhold all future development and prevent TA 
from recovering any damages which the Jury might determine the City inflicted upon TA. 
The City cannot after trial suggest that the finding of waiver does not apply to the one 
particular defense it chose not to disclose to the Jury. By all appearances, since the 
argument was raised for the first time after trial, the City did not even conceive of the so-
called "death penalty" argument under Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement until after 
trial, in a desperate attempt to avoid enforcement of the Jury's award of damages to TA. 
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(by way of evidence, Jury Instruction or Verdict question), but it represented to the Jury 
that the incomplete improvements "[are] not [the] central theme of our case." [R. 24332, 
Transcript, Vol. 1, 105 (representing that the theme of the City's claims is that TA was 
playing "catch me if you can," not that TA should be precluded from obtaining any relief 
due to minor breaches)]. After trial, the City argued that the Jury's findings authorized it 
to deny future development, thereby preventing TA from any and all future development 
and precluding an award of any damages to TA. 
The City's argument that the Jury's findings preclude TA from commencing the 
development of new subdivisions in Overlake is contrary to the Jury's express finding 
that the City's refusal of applications to develop new subdivisions or phases was 
wrongful and done in bad faith. [R. 22163, Question l(i)].26 The City's argument also 
contravenes the Jury's determination that the term of the Development Agreement should 
be extended for TA's benefit. [R. 22163, Question 1(c)]. Since the City did not present 
the Paragraph 18 "death penalty" claim/defense to the Jury, the Jury had no basis to 
determine whether the same action could be a material breach of the Development 
Agreement but not a breach of the Bond Agreement. 
In sum, any interpretation of the Verdict that concludes the City preserved its 
claim that TA breached the Bond Agreement or that the Bond Agreement can be invoked 
as a "death penalty" to TA's claims is contrary to the Jury's express findings that: 
"Has [TA] proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele City materially 
breached the Development Agreement including its implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing . . .[b]y refusing to approve, and threatening refusal of, applications for 
the creation of new subdivisions within the Overlake Project Area? [Answer:] Yes" 
(emphasis added). 
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• The City wrongfully and "actively interfered" with TA's completion of the 
public improvements [R. 24302-24303; Questions 1(e), 1(f), 1(g) and 1(h)]; 
• The City acted wrongfully and materially breached the Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing when it refused applications for new subdivisions within Overlake [R. 
22163; Question l(i)]; 
• The term of the Development Agreement should be extended as requested by TA 
[R. 22163, Question 1(c)]; 
• The City waived identical claims of material breach of the Development 
Agreement which were indistinguishable from the City's claims under the Bond 
Agreement; therefore, there is no justification for a finding of waiver of breach of one 
agreement but not the other [R. 22164-22166]; 
• The City was not excused from its contractual obligations and is liable for $22.5 
million in damages it caused to TA [R. 22162-22166; Questions 5(a) and 5(b)]; 
• TA substantially performed its obligations to the City, illustrated in part by the 
Jury's finding that the City materially breached the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing and the Development Agreement when it denied the request for a ten-year 
extension of the Development Agreement [R. 22162; Question 1(c)]; and 
• TA's failure to fully complete public improvements was not a material breach 
[R. 22164; Question 2(a)]. 
iii. The "as stated in Question 2" Descriptor in Question 3 Does Not 
Limit the Jury's Finding of Waiver to the Development Agreement. 
97 
The descriptor "as stated in Question 2" should not frustrate the harmonization 
analysis because it does not limit the Jury's finding of waiver of claims and defenses of 
material breach to the Development Agreement. There are at least two straightforward 
theories of interpretation which allow Question 3 to apply to both the Development 
Agreement and Bond Agreement, thereby reconciling the Verdict. 
Question 3 asked the Jury whether "Tooele City waived its claims and defenses, as 
stated in Question 2, that [TA] materially breached the Development Agreement and/or 
Bond Agreements." (Emphasis added) [R. 22165]. 
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One simple interpretation is that the descriptor "as stated in Question 2" is a 
reference to the actual actions described in the subparts of Question 2 (for example, 
failing to complete public improvements, and failing to comply with requirements for the 
approval of subdivision plats and site plans). [R. 22164-22165, Question 2]. The District 
Court determined that the language of the "main" questions of both Question 1 and 
Question 2 should "parrot" each other. [R. 24341, Transcript Vol. 10, 2742].28 
Accordingly, each Verdict question references only the Development Agreement in the 
body of the question but then goes far beyond the Development Agreement in addressing 
the various alleged wrongful actions of the parties, including claims regarding City 
ordinances, improvements required by the Bond Agreement, and other actions which are 
not technically breaches of the Development Agreement. Because Question 3 expressly 
applied the doctrine of waiver to the "Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreement," 
by answering "Yes," the Jury found that the City waived all claims and defenses of 
breach based on the actions described in the subparts of Question 2, regardless of 
whether the City alleged the acts to be in violation of either the Development Agreement, 
Bond Agreement or both agreements. 
9R 
Each question asks, "[h]as [one party] proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 
[other party] materially breached the Developments Agreement?" [R. 22162-22164] 
(Question 1 also added "including its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?"). 
29
 While the District Court and parties were drafting the Verdict, the City's counsel 
referred to Question 3 broadly as applying to waiver of the right to claim breach, without 
limiting the waiver to the Development Agreement, and expressly stipulated to inclusion 
of language for the finding of waiver of the Bond Agreement claims [R. 24341, 
Transcript Vol. 10, 2743 ("That was my attempt at giving them their waiver provision. 
Even if there's a breach, we waive.")]; [Id. at 2746-2747 (TA's counsel asked "[s]o could 
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Another harmonizing interpretation is that the parties' agreement regarding the 
Overtake project is memorialized and governed by a collection of contracts, plats, plans, 
ordinances, resolutions, policies, and procedures, many of which have overlapping 
requirements and which incorporate or refer to the requirements of another (and some of 
which were never reduced to writing). Accordingly, neither the Development Agreement 
nor Bond Agreement can be interpreted in isolation. (Note, for example, that while the 
Development Agreement contains an "integration" clause it also specifically preserves 
the Annexation Agreement and the Funding Agreement.) 
The evidence at trial supports this interpretation. Representatives and witnesses 
for the City testified that the Development Agreement incorporates the Bond Agreement. 
[R. 24339, Transcript Vol. 8, 1934 (Q. [Mr. Hogle] Do bond agreements and compliance 
therewith^// within any provision of the Development Agreement? A. [Mr. Baker, City 
Attorney] I think so, yes." Mr. Baker further identifies language in the Development 
Agreement that "all other requirements of the City shall remain in full force and effect" 
as incorporating the Bond Agreement.)]. The Development Agreement is really a master 
agreement wherein the parties agreed to comply with the obligations set forth in their 
we add the words 'other agreements' Your Honor? I think it is important. . ." The City's 
counsel responded "[i]f you want to add 'or Bond Agreement' that's fine with me . . . we 
are saying that they breached the Bond Agreement by not completing performance, so I 
think their point about the Bond Agreement is well taken, and we will stipulate to add the 
word 'Bond Agreement' in that.")]. The City wanted to ensure that in order to answer 
"yes," the Jury would have had to find that all of the City's claims and defenses could be 
waived so that the Jury could "legitimately still answer no" "if one of [the City's] claims 
of breach survived the waiver argument." The District Court determined that the 
language adopted accomplished the City's purpose. [R. 24342, Transcript Vol. 11, 2826 
(Counsel for the City arguing, "if one of our claims of breach survived the waiver 
argument, then the jury could legitimately still answer no to this ...")]. 
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other agreements, Ordinances, Resolutions and the development documents, including 
the Bond Agreement. 
Specifically, the requirement for construction of public improvements is common 
to both agreements but the Jury found that the standards are not clearly set forth in either 
agreement. [R. 22163, Question 1(h) (the Jury found that the City held TA to "public 
improvement standards that are not found within the Development Agreement, the 
approved construction drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City's Ordinances.")]. 
As such, while the Jury was asked to make findings and conclusions regarding the 
material breaches of the Development Agreement in Questions No. 1 and No. 2 (and later 
to make conclusions about non-material breaches of the Bond Agreement and 
Development Agreement based on incomplete public improvements in Questions No. 6 
and 7) the Jury's inquiry could not have been confined to the four corners of the 
referenced document(s) and necessarily required the Jury to interpret several overlapping 
documents, regulations and ordinances which, taken together, comprise the parties' 
agreement regarding public improvements. 
For example, pursuant to Question 2, the Jury determined that "[TA] materially 
breached the Development Agreement," but the basis for the finding of breach went 
beyond the four corners of the agreement, requiring the Jury also to consider City's 
Ordinances, resolution, policies and procedures. [See R. 22164, Question 2(b) (asking 
30
 The Development Agreement itself was adopted by Ordinance 97-58. [Exhibit 1030]. 
31
 Both of TA's "material" breaches were waived by the City. [See Verdict, Question 3]. 
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whether the Development Agreement was breached by failing to comply with the 
requirements for subdivision plats and site plans and all other applicable ordinances, 
resolutions, policies and procedures of the City)]. 
Likewise, while the Jury found that 'Tooele City materially breached the 
Development Agreement, including its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing," 
the Jury's findings of material breach by the City were not limited to the four corners of 
the Development Agreement, as demonstrated by the Verdict questions themselves, 
including, without limitation, the following: 
Question No 1(e): "By slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the 
public improvements constructed by [TA] in the Overlake Project Area's 
subdivision?" 
[R. 22163]. The Development Agreement did not include express requirements 
regarding final inspections of improvements. Instead, the requirement was 
incorporated by reference to City ordinances, resolutions, policies and procedures. 
Question 1(f): "By misinterpreting and misapplying its own public 
improvement ordinances in relation to the Overlake Project Area's 
subdivisions!." 
[R. 22163]. Clearly, the Jury went beyond the four corners of the Development 
Agreement when it found that the City's material breaches included the City's 
misinterpretation and misapplication of its own ordinances. 
The Bond Agreement is the product of Tooele City Ordinance 7-19-12, and is in its 
own right an official resolution, policy and procedure regarding Overlake. It was adopted 
by the City when it was executed by the Mayor, County Recorder, City Building and City 
Attorney. [See R. 22222-23, Instruction 44, City Ordinance 7-19-12]. Thus, the Jury's 
finding of City breaches of the Development Agreement by misapplying ordinances 
encompasses misapplication of the Bond Agreement. 
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Question 1(g): "By refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions 
that public improvements within the Over lake Project Area ys subdivisions 
were complete?" 
[R. 22163]. The City's refusal to accept its own admissions regarding completion 
of public improvements was a breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing under both the Development Agreement and Bond Agreement. 
Question 1(h): "By requiring [TAJ to complete public improvements to 
standards that are not found within the Development Agreement, the 
approved construction drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City's 
Ordinances and/or that are not required of other similarly situated 
developers?" 
[R. 22163]. Again, this question shows the Jury was required to go beyond the 
Development Agreement and that it made findings pertaining to other documents 
and ordinances - specifically including the Bond Agreement. 
Upon review of the collection of agreements executed by and between the parties, 
as well as City Ordinances, regulations and procedures, it becomes clear that while the 
parties sometime referred to breach of the Development Agreement or the Bond 
Agreement, the agreements were not presented to the Jury in a manner which allowed for 
independent interpretation, particularly as to the public improvement requirements. 
Questions 1 and 2 refer to "material breaches of the Development Agreement," yet the 
subparts of these questions make it clear that the Jury was asked to make factual 
determinations involving more than just the Development Agreement, expressly requiring 
the Jury to also analyze the Bond Agreement, City ordinances, rules and regulations. 
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Accordingly, since Question 2 is not actually limited to the Development 
Agreement, the descriptor "as stated in Question 2" does not limit the waiver found in 
Question 3 to the Development Agreement alone. 
Regardless of which theory of interpretation is adopted, it is unnecessary for the 
Court to "strain" to determine whether the Jury could have intended Question 3 to deal 
with waiver of breach of contract claims of the Development Agreement but not the Bond 
Agreement (under either the "as stated in Question 2" argument or the argument as to 
interpretation of "and/or"), because waiver of claims of breach of both agreements is a 
viable option and, frankly, the only interpretation that makes sense. See Medley v. State, 
162 P.2d 881 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1945) (the verdict "need not follow the strict rules of 
pleading, or be otherwise technical, since whatever conveys the idea to the common 
understanding will suffice and all fair intendments will be made to support it"). As 
"presumptions and intendments cannot be indulged in to establish a contradiction or 
inconsistency in the findings," Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist., 358 P.2d at 83, 
this Court should not unnecessarily interpret the "and/or" in Question 3 as an "or" when 
the "and" is the only interpretation by the Jury which harmonizes the Verdict, and is the 
interpretation that all parties, counsel and the District Court intended. 
C. Because Toole Associates' Interpretation Harmonizes the Verdict, 
Judgment Must be Entered Upon the Verdict. 
The Jury's harmonized findings are simplified as follows: 
(1) The Jury found that both parties breached the agreements: the City materially 
breached the Development Agreement and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
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in numerous ways; and TA committed both material and non-material breaches of the 
Development Agreement and a non-material breach of the Bond Agreement.33 [R. 22162-
22166, Questions 1, 2, 6 and 7]; 
(2) The Jury found that the City waived its claims and defenses that TA materially 
breached the agreements. [R. 22165, Question 3]; 
(3) As a result of the City's several material breaches of the Development 
Agreement and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing the City caused $22.5 
million in damages to TA. [R. 22162-22165, Questions 1, 3-5]; and 
(4) Even though the City waived claims and defenses of material breach of the 
Development Agreement and Bond Agreement,35 the City did not waive its right to the 
cost of completion of the curable, non-material breach of the substantially-completed 
public improvements ($1.75 million). 
JJ
 The District Court agreed with this interpretation. [R. 24287-24291, 24300-24301]. 
34
 The District Court agreed with this interpretation as to the Development Agreement 
but not the Bond Agreement. [R. 24300]. It is undisputed that the Jury found the City 
waived all material breaches by TA of the Development Agreement. [Verdict Questions 
2 and 3; R. 22165, 22167-22168, 24292 (The District Court stating "[c]ounsel for [the 
City] concedes, and indeed actively argues ... that the jury found that [the City] waived 
its claims and defenses under the Development Agreement")]. 
The City argues that in answering "yes" to Question 6, the Jury clearly found that 
TA's breach of the Bond Agreement was "material" or "substantial" despite the absence 
of express materiality language. [R. 22742, 22975]. If Tooele City is correct and the 
breach of the Bond Agreement is "material," the City's claim has been waived, as the 
Jury found that all of the City's claims and defenses of material breach of the 
Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreement have been waived. The City cannot 
have it both ways. 
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Because this interpretation sensibly harmonizes the Verdict and is supported by 
the Instructions,36 the Verdict is consistent as a matter of law. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the District Court's erroneous order and remand with instructions to enter 
a Judgment upon the Verdict based on TA's harmonization. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND FACTS AND 
APPLIED LAW TO MAKE ULTIMATE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS, THE 
VERDICT MAY BE INTERPRETED UNDER RULE 49(b) AND 
JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR TOOELE ASSOCIATES. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 49 contemplates two types of jury verdicts: (1) 
"special verdicts" under Rule 49(a) "in the form of a special written finding upon each 
issue of fact"; and (2) "general verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories" under 
Rule 49(b) in the form of "written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the 
decision of which is necessary to a verdict" accompanied by "explanation or instruction 
as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to 
render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to make written answers 
and to render a general verdict." UTAH R. Civ. P. 49 (emphasis added). 
A "general verdict" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary 9th ed. (2009) as "[a] 
verdict by which the jury finds in favor of one party or the other, as opposed to resolving 
specific fact questions." Further, 
"A theory of consistency must be supported by the verdict form and the jury 
instructions." Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (Haw. 1995); Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 797, 6 P.3d 583, 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) affd, 32 P.3d 250 (2001) ("In 
harmonizing a verdict, the court does not read the special verdict in isolation, but as part of 
the whole verdict, including the jury instructions.") 
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[a] jury may return multiple general verdicts as to each claim, and each 
party, in a lawsuit, without undermining the general nature of its 
verdicts . . . the key is not the number of questions on the verdict form, 
but whether the jury announces the ultimate legal result of each claim. If 
the jury announces only its ultimate conclusions, it returns an ordinary 
general verdict; if it makes factual findings in addition to the ultimate 
legal conclusions, it returns a general verdict with interrogatories. If it 
returns only factual findings, leaving the court to determine the ultimate 
legal result, it returns a special verdict. 
Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
In contrast to a general verdict with special interrogatories, in the case of a special 
verdict, "the jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and renders 
the verdict." Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, \ 17, 47 P.3d 76; Floyd v. Laws, 
929 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991) (theoretical distinction between general and special 
verdicts is that general verdicts require jury to apply law to the facts, and therefore 
require legal instruction, whereas special verdicts "compel the jury to focus exclusively 
on its fact-finding role"). "The special verdict was devised to relieve the jury of 
attempting to apply the law in a complicated case to the facts in arriving at a verdict. . . ." 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Assoc, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970) (Ellett, J., 
concurring). 
While there appears to be no published Utah opinions on this issue, other courts 
have ruled that in determining whether a verdict has been rendered under Rule 49(a) or 
Rule 49(b), the title of the verdict form is not controlling. Rather, the court must evaluate 
the function that was performed by the jury, whether the jury exclusively found facts, or 
whether it also received legal instruction and applied the law to those facts, rendering 
ultimate conclusions of liability: 
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it is clear that, in determining whether a verdict has been rendered under 
Rule 49(b), as opposed to Rule 49(a), a court need not limit its inquiry to 
the specific form of the interrogatories framed within the four corners of 
the verdict sheet. . . we must look, rather, to the totality of the district 
court's instructions, determining whether the court instructed the jury, 
either verbally or in writing, to make a general finding for the plaintiff or 
the defendant, in addition to findings of actual or ultimate facts. 
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1058 (3rd Cir. 1991).37 
If this Court determines that the Verdict cannot be harmonized under Rule 49(a), 
this Court may properly determine that the Verdict should be treated as one rendered 
under Rule 49(b). While the Verdict in this case is labeled "Special Verdict Form," the 
Jury did much more than simply find facts. The Jury was asked to resolve mixed 
questions of fact and law, apply the law in reaching its conclusions, and make overall 
determinations of liability, including by making ultimate conclusions as to whether 
material breaches of contract had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. [See, 
37
 See also Babcock v. General Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Although the 
Verdict Form is entitled 'Special Verdict Form,' it seems clear that it was not a true 
'special verdict5 . . . . Here, for example, a special verdict form would have included 
questions such as whether [plaintiff] was wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident" 
rather than "[h]as plaintiff proved her negligence claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence"); see also Lavoie v. Pac. Press & Shear Co., a Div. ofCanron Corp., 975 F.2d 
48, 54 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("The charge to the present jury required that it consider the 
necessary legal principles given to it by the trial court and make determinations of 
ultimate liability. In such case, the answers to the questions submitted to the jury are not 
special verdicts, despite the use of those words in the title appended to the form, and Rule 
49(a) therefore does not apply."); Stanton by Brooks v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, 
Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 574-75 (3rd Cir.1983) (though labeled special verdict, the jury 
rendered general verdicts with written interrogatories when it made findings of ultimate 
liability); State v. Dilboy, 999 A.2d 1092, 1109 (N.H. 2010), as modified on denial of 
reconsideration (June 3, 2010) ("Although the parties use the term 'special verdict' to 
describe the form used by the trial court, "[a] true special verdict is one where the jury 
does not render a general verdict [in favor of one party or another], but simply finds 
certain facts and leaves the rest to the court."). 
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e.g. R. 22162, Question 1]. In the 69 Jury Instructions provided to the Jury, the Jury was 
instructed on its role as follows: 
It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and 
instruct the jury on the law that it must apply. . . 
* # * 
[K]eep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, 
because that is your role. Don't be influenced by what you think our 
personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based upon the law 
explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court. 
[R. 22176, Instruction 3 (emphasis added)]. 
Your verdict should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law 
as explained in these instructions and should not be distorted by any 
outside factors or objectives. 
[R. 22198, Instruction 24 (emphasis added)]. The Jury was further instructed as to 42 
issues of law it was to apply to the evidence in rendering its Verdict. [R. 22201-22270]. 
In returning the Verdict, the Jury was required to respond to 33 questions, only 
four of which were purely factual. The structure of the questions (i.e., the first 20 
questions within Questions No. 1 and 2) illustrates that the Verdict was set up as a 
general verdict with special interrogatories. For example, the Verdict questions first 
request an ultimate conclusion of liability on the parties' claims of breach (e.g., "Has 
[TA] proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele City materially breached the 
Development Agreement, including its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?" 
"Yes"). Following the general questions of ultimate liability, there are between six and 
twelve questions requiring the Jury to make specific findings of fact and then apply the 
law to the facts to determine if a material breach of contract was committed (e.g., "By 
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failing and refusing to extend the term of the Development Agreement pursuant to 
Section XXIII of the Development Agreement? Yes"). [R. 22162, Question 1, 1(c)]. 
A true special verdict under Rule 49(a) would have asked the Jury to only make 
factual findings (such as, "did the City create arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for the 
public improvements?"), rather than ask the Jury to determine whether such action 
occurred, and if so, to apply the law to determine whether such action was a breach of 
contract, whether such breach was material, and whether the breach was waived or 
performance excused. [Verdict Question 1(d); R. 22201-22204, Instructions 27-30]. 
By interpreting the Verdict under Rule 49(b), as opposed to Rule 49(a), if the 
Court finds an "irreconcilable inconsistency" between specific answers (factual findings) 
and a general verdict (an ultimate conclusion of liability), judgment may still be entered 
in accordance with the factual findings. UTAH R. CIV. P. 49(b). For example, this Court 
may instruct the District Court to enter judgment in accordance with the Jury's finding 
that the City "actively interfered" with TA's completion of public improvements, 
causing damages to TA, notwithstanding inconsistent general verdicts which arguably 
preserve the City's claims of breach based on incomplete improvements (Questions 6 and 
7). [R. 22163-22166, Questions l(e)(f)(g)(h), 6, 7]. 
In sum, the District Court erred when it determined that the Verdict must be 
interpreted under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) based primarily on the form's title, 
38
 "Tooele City cannot actively interfere with [TA's] ability to complete the public 
improvement as these findings in Section I [of the Verdict] clearly seem to indicate, and 
then receive the benefit of such a breach, or a defense, under the Bond Agreement that 
failure to complete public improvements is a breach by [TA]." [R. 24303]. 
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without considering the tasks or function that the Jury actually performed in rendering the 
Verdict. [R. 24276-24277 (relying on title of form and Jury Instruction 56, in which the 
Jury was instructed that it was not being asked to render a general verdict, but rather 
special questions)]. If this Court concludes that the Verdict cannot be harmonized under 
Rule 49(a), it should instruct the District Court to apply Rule 49(b) and enter judgment in 
favor of TA in accordance with the Jury's factual findings. 
III. THE CITY'S CLAIM THAT IT CAN INVOKE PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE 
BOND AGREEMENT AS THE "DEATH PENALTY" TO ESCAPE 
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES WAS NOT PART OF THE "CASE AS 
SUBMITTED" TO THE JURY. 
During the process of harmonizing a jury verdict a district court should consider 
the verdict from the jury's perspective - requiring the court to consider the jury verdict 
form and the "case as submitted" to the jury, including jury instructions and the evidence 
and arguments presented at trial. See Perdoni Bros., Inc. v. Concrete Sys., Inc., 35 F.3d 
1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Challenges to jury verdicts must be evaluated against the backdrop 
of the case 'as submitted' to the jury.") (emphasis added); Griffin v. Matherne, All F.2d 
911,915 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The test employed in determining whether a conflict in the 
verdict can be reconciled is "whether the answers may fairly be said to represent a logical 
and probable decision on the relevant issues as submitted...") (emphasis added). This 
issue is one of first impression under Utah law. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court wisely noted that the intent of the 
District Court and litigants in drafting the Verdict questions "is immaterial to the jury" 
and the Court is obligated to consider only the "jury responses in an effort to reconcile 
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any perceived inconsistencies." [R. 24287 (emphasis added)]. The District Court 
repeated this principal when it determined, 
[I]t is this Court's effort to make the findings of the [Verdict] consistent 
with each other, and to do so requires the Court to examine what was 
before the jury as part of their deliberations, not the litigants. The Pretrial 
Order was not an exhibit at trial and was not therefore before the jury in the 
deliberations. 
[R. 24290 (concluding the Pretrial Order is not important to the harmonization analysis) 
(emphasis added)]. 
Ironically, the District Court then fatally strayed from this principle when it 
considered the City's argument that the City may, post-trial, invoke Section 18 of the 
Bond Agreement as the "death penalty," eviscerating all but three or four of the responses 
in the 33-question Verdict and precluding entry of any damage award in favor of TA: 
The practical effect of the harmonization of [Verdict] Section I, Question 3 
and [Verdict] Section II, Question 8 Tooele City argues, is that paragraph 18 
of the Bond Agreement, as argued by Tooele City, would preclude the 
recovery of damages by [TA] by this breach. Thus, the application of the 
most persuasive of the arguments by the parties to the Court to harmonize 
the jury's findings in the [Verdict], still renders a fundamental and practical 
inconsistency to the result. This inconsistency appears to the Court to be 
irreconcilable. 
[R. 24304 (emphasis added)]. The District Court's determination that the Verdict was 
irreconcilably inconsistent went beyond the case as submitted to the Jury and was based 
largely upon considering the "practical effect" of the City's argument that Paragraph 18 
of the Bond Agreement. The argument (whether as a claim or a defense) - that 
39
 By its own terms, Paragraph 18 may be invoked only "in the event of a Failure to 
Perform" which is defined as non-performance of an obligation required by the terms of 
the Bond Agreement or City Ordinance. [Exhibit 220 at 3]. While the City failed to 
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Paragraph 18 obliterates the Jury's findings related to the City's 16 material breaches 
which caused $22.5 million in damage to TA - was never presented to the Jury. 
In reconciling the Verdict, the starting point should be the contents of the Verdict 
form itself. Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement is not expressly referenced anywhere 
in the Verdict. At most, Paragraph 18 is incorporated into the Verdict only by 
implication in the references to the Bond Agreement as a whole (Questions 3, 6, 8-10) -
which provides no support whatsoever for any interpretation that would gut the Jury's 
clear intent of making both parties whole through its damage awards. In short, nothing in 
the evidence presented at trial, the Jury Instructions or the Verdict itself suggests that the 
Jury considered the City's argument that Paragraph 18 allows the City to escape liability 
for its wrongdoing (the "death penalty" argument). . 
The next step is considering whether the City's "death penalty" argument was 
presented to the Jury in an Instruction. Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement was not 
expressly referenced in any Instruction. As set forth above, the Jury was instructed on 
the City's Bond Agreement claims as follows: 
Tooele City claims that [TA] breached the Development Agreement and 
its amendments, the Annexation Agreement, and the Bond Agreements 
and their amendments by not performing its obligations as follows: 
request that the Jury make a factual finding as to whether TA committed a "Failure to 
Perform" as defined by the Bond Agreement, the Jury expressly found that the public 
improvement standards were not contained in the Bond Agreement or any City 
Ordinance. Thus, any failure by TA to satisfy standards not contained in the Bond 
Agreement could not be a "Failure to Perform" under the Bond Agreement. The Jury, 
again, also found that any failure by TA to complete the public improvements was not a 
material breach. 
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1. By failing to complete the public improvements in each phase of the 
Overlake development, except for Phase 1 A, in accordance with the 
terms of the Annexation Agreement, the Development Agreement and 
its amendments, and the Bond Agreements and their amendments . . . 
* * * 
Tooele City claims that it has been damaged as a result and wants [TA] 
to pay it money to compensate it for the damages it claims to have 
suffered. 
[TA] denies Tooele City's claims and its defense claims that (1) Tooele 
City waived, or should be estopped from asserting, its claims; (2) [TA] 
substantially performed the Development Agreement and Bond 
Agreements and committed no material breach of those Agreements . . . 
[R. 22201, Instruction 27 (emphasis added)]. The "Bond Agreement" is also referenced 
in Instructions 33, 46 and 64, although no Instructions pertain to the relief the City is 
requesting under the Bond Agreement or the City's alleged rights thereunder. Instead, 
the City asked the Court to instruct the Jury that it only wanted the Jury to "compensate it 
for the damages it claims to have suffered." [R. 22257-22259, Instruction 57]. 
The closest the City came to informing the Jury of its "death penalty" theory is 
Jury Instruction 63, Performance Excused by Material Breach: 
Tooele City contends that it was excused from performing its 
remaining obligations under the Development Agreement because 
of [TA's] conduct in failing to complete public improvements. In 
order to establish this as a justification for not performing Tooele City's 
remaining obligations under the contract, Tooele City must prove that 
[TA] breached an important part of what [TA] had promised to do. . . . 
* * # 
. . . If you find that [TA's] conduct was unimportant in relation to what 
[TA] had promised to perform, you must find Tooele City was 
required to continue to perform, although Tooele City may still be 
entitled to compensation for the breach. 
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[R. 22265 (emphasis added)]. Pursuant to this instruction, the so-called "death penalty" 
could apply only if TA's conduct in failing to complete public improvements was 
"important" - if it was "unimportant" then there could be no "death penalty" for 
Overlake. The Jury found that the City's failure to complete the improvements was 
unimportant (i.e., not "material"). Therefore, the City's argument of "death penalty" 
cannot apply, and TA should recover the $22.5 million awarded in damages. [R. 22162-
22166]. The City's post-trial argument that any minor or technical failure related to 
completing public improvements invokes the "death penalty" is clearly contrary to the 
Instructions presented to the Jury. 
The only other context in which Paragraph 18 should be considered for the 
purpose of harmonization of the Verdict is whether the City's Paragraph 18 "death 
penalty" argument was clearly presented to the Jury based on evidence admitted or 
arguments made at trial, and if so, whether the evidence sheds light on the Jury's 
findings. [R. 22184, Instruction 11 ("It will be your duty to determine your verdict 
relying solely on the evidence presented during the trial") (emphasis added)]. The Bond 
Agreement was entered as Exhibit 220, and Paragraph 18 was referenced as follows: 
Q. And [Paragraph 18] says [in the event of Failure's to Perform] "no further 
permits or business licenses shall be issued," right? And you understand 
"shall" be to be mandatory? 
A. I do. 
Q. Now - and those sort of business permits and licensing in conjunction with 
this project would be things like building permits, occupancy permits, those 
sort of things? 
A. Those are examples, yes. 
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Q. Were, in fact - well, we know that building permits and occupancy permits 
were, in fact, issued after Phase IB, right? 
A. Yes. 
[R. 24339, Transcript Vol. 8, 1943-54]. 
Q. [Tooele City's counsel]. . . Normally is there a mechanism that a city can 
exercise to complete public improvements if a developer does not? 
A. . . . The bond agreement provides that if you don't complete the public 
improvements in a certain period of time . . . the City then can go in, call on the 
bond, take the money, go hire its own contractor to come in and do your work 
for you. 
[R. 24338, Transcript Vol. 7, 1642-43]. 
A. . . . under our city ordinances and under the bond agreement and under the 
drawings for the bond agreement that were submitted to the City and accepted 
by the City, the developer was required to complete all major public 
improvements prior to obtaining approval of subsequent phases, and as I've 
already testified, that hadn't been done. And that was - that is one way that the 
City could obtain leverage over a developer, is to say, look, we are not going to 
approve subsequent phases unless you do what you were supposed to do in 
prior phases. So that was one reason. 
[Id. at 1677]. While witnesses for the City testified that Paragraph 18 provided the City 
with a mechanism to withhold permits and approvals if improvements in prior phases 
were not completed, there was further evidence that during the time of the construction 
and permit/approval process, there was no "real time" dispute regarding whether the 
improvements were complete. When the events actually took place, the City provided 
letters to TA confirming that the public improvements were in compliance; the City 
continued to grant TA permits and approvals for subsequent phases; and the City 
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accepted and maintained the public improvements as if they were completed. The City 
went so far as to obtain road funds from the State of Utah by claiming that it owned the 
public streets, something that could happen only if the City had "accepted" ownership of 
the completed improvements.41 
Also, the Jury was presented with evidence that even while this litigation was 
pending the City granted permits and approvals for other developers when their public 
improvements in prior phases/subdivisions were clearly not fully completed, and the 
City's policy was that public improvements did not need to be fully completed before 
additional permits would be issued.42 Further, the evidence demonstrated that the City 
failed to take any efforts to enforce the Bond Agreement or act in a manner which 
demonstrated that the City considered TA to be in breach of the Bond Agreement.43 
The City Engineer, City Inspector, Forsgren Engineers and the City Attorney all sent 
correspondence to TA stating that the City considered the public improvements complete 
and, consistent therewith, the City reduced the bond amount required for subdivisions 
1A, IB and 1C to 20%. [Exhibits 108, 114, 123, 124, 125, 127, 138, 140]. The City 
continued to grant permits after phase IB, despite the public improvements not being 
fully completed (per agreement). [R. 24339, Transcript Vol. 8, 1943-54]. A City 
Ordinance provides that public improvements will not be maintained by the City unless 
they are completed, and the City maintains the public improvements in dispute [R. 24335, 
Transcript Vol. 4, 804-05] [Exhibit 625]. 
41
 [R. 24335, Vol. 4 at 792-98; Exhibits 162 and 952 (signed submittal form to UDOT)]. 
42
 [Exhibit 625]; [R. 24335, Transcript Vol. 4, 800-01 (prior to a policy change in 2005 
or 2006 the City did not require full completion of public improvements in a subdivision 
phase before the issuance of permits)]; [R. 24338, Transcript Vol. 9, 2258-66, 2275 
(discussion of other developments - The Cove, Sunset Estates, Cedar Woods - were 
permitted to proceed despite incomplete improvements)]. 
43
 The City never called the bonds. Despite its alleged "concerns" the City did not 
investigate to determine whether the trust deed bond provided adequate security, never 
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Paragraph 18 and the Bond Agreement also came up in TA's closing argument, 
but only in the context that the City never invoked Paragraph 18 to deny permits or 
application "in real time," as follows: 
So let's look at the public improvements and what was going on before 
they filed this counterclaim. Now, before they filed the counterclaim 
they were passing the inspections weren't they? Do you remember the 
certifications that the City engineer, Mr. Webster, had given to 1 A, IB, 
1C? Do you remember that the bonds had been reduced to 20 percent, 
and the bonds can only be reduced after the improvements have been 
accepted? There was never any complaint before [the Tiling of the 
counterclaim] about some problem with the bonds as security. The 
City, the City's own attorney, said those things have been completed. 
There were building and occupancy permits that obviously were issued, 
and if you remember, the ordinances said you can only issues building 
and occupancy permits . . . in the event that the public improvements 
have been completed. 
There were additional subdivisions that were improved. If you 
remember, the Bond Agreement said you can't go any further unless 
you've completed the improvements in the prior subdivision. 
Remember I think it's paragraph 16 or 19 of the Bond Agreement itself? 
400 West didn't appear on any written punch list before that date. 
There were no other written complaints about 400 West before that 
particular date . . . 
[R.24342, Transcript Vol. 11, 2842-43]. 
Now take a look at the public improvements after March of '04. The 
inspectors now are telling you that they didn't mean what they say and 
that you couldn't rely on them. Webster, the city engineer, is saying 
you can't rely on what I said. They're telling you that the bond 
reductions were meaningless and they }re telling you for the first time 
that the bonds are worthless. 
requested a substitute bond and never requested a subordination agreement. [R. 24339, 
Transcript Vol. 8, 1960-71]. 
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And by the way, they never asked, did they, for a replacement bond? 
They never asked to solve that particular problem. They never tried to 
fix any of the bond problems. They could have done that easily. 
[Id. at 2845 (emphasis added)]. 
. . . I don't want you to think for a second in terms of the public 
improvements that they say haven't been completed. One of the issues 
in this case is is that material. Is that material in light of over $10 
million of improvements that have been completed? And the question 
that you have to ask yourself is: if we had written them a check for 
$500,000, would that have brought this to an end or would this have 
continued? Would this have continued because of concepts like - - that 
you've seen in the resolutions like, you know, the golf course isn't open 
to the public because, well, I saw it locked one time, and would it end 
because of all of the other little nitpicky things that they put in those 
resolutions? I mean, would that have done it? 
That's going to be one of the questions you're going to have to answer, 
is that material, and I think the answer to that question is no, that's not 
material, because I don't think the City was actually interested in ever 
solving the problem. I think what they were interested in doing was 
continuing the dispute on and on and on and jump - - and jump through 
a hurdle and jump through another hurdle. 
[Id. at 2856-57 (emphasis added)]. 
In addition to the evidence at trial that the City never invoked Paragraph 18 in real 
time, the Jury was also instructed that the key issue was whether TA's breaches were 
material. The Jury was never informed that the City claimed Paragraph 18 of the Bond 
Agreement allowed it to kill the entire Overlake project in response to technical and 
curable breaches caused, at least in part, by the City's "active interference." Thus, the 
City's argument is irrelevant for the purpose of harmonizing the Jury's Verdict. Further, 
even if the City's Paragraph 18 was raised or implied, the Jury obviously rejected it by 
finding that the City acted wrongfully in denying applications for new subdivisions, that 
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the term of the Development Agreement should be extended, and that the City should 
receive $1.75 million to complete the public improvements (rather than finding that the 
non-completion of public improvements was a material breach). 
The Jury was not aware of the City's argument that if the Jury found that TA 
committed a curable, non-material breach of the Bond Agreement, then TA could not 
recover any portion of the $22.5 million in damages caused by the City, rendering 
meaningless the weeks that the Jury invested in hearing evidence and deliberating about 
the City's material breaches. [R. 22201, Jury Instruction 27]. 
Irrespective of the consequences of the City's failure to inform the Jury of its 
claim that Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement can be invoked as the "death penalty," 
any pre-trial rulings or post-trial arguments relating thereto are irrelevant for the purposes 
of harmonizing the Verdict rendered. After all, the Jury could only have drawn its factual 
findings and legal conclusions exclusively from the case "as submitted," and not from 
pre-trial rulings or issues about which the Jury was unaware. Attempting to harmonize 
the Verdict with these potential end results or "practical effects" and issues not submitted 
to the Jury confounded the District Court's analysis, and lead the District Court astray in 
concluding the Verdict was irreconcilably inconsistent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Verdict is consistent. A simple and clear theory of interpretation exists which 
harmonizes the Verdict responses and is consistent with the Jury Instructions. TA should 
be awarded $22.5 million in damages and the City should be entitled to $1.75 million to 
ensure the improvements are completed. Alternatively, the District Court erred in ruling 
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that the Verdict is to be interpreted under Rule 49(a) without considering the true 
function of the Jury of rendering findings of fact and applying the law to reach ultimate 
conclusions of liability, which is more akin to a verdict under Rule 49(b). Further, the 
District Court erred in ruling that the Verdict could not be harmonized because it could 
not be reconciled with claims and pre-trial rulings that were not submitted to the Jury. 
Accordingly, Tooele Associates respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
District Court's declaration of a mistrial, interpret the Verdict harmoniously, and remand 
to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment based on the harmonized Verdict. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto in the Addendum are: (A) the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order; (B) the Jury Instructions; (C) the Verdict; (D) Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 49; (E) Utah Constitution Article I, §10; and (F) the Overtake Map. 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2011. 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, P.C. 
Baird 
Attorneys for Tooele Associates 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
Paxton R. Guymon 
Lauren Y. Parry 
Attorneys for Tooele Associates 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE ASSOCIATES, L.P., et al. , : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON MOTIONS FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
CASE NO. 060919737 
vs. : 
TOOELE CITY, a municipal : 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
TOOELE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, et al., : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Third Party Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
FORSGREN ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., : 
Third Party Defendants. : 
The Court has before it Tooele Associates, L.P.'s ("Tooele 
Associates") Rule 58A Motion for Entry of Judgment, filed October 29, 
2009, and Tooele Associates' Motion for Ruling on Estoppel Claim, filed 
September 9, 2009, and Tooele City's Rule 54 and Rule 58A Motion for 
Entry of Judgment, filed August 7, 2009, and Tooele City's Cross Motion 
for Ruling on Estoppel Claims. Oral arguments were held January 22, 
2010, at which time the Court asked the parties for further briefing on 
certain specified issues. Tooele Associates filed a Memorandum in 
Support of Harmonizing All Answers in the Special Verdict Form on 
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TOOELE ASSOCIATES 
V. TOOELE CITY PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
February 1, 2010, and Tooele City filed a Supplemental Memorandum 
Regarding Special Verdict Form the same day. Arguments on the 
supplemental Memoranda were heard February 4, 2010. Additional oral 
argument was thereafter requested by the Court and heard on April 19, 
2010 to address specific issues raised by the pending Motions. The Court 
thereafter received an Objection to a supplemental exhibit used in the 
argument, and the Court took the Motions under advisement on April 26, 
2010. The matters are now ready for the Court's decision. The Court 
will issue a separate opinion on the two competing Motions for Ruling 
on Estoppel Claims. 
FACTUAL INTRODUCTION 
This lawsuit arose over the development of a massive planned 
community in Tooele City known as Overlake. In October of 1996 Tooele 
Associates and Tooele City executed an initial Bond Agreement ("Bond 
Agreement" Trial Exhibit 22 0) which related to the development of Phase 
1A and Phase IB of the Overlake Project. 
Throughout the Decision the Court will refer to the Bond Agreement 
as Trial Exhibit 220. There are several bond agreements, however, as 
bonds were posted or amended as various phases of the Overlake 
Development were proposed. Those agreements or amendments include: Trial 
Exhibit 267, Amendment to Bond Agreement, dated November 30, 1998; Trial 
Exhibit 268, Amendment to Bond Agreement for Phases 1C and ID, dated 
December 1, 1998; Trial Exhibit 282, Amendment to Bond Agreement for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TOOELE ASSOCIATES 
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Phase 1G, dated April 30, 1999; Trial Exhibit 293, Amendment to Bond 
Agreement for Phase IE, dated November 15, 1999; and Trial Exhibit 449, 
Bond Agreement for Phase 1J, dated August 2, 2001.1 The Bond Agreement 
sets forth obligations of Tooele Associates to complete specified public 
improvements for the Overlake development pursuant to Construction 
Drawings on file with the Tooele City Engineering Department. (Trial 
Exhibit 220.) In Amendments to the Bond Agreements, Tooele City approved 
construction of additional phases in Overlake. (Trial Exhibits 267, 268, 
282, 293 and 449. ) 
In December of 1997 Tooele Associates and Tooele City entered into 
a Development Agreement ("Development Agreement," Trial Exhibit 100), 
which identified various obligations of the parties associated with the 
Overlake development. (Jury Instruction 17.) The Development Agreement 
was amended five times over the course of this project. (Trial Exhibits 
101, 102, 103, 104 and 106.) (Jury Instruction No. 17.) The Development 
Agreement and its amendments will be collectively referred to as the 
"Development Agreement." Development of Overlake came to a halt in 2001 
and thereafter this lawsuit was filed. The respective claims of these 
parties result from the contractual obligations between the parties in 
the Development Agreement and Bond Agreement. 
lrThe Bond Agreement and its amendments will collectively be referred to as "Bond 
Agreement." 
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At trial Tooele Associates claimed that Tooele City had breached the 
Development Agreement and its accompanying covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing by failing to perform various of its obligations thereunder. 
(Jury Instruction No. 57.) Tooele Associates further claimed that any 
claims of Tooele City were waived or that Tooele City should be estopped 
from asserting them, and that as a further defense to Tooele City's 
claims, Tooele Associates had substantially performed its obligations and 
committed no material breaches of the Agreements. (Jury Instruction No. 
27.)2 
Tooele City claimed that Tooele Associates had breached both the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreement by not performing its 
obligations thereunder, primarily that it had not completed public 
improvements in numerous Phases of Overlake and had failed to pay for 
water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf Course. (Jury Instruction No. 
27.) Additionally, Tooele City denied Tooele Associates' claims and 
asserted that Tooele Associates' non-performance of its obligations under 
the Development Agreement precluded any claims against Tooele City. 
Following a three week jury trial, on June 19, 2009 the parties 
submitted their claims and defenses to the jury by way of a Special 
Verdict Form. The parties had narrowed the questions sought to be 
2The issues of estoppel were reserved for the Court and not submitted to the jury. These 
claims are the subject of a separate Memorandum Decision and Order which will be issued in the 
next few days. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TOOELE ASSOCIATES 
V. TOOELE CITY PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
determined by the jury from those set forth in the Pretrial Order or the 
Jury Instructions. In Section I of the Special Verdict Form ("SFV"), 
Tooele Associates set forth its claims against Tooele City. In Section 
I, Question (1) (references to the SVF questions will be made as I for 
Section I claims and II for Section II claims) the jury was asked whether 
Tooele Associates had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Tooele City "materially breached the Development Agreement, including its 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." The jury found that 
of Tooele Associates' twelve claims of material breach of the Development 
Agreement by;; Tooele City, Tooele Associates had proven eight of them. 
The breach claims that Tooele Associates failed to convince the jury 
included the claims that Tooele City had breached the Development 
Agreement by: 
1(1) (a) By refusing to recognize and accept as complete public 
improvements in the Overlake Project Area subdivisions 
Overlake Estates Phases IB, 1C, ID, IE, IF or 1G; and 
1(1)(d) By creating arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for 
the public improvements constructed by Tooele Associates in 
the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions; and 
1(1) (j)^  By finding and asserting that Tooele Associates had 
materially breached the Development Agreement; and 
1(1)(k) By asserting meritless trivial and frivolous claims 
against Tooele Associates 
SVF Section 1, Question 2 asked whether Tooele City had proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Tooele Associates had materially 
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breached the Development Agreement under six different claims. The jury 
found that Tooele City had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Tooele Associates had materially breached the Development 
Agreement in four of the six claims identified. Among these was the 
claim in SVF Section 1(2) (a) that Tooele Associates had failed to 
complete specific public improvements identified under the Development 
Agreement as they related to Transportation Facilities and Circulation 
System (Development Agreement VII.2, Trial Exhibit 100), and Flood 
Control Facilities (Development Agreement, VIII.2, Trial Exhibit 100.) 
Thereafter, under Tooele Associates' Section I claims, the jury 
found that: >, 
Section I 
Question 3: Tooele City waived its claims and defenses, as 
stated in Question 2, that Tooele Associates 
materially breached the Development Agreement 
and/or Bond Agreements. 
Thereafter, in Questions 4 & 5, the jury determined what it considered 
to be reasonable losses suffered by Tooele Associates for Tooele City's 
breach of the Development Agreement of $5,000,000 for past losses and 
$17,500,000 for future losses. 
The jury was then asked to consider the SVF Section II claims of 
Tooele City.v In response to SVF Section II, Questions 6 and 7 the jury 
found that Tooele City had proved that Tooele Associates had breached the 
Bond Agreement by failing to complete public improvements (Question 6) , 
and that Tooele Associates had breached specific sections of the 
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Development Agreement, including Sections III.6, VII.2, VIII.2 and XVII 
of the Development Agreement by failing to complete public improvements 
in Overlake (Question 7) . Thereafter, in response to SVF Section II, 
Question 8 the jury found that Tooele Associates had failed to prove that 
Tooele City waived its right to claim that Tooele Associates did not 
complete Overlake public improvements required by the Development 
Agreement and Bond Agreements. Next, in SVF Section II, Questions 9 and 
10, the jury found that Tooele City will incur costs to complete the 
Overlake public improvements required by the Development Agreement and 
Bond Agreements in the amount of $1,750,000. Finally, in SVF Section II, 
Question 11 the jury found that Tooele Associates breached Section 8 of 
Amendment 4 to the Development Agreement (Trial Exhibit 104) by failing 
to pay for irrigation water for the Overlake Golf Course, and that Tooele 
City suffered $70,000 in damages from Tooele Associates' breach as a 
result thereof. (SVF Section II, Questions 12 and 13.) 
As will be the subject of further discussion herein, on first 
reading of the Special Verdict Form, the jury verdict gives rise to the 
concern that the jury's conclusions are inconsistent in several areas. 
First, in SVF Section I, Question 2(a) the jury found that Tooele City 
had failed to prove that Tooele Associates breached the Development 
Agreement in Sections VII. 2 and VIII. 2 and then in SVF Section II, 
Question 7, the jury concluded that Tooele City successfully proved that 
Tooele Associates breached the Development Agreement in Sections VII.2 
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and VIII.2, among others. Further, and more fundamentally, in SVF 
Section I, Question 3 the jury found that Tooele Associates had proven 
that Tooele City "waived its claims and its defenses, as stated in 
Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially breached the Development 
Agreement and/or Bond Agreements," while the jury concluded in response 
to SVF Section II, Question 8 that Tooele Associates has failed to prove 
that Tooele City ''waived its rights to claim that Tooele Associates did 
not complete the public improvements in Overlake required by the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements." These two findings 
appear directly inconsistent. Accordingly, before the Court can enter 
Judgment on behalf of either of the parties, the inconsistencies as set 
forth in the jury's Special Verdict Form need to be addressed. 
PROCEDURAL STATUS OF MOTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT 
Tooele Associates and Tooele City have moved this Court to enter 
competing Judgments following the jury verdict pursuant to Rule 54(c) 
(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 
Tooele City'te Motion for Entry of Judcrment; 
Tooele City struck first by filing its Motion for Entry of Judgment 
on August 7, 2 009, asking the Court to enter Judgment in its favor 
3
 Rule 54(c)(1): "Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or 
against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves." 
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consistent with the SVF and the Court's pretrial rulings. In summary, 
Tooele City contends that Judgment should enter in its favor for 
$1,820,000 and no Judgment should enter in favor of Tooele Associates. 
It bases this argument on the jury's finding that Tooele Associates 
breached the Bond Agreement and Development Agreement by failing to 
complete public improvement projects (SVF Section II, Questions 6 & 7). 
Therefore, Tooele City argues that paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement 
allows Tooele City to withhold any further development permits to Tooele 
Associates, thus eliminating any and all damages available to Tooele 
Associates as it would have no expectation for continued development if 
it breached the Bond Agreement, which the jury found it did. Paragraph 
18 of the Bond Agreement (Trial Exhibit 22 0) provides: 
In the event of a Failure to Perform by APPLICANT, no further 
permits or business licenses shall be issued, and any existing 
permits or business licenses that may have been previously 
issued in the Project may be immediately suspended or revoked 
by the City Manager until the Improvements are completed 
and/or the Fees are paid, or until a new bond acceptable to 
CITY has been executed to insure completion of the remaining 
improvements and/or payment of Fees. 
Adding to this argument, Tooele City argues that the Court must 
apply to the jury's verdict the Court's previous finding that "[T]he Bond 
Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further phases 
based upon incomplete public improvements." See June 11, 2009 Pretrial 
Order (quoting the Court's August 13, 2008 Memo. Dec. at 20). Tooele 
Associates' damages were based on the projection of lots and units to be 
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developed and sold in Overlake from 2003 through 2017. Because the jury 
found that Tooele Associates breached the Bond Agreement, the City 
contends that it may invoke paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement to deny 
further development, making the issue of recoverable damages to Tooele 
Associates unavailable. 
Tooele Associates7 Motion for Entry of Judgment 
On October 29, 2009, Tooele Associates filed its competing Motion 
for Entry of Judgment, seeking a Judgment to be entered in its favor for 
$22,500,000 against Tooele City on the basis of the jury's findings that 
Tooele City waived all of its claims and defenses that "Tooele Associates 
materially breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements." 
(SVF Section I, Question 3.) In the alternative, Tooele Associates asks 
the Court to enter Judgment in its favor for $20,680,000, which is the 
net amount of its damages (SVF Section I, Question 5), less Tooele City's 
damages (SVFiSection II, Questions 10 & 13). 
Tooele Associates argues several points for its position that it is 
entitled to the damage award assessed by the jury. First, it argues that 
the City elected damages rather than specific performance as its remedy 
for Tooele Associates' breach of the Bond Agreement. Tooele City does not 
disagree that it elected damages. The jury assessed damages for Tooele 
City in the amount of $1,750,000 to compensate it for unfinished public 
improvement projects. (SVF Section II, Question 10.) To recover damages 
for unfinished public improvements and to invoke terms of the Bond 
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Agreement prohibiting Tooele Associates from damages for future 
development would be, according to Tooele Associates, akin to a double 
recovery. See Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257 (1924) (An 
aggrieved party in a breach of contract suit is entitled to compensatory 
damages that approximate performance of the contract.). 
Next, Tooele Associates contends that the Court's entry of Judgment 
will extinguish the Bond Agreement, merging the Agreement into the 
Judgment. See Yergensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 1965) (when a 
final judgment for money is rendered, the original claim is 
extinguished.); see also Restatement (Second) Judgments § 24 (1982). 
Third, Tooele Associates argues that the jury found in Section I, 
Question 3 of the SVF that Tooele City waived its claims and defenses 
that Tooele Associates breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond 
Agreements. Tooele Associates argues that, even if the Bond Agreement 
was valid after the Judgment is entered, the City waived its right to 
defend against Tooele Associates' breach of the Agreements thereby 
precluding any argument to invoke paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement as 
a bar to future damages. Tooele Associates further contends that the 
City's use of paragraph 18 is a defense to prevent the plaintiff's 
recovery of damages, and the City is barred from bringing defenses 
pursuant to the SVF Section I, Question 3. 
Fourth, Tooele Associates argues that the City's breach of contracts 
occurred prior to Tooele Associates' breaches. Tooele Associates cites 
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the proposition that a party to a contract cannot make it difficult for 
the other to"perform, then invoke the non-performance as a defense. See 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979); see also Holbrook v. 
Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (a 
material breach by one party excuses further performance by the non-
breaching party.) According to Tooele Associates, if the jury believed 
that Tooele City could block further development under the Bond 
Agreements, the jury could not have found that Tooele City materially 
breached the Development Agreement by refusing to approve future phase 
development applications. (SVF Section I, Question l(i).) 
Lastly, Tooele Associates argues that the jury's damage assessment 
is not necessarily for future damages. The City's damage expert, Jason 
Burningham, included a damage calculation based on the benefit the 
Development Agreement would have conferred to Tooele Associates, in 
particular a "market value enhancement," or the increase in the 
entitlement values within the Development Agreement. 
Upon first argument and briefing on the competing Motions for Entry 
of Judgment, the inconsistent positions taken by the parties for entry 
of Judgment in their respective favors highlighted the apparent 
inconsistent nature of the Special Verdict, and thereafter the Court 
asked the parties to brief the specific issues associated with a 
perceived inconsistency in the SVF by the Court, which they have done. 
Both parties provided the Court with written and oral arguments on how 
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the inconsistencies in the SVF can be explained and both arguments are 
fundamentally different. The Court has convened at least two specific 
sessions to hear arguments to provide the Court with a basis upon which 
to enter a verdict. Both parties have argued persuasively that the SVF 
is consistent, and each of these persuasive arguments reach fundamentally 
different end results. Clearly, neither party nor the Court wants a 
determination that the SVF is inconsistent. It is under this factual and 
procedural backdrop that the Court turns to its discussion of the issues. 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
1) The Matter was Submitted to the Jury by Special Verdict 
Tooele Associates makes some argument that the Verdict should be 
construed as a General Verdict pursuant to Rule 49(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Tooele Associates premises this argument on the 
suggestion that the verdict form asks the jury to consider and render a 
verdict on both questions of law and questions of fact. However, nothing 
in the verdict form or instructions to the jury provides support for such 
an argument. 
The verdict form submitted to the jury was labeled ''Special Verdict 
Form" and was intended by the parties to be used as such. Jury 
Instruction No. 56 further instructed the jury as to the form of the 
verdict it was being asked to provide. Jury Instruction No. 56 instructs 
the jury that: 
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This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a 
general verdict as is sometimes done, but it will be your 
function in this case to make findings as to special questions 
which are submitted to you.... 
(Jury Instruction No. 56.) 
Accordingly, the Court and the litigants understood that the matter 
was being submitted to the jury as a Special Verdict, pursuant to Rule 
49(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Special verdict forms are "devised to relieve the jury of attempting 
to apply the law in a complicated case to the facts in arriving at a 
verdict." Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App. 209, at % 17, 47 P.3d 76, 
citing Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n. , 470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 
1970). 
Additionally, it is the sole province of the Court to apply the law 
to the facts as found by the jury. As such, arguments by the parties 
that the jury awarded it damages is limited to a factual determination 
that the jury "[i]nstead of awarding damages to the plaintiff, the jury 
merely determined the amount of damages which he had sustained." 
Brigham, 470 P.2d at 397. 
Accordingly, as this Court approaches a review of the Special 
Verdict, it does so pursuant to Rule 49(a) and Rule 58A of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure with the assignment to direct the appropriate 
Judgment, applying the law to the facts as found by the jurors in the 
Special Verdict. 
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A special verdict requires the Court to apply the law to the jury's 
factual findings before entering judgment. See Rule 58A(a), Utah R. Civ. 
P. ("If there is a special verdict..., the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment, which the clerk shall promptly sign and file.") 
"The special verdict was devised to relieve the jury of attempting to 
apply the law in a complicated case to the facts in arriving at a 
verdict." Dishinger, 2001 UT App at 209, H 17. 
Thus, under Utah law, Special Verdicts are findings of fact; they 
are not awards and they differ materially from general verdicts. 
Dishinger, 47 P.3d 76. A Special Verdict is not a final Judgment. The 
jury finds the facts and the Court applies those facts to the law to 
grant or withhold an award. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency v. W.C. Foy & 
Sons, 665 P. 2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1983) . Damages are a question of fact 
within the jury's province. Judd ex rel. Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 
91, % 34, 103 P. 3d 135. Breach of contract and waiver are mixed 
questions of law and fact, and as such are also within the jury's 
province. See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, % 20, 140 P.3d 1200, and Shar's Cars, L.L.C. v. Elder, 
2004 UT App 258, ^ 14, 97 P.3d 724. In Judd, the jury determined that 
the plaintiff sustained damages of over one million dollars. However, 
because there was a statutory cap on the allowable amount of damages, the 
court was tasked with conforming the jury's findings to the law and 
reduced the damage amount. Judd, 2004 UT 91. * [A] lthough a party has 
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the right to have a jury assess his damages, he has no right to have a 
jury dictate through an award the legal consequences of its assessment." 
Id. at 11 33 (quotation omitted) . vvIt is the jury's duty to determine the 
amount of damages a plaintiff in fact sustained, but it is up to the 
court to conform the jury's findings to applicable law." Icl. at K 34. 
2) Attempt to Harmonize the Special Verdict 
Whenever possible, the trial court must bring into harmony seemingly 
inconsistent jury findings. Bennion v. Le Grand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 
P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985) ("Where the possibility of inconsistency in 
jury interrogatories or special verdicts exists, the courts will not 
presume inconsistency; rather, they will seek to reconcile the answers 
if possible.") (citations omitted). However, when provisions within a 
special verdict are irreconcilably inconsistent, the court may order a 
new trial or disregard a general finding in favor of a more specific 
finding. See Wright v. Westside-Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516-517 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) ("If special findings cannot be reconciled with the general 
verdict and are sufficiently full and complete in themselves, and are not 
inconsistent in themselves, judgment must follow the special findings.") 
(citations omitted); see also Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209 at % 30 ("While 
the jury's findings support inconsistent legal claims, a court is not 
precluded, under Rule 49(a), from applying the law to those findings and 
entering judgment for a party on one theory, as a matter of law, which 
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precludes judgment on another inconsistent legal theory.) (citations 
omitted). 
Further, the Court's obligation appears to be that it must examine 
every possible avenue to resolve the questions in a manner to preserve 
the consistency of the verdict, even if that interpretation is strained. 
Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2nd Cir. 2004) ("to 
justify setting aside an otherwise valid jury verdict, the special 
verdict answers must be 'ineluctably inconsistent.'") (quoting Tolbert 
v. Queens Coll. , 242 F.3d 58, 74 (2nd Cir. 2001)); See also, Julien J. 
Studlev, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 407 F.2d 521, 526-27 (2nd Cir. 1969), 
("But with the Seventh Amendment as an August guide and limitation, we 
must struggle to avoid a finding of inconsistency and 'attempt to 
reconcile. .  .by exegesis if necessary,' the specific responses and the 
jury's overall judgment as to who should win and who should lose.") 
citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963) . 
Accordingly, this Court now undertakes the effort to harmonize the 
apparent inconsistent findings as set forth in the SVF. 
The Special Verdict Form sets forth certain findings of fact that 
appear facially to specifically contradict themselves. The conflict 
arises in two separate instances in the SVF. The first occurs under 
Section 1 of, the SVF entitled Tooele Associates' Claims. Generally, in 
Section 1, Question 1, the jury found that Tooele Associates had proven, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Tooele City had materially 
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breached the Development Agreement and its accompanying covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in a number of particulars, i.e., eight of the 
twelve assertions of claims it made of breach. Of importance, however, 
is the fact that the jury did not find that Tooele Associates had carried 
its burden as to certain issues under the Development Agreement as it 
applied to public improvements. Specifically, the jury found that Tooele 
Associates failed to carry its burden of proof of breach of the 
Development Agreement, including the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as to the following: 
SVF, Section I, Question 1(a): By refusing to recognize and 
accept as complete the public improvements in the Overlake 
Project-.. Area Subdivisions Overlake Estates Phases IB, 1C, ID, 
IE, IF, or 1G; and 
SVF, Section I, Question 1(d) : By creating arbitrary and 
incomplete punch lists for the public improvements constructed 
by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's 
subdivisions; 
Thus, SVF Section I, Question 1, generally suggests that the jury 
concluded that, except for issues generally associated with the 
completion of public improvements requirements of Tooele Associates, 
Tooele Associates carried its burden of proof to establish Tooele City's 
breach of the Development Agreement and the accompanying implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. The jury also found that Tooele 
Associates failed to meet its burden of proof under this question as to 
SVF Section I, Question l(j) (by asserting that Tooele Associates had 
materially breached the Development Agreement) and SVF Section I, 
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Question 1 (k) (by asserting meritless, trivial and frivolous claims 
against Tooele Associates). Those findings, however, are not important 
to this discussion as they can be reconciled with the jury's responses 
to SVF Section I, Questions 1(a) and 1(d). In short, Tooele Associates 
had not completed public improvements, as it now readily admits, and thus 
asserting claims against Tooele Associates that it had breached the 
Development Agreement by failing to complete public improvements is 
consistent with the jury's conclusion here and in response to SVF, 
Section II questions as discussed later. 
SVF Section I, Question No. 2 under Tooele Associates' Claims asked 
the jury to determine if Tooele City had proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Tooele Associates ''materially breached the Development 
Agreement" as to specific sections of the Development Agreement. The 
jury found that Tooele City had proven some, but not all, specific 
breaches of the Development Agreement by Tooele Associates. 
In summary then, in SVF Section I, Questions 1 and 2 the findings 
of the jury establish that Tooele City materially breached the 
Development Agreement in various particulars, except for its insistence 
on the completion of public improvements. 
Significantly, SVF Section I, Questions 1 and 2 are directed 
exclusively to Tooele Associates' claims under the Development Agreement. 
In SVF-Section I, Question 3, the jury was then asked and answered 
the following question: 
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Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its 
claims and its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that Tooele 
Associates materially breached the Development Agreement 
and/or Bond Agreements? 
Yes_X No 
This is the first time the jury was asked to consider a question 
associated with the Bond Agreement, although SVF Section I, Question 3 
specifically directed the jury to SVF Section I, Question 2, which dealt 
exclusively with the Development Agreement. Thereafter, the jury 
completed the remaining questions under SVF Section I by determining that 
Tooele Associates had sustained losses as a result of the breaches and 
determined those losses to be $22,500,000.4 This concluded all of the 
questions directed to the jury under the Tooele Associates' Claims, SVF 
Section I. 
The jury was then asked to determine Tooele City's Claims in Section 
II of the SVF. The jury found that Tooele City had proven that Tooele 
Associates breached the Bond Agreements and Bond Agreement amendments 
(SVF Section II, Question 6), and Sections III.G, VII.2, VIII.2 and XVII 
of the Development Agreement Kby failing to complete public improvements 
in Overlake. (SVF Section II, Question 7.) It should be noted here that 
the first facially inconsistent finding of the jury occurs here, in 
response to SVF Section II, Question 7. Here the jury found that Tooele 
4SVF Section 1, Question 5, breaks out the historic and future losses as $5 million and 
$17.5 million, respectively. 
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City had proven that Tooele Associates breached Sections VII.2 and VIII.2 
of the Development Agreement, whereas the jury concluded in response to 
SVF Section I, Question 2(a) that Tooele City had failed to meet its 
burden to prove that Tooele Associates breached the Development Agreement 
regarding those same two sections. This apparent inconsistency will be 
addressed hereafter. 
Thereafter, in SVF Section II, Question 8, the jury was asked and 
answered the following: 
Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its 
rights to claim that Tooele Associates did not complete public 
improvements in Overlake required by the Development Agreement 
and the Bond Agreements? 
Yes No X 
Thus, consistent with the jury's findings in SVF Section 1, the jury 
generally found that the public improvements under the Development 
Agreement were not completed by Tooele Associates, which caused the jury 
to conclude that Tooele Associates had breached both the Bond Agreements 
and the Development Agreement. The jury went on to determine the amount 
of loss to the City for those breaches at $1,750,000. (SVF Section II, 
Question 10).5 
5The jury further found that Tooele Associates had breached another term of Amendment 
4 to the Development Agreement by failing to pay for irrigation water and found a damage 
amount to the City of $70,000. (SVF Section II, Questions 11,12,13.) 
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The jury's response to SVF Section II, Question 8 also is facially 
inconsistent as it appears to directly contradict SVF Section I, Question 
3. In short, SVF Questions 3 and 8 suggest that .Tooele Associates both 
proved, and failed to prove, that Tooele City waived its claims and 
defenses under the Development Agreement and the Bond Agreement. This 
is an oversimplified statement of the conflict between these two 
findings, but it underscores the direct and substantial conflict between 
these two findings on an initial observation. Before these conflicts are 
addressed in detail, a few general conclusions will be set out. 
A. No One Party Drafted the SVF 
In attempting to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies, Tooele 
Associates argues that the drafter of the SVF was Tooele City and 
therefore any ambiguity should be construed against the drafter of the 
document. (Tooele Associates' Memorandum in Support of Harmonizing All 
Answers in the Special Verdict Form, p. 3, fn. 3.) It is a well 
established rule in Utah that any uncertainty with respect to the 
construction of a contract should be resolved against the party who had 
drawn the agreement. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P. 2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 
1982). Tooele Associates does not point the Court toward case law that 
would suggest such a rule of construction would be applicable in 
attempting to address an inconsistency in a Special Verdict Form, nor 
would that be helpful here if such case law existed. Nor is it that 
simple in this case, as each of the parties participated in the 
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conglomeration that is now the SVF. Prior to submission of the case to 
the jury, each party brought to the Court, on the eve of closing 
arguments, competing Special Verdict Forms. The parties thereafter, in 
concert with the Court, worked through the intended form for the SVF, 
cobbling together from the respective parties' competing Special Verdict 
Forms, the final Special Verdict Form before the Court today. 
Accordingly and unfortunately, each party and the Court bears 
responsibility for the result. As such, no principle of contract 
construction assists the Court to reach a result or dictate at whose feet 
a result should fall. Nor is such an approach in keeping with the 
obligation of the Court to harmonize the findings of the jury by 
resolving the issue, not by determining who drafted the inconsistency and 
then holding for an interpretation against that party, as is done in 
contract construction This Court's job is to reconcile any 
inconsistency, if it is not otherwise irreconcilable. Wright v. Westside 
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (UT App 1990). 
B. The Intent of the Drafters is Immaterial to a Resolution of the 
Inconsistency. 
Tooele Associates further suggests that the intent of the drafter 
in preparing the question to the jury should control. After repeated 
argument over the language to be included in each of the questions, the 
Court is not able to determine what exactly each litigant wholly intended 
to convey by the question to the jury. Nor was the jury privy to the 
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parties' intent, as their task was to take the Special Verdict Form and 
make their findings as directed by the individual questions set forth in 
each interrogatory. Further, it is immaterial to the jury what the 
intent of the drafter may have been, as the Court's obligation is to view 
the jury responses in an effort to reconcile any perceived 
inconsistencies. 
C. Questions 2(a) and 7 of the SVF. 
The apparent conflict between SVF Questions 2 (a) and 7 is that both 
questions, similar on their face, appear to be answered inconsistently. 
SVF Section I, Question 2, under Tooele Associates' Claims, asked 
the jury to determine whether Tooele City had "proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Tooele Associates materially breached the 
Development Agreement." To this question the jury returned a finding of 
"yes," i.e., Tooele City had proved that Tooele Associates had materially 
breached the Development Agreement. The jury was then asked to identify 
how Tooele Associates had breached the Development Agreement by answering 
"yes" or "no" to specific identified provisions of the Development 
Agreement. In SVF Section I, Question 2(a) the jury found that Tooele 
City had failed to prove a material breach by Tooele Associates "to 
complete public improvements in Overlake pursuant to Sections VII.2 and 
VIII.2 of the Development Agreement. Section VII.2 of the Development 
Agreement relates to Tooele Associates' obligations to provide 
Transportation Facilities and Circulation Systems, which in summary 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TOOELE ASSOCIATES 
V. TOOELE CITY PAGE 25 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
required Tooele Associates to build streets in conformity with the 
adopted Overlake Street Plan as set forth in the Development Plan, an 
exhibit to the Development Agreement. (Development Agreement, Trial Ex. 
100.) Section VIII.2 of the Development Agreement required Tooele 
Associates to construct and provide sufficient flood control facilities 
necessary to serve the Overlake Project Area. (Development Agreement, 
Trial Ex. 100.) 
SVF Section II, Question 7 under Tooele City's Claim asks a similar 
question, as follows: "7. Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates 
breached Sections...VII.2, VIII.2...of the Development Agreement by 
failing to complete public improvements in Overlake?" To this question, 
the jury answered "yes," thus creating a direct inconsistency with its 
response to SVF Section I, Question 2(a). 
A close examination of these two questions may, however, provide a 
distinction between the two sufficient for the Court to conclude that 
they are not internally inconsistent. First, SVF Section I, Question 
2(a) asks the jury to determine that the City had proven a "material" 
breach of this section of the Development Agreement, while SVF Section 
II, Question 7 omits the materiality finding for the breach. As will be 
seen in the Court's discussion of the apparent inconsistencies between 
SVF Questions 3 and 8, the inclusion of a finding of a "material" breach 
is a requirement the jury was asked to find in each of the Tooele 
Associates' claims. Thus, the jury could have concluded that Tooele 
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Associates breached Sections VII.2 and VIII.2 of the Development 
Agreement, but that breach was not material. A review of the jury 
instructions gives some weight to such a conclusion. Tooele City's 
claims against Tooele Associates are outlined in Jury Instruction No. 27. 
Nowhere in that instruction is the jury presented with the idea that 
Tooele City's obligations require proof of a "material" breach of any of 
the Agreements. Tooele Associates' claims are outlined for the jury in 
Jury Instruction No. 57 and they are similar in tone to those of Tooele 
City's, that is, there is no recitation of a requirement for a finding 
of a "material" breach. Jury Instruction No. 3 0 defines a "material" 
breach for the jury. It instructs the jury that it must decide "whether 
there was a material breach of the Development Agreement. A breach is 
material if a party fails to perform an obligation that was important to 
fulfilling the purpose of the contract. A breach is not material if the 
party's failure was minor and could be fixed without difficulty." 
The jury, after reading these instructions would have been directed 
by the SVF to determine whether under Tooele Associates' claims Tooele 
City had proven a "material" breach of the identified sections of the 
Development Agreement in SVF Section I, Question 2(a). The jury 
determined that Tooele City had not been successful in that effort. At 
SVF Section II, Question 7 the jury, with similar specificity, was asked 
a virtually identical question, but for the materiality requirement, and 
the jury concluded that Tooele City had proven that breach by Tooele 
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Associates. Accordingly, the Court can view this inconsistency as a 
distinction the jury drew from the manner in which the two questions were 
qualified by the descriptor. 
Admittedly, this is a strained construction as the parties made 
little distinction about the difference on those claims in the Pretrial 
Order.6 However, what the parties may set forth in the Pretrial Order is 
less important to this discussion, as it is this Court's effort to make 
the findings of the SVF consistent with each other, and to do so requires 
the Court to examine what was before the jury as part of their 
deliberations, not the litigants. The Pretrial Order was not an exhibit 
at trial and was not therefore before the jury in its deliberations. 
The only other real distinction between SVF Questions 2(a) and 7 is 
the omission in SVF Section II, Question 7 of the preponderance of 
evidence standard which was recited in SVF Section I, Question 2(a). 
This is a distinction without a difference, as the jury was instructed 
in Jury Instruction Nos. 15 and 18 that the party making a claim has the 
burden to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. 
6The Pretrial Order makes no such fine distinction. The recitation of both Tooele 
Associates' claims (Pretrial Order III.A) and Tooele City's claims (Pretrial Order EI.B) speak in 
terms of material breaches under the Development Agreement. Tooele City's discussion in the 
Pretrial Order related to the Bond Agreement and the requirement for completion of public 
improvements is similarly addressed as material breaches of the Bond Agreement. (Pretrial 
Order ffl.B.) 
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Accordingly, the Court construes any apparent inconsistency between 
SVF Questions 2(a) and 7 as explained by the jury's deliberation over the 
material or non-material nature of the breach. Thus, the jury found that 
Tooele City failed to prove that Tooele Associates "materially" breached 
the Development Agreement, but that it proved Tooele Associates breached 
the Development Agreement. 
D. A General Discussion of SVF Section I, Question 3 and SVF Section II, 
Question 8. 
A review of SVF Section I, Question 3 provides the following general 
conclusions.7 
(i) SVF Section I Questions Refer to the Development 
Agreement. The introduction to SVF Section I, Question 3 asks the jury 
to determine if Tooele City waived its claims and its defenses, uas 
stated in Question 2." The reference to SVF Section I, Question 2 
referred the jury to specific sections of the Development Agreement to 
determine whether Tooele City proved a material breach of those specific 
identified sections. SVF Section I, Question 2 does not ask any question 
related to the Bond Agreement. This limitation clearly suggests that SVF 
Section I, Question 3's waiver of claims and defenses is limited to the 
7The "real" general conclusion that can be drawn from a review of Section I, Question 3 
is that compound questions are anathema to the drafting of a Special Verdict Form. The Court 
now fully understands why the objection to a compound question is so appropriate at trial and 
elsewhere. 
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Development Agreement. Counsel for Tooele City concedes, and indeed 
actively argues, that such is the case, i.e., that the jury found that 
Tooele City waived its claims and defenses under the Development 
Agreement. 
(ii) Language is limited by its express modifiers. SVF 
Section I, Question 3 specifically asked the jury to consider whether 
Tooele City has "waived its claims and defenses, as stated in Question 
2, . . . ." As previously discussed, the heading of SVF Section I, Question 
2 limited the jury to consider whether Tooele City had met its burden to 
show that Tooele Associates had materially breached the Development 
Agreement. Each of the six subparts to SVF Section I, Question 2 
directed the jury to specific sections of the Development Agreement to 
identify whether those specific sections of the Development Agreement 
were subject, to a finding of a material breach. Thus, SVF Section I, 
Question 3 limited the scope of the jury's review to the Development 
Agreement, as specifically outlined in SVF Section I, Question 2. 
In itsiargument to support a consistent SVF, the City acknowledges 
that to read SVF Section I, Question 3 in any other manner creates an 
irreconcilable inconsistency in the SVF. Counsel for Tooele Associates 
argues, however, that the waiver discussion of SVF Section I, Question 
3 obviates all of Tooele City's defenses, but preserves in SVF Section 
II, Question 8 all of Tooele City's claims under the Bond Agreement. The 
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Court will address this argument, which it does not find persuasive, 
later in this argument. 
(iii) SVF Section I Questions Refer to "Material" Breaches . 
SVF Section I, Question 3 and SVF Section II, Question 8 differ as well 
in the nature of the breach the jury is asked to determine. SVF Section 
I, Question 3 asks the jury to determine whether Tooele Associates proved 
that Tooele City "waived its claims and its defenses, as stated in 
Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially breached the Development 
Agreement and/or Bond Agreements?" The use of the term "material" is 
important and is used in each of the Section I questions concerning the 
claims of Tooele Associates. In both SVF Questions 1 and 2, the jury was 
asked to determine whether the breaches were material. The jury was 
further instructed in Jury Instruction 63 that the materiality of the 
breaches could excuse Tooele City's performance of, and effectively 
terminate, the Development Agreement. The only other jury instruction 
relating to the materiality of breaches, Jury Instruction No. 33, was 
likewise directed only to the Development Agreement. 
SVF Section II, Question 8 has no "material" breach requirement in 
the question.posed to the jury. 
(iv) SVF Section I, Question 3 asks the Jury Three Questions. 
SVF Section I, Question 3 is framed in the conjunctive and the 
disjunctive, as the question placed to the jury was whether Tooele 
Associates had proven that "Tooele City waived its claims and its 
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defenses, as stated in Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially 
breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements?" 
Thus, the compound question posed to the jury was either one of 
three options: (1) Tooele City's waiver of its claims and defenses that 
Tooele Associates materially breached the Development Agreement; (2) 
Tooele City's waiver of its claims and defenses that Tooele Associates 
materially breached the Bond Agreement; or (3) Tooele City's waiver of 
its claims and defenses that Tooele Associates materially breached both 
the Development and the Bond Agreements. Seef Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 8 0 (1986); 
see also, State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah , 205 P.2d 245, 
246-47 (Utah- 1949)(holding that an order requiring "Merchants Police 
and/or Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc." to pay an injured employee's 
expenses did not indicate which entity must pay.) Such an array of 
options makes it unclear exactly what the answer "yes" may mean, as the 
jury was asked three separate questions. 
Thus, the question is whether the jury found that Tooele City waived 
its claims and defenses (a) under both the Development Agreement and the 
Bond Agreements; or (b) under the Development Agreement or under the Bond 
Agreement. ...This compound question requires the Court to select the 
appropriate •% question to attempt to make the findings of the SVF 
consistent. . 
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SVF Section II, Question 8, by comparison, is framed in the 
conjunctive and asks the jury whether "Tooele Associates waived its 
rights to claim that Tooele Associates did not complete public 
improvements in Overlake required by the Development Agreement and the 
Bond Agreement?" This asks the jury to consider both the Development 
Agreement and the Bond Agreement together. The jury answered "No" to 
this question. 
(v) SVF Section I, Question 3 Refers to Both Tooele City's 
Claims and Defenses. SVF Section I, Question 3 further asks the jury to 
determine if "...Tooele City waived its claims and its defenses...." 
This part of the question is conjunctive in that it requires the jury to 
decide this question without separating the two. See generally, Parr v. 
Stubbs, 117 P.3d 1079 (UT App 2005). 
Tooele Associates in written arguments addressing the apparent 
inconsistency of SVF Section I, Question 3 and SVF Section II, Question 
8 suggested that SVF Section I, Question 3 really asks only two 
questions: 
(1) Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its 
claims and its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that Tooele 
Associates materially beached the Development Agreement? And 
(2) Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its 
defenses that Tooele Associates breached the Bond Agreements? 
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Thus, Tooele Associates argues, by bifurcating these questions into 
two, the jury could conclude that Tooele City had waived its claims and 
defenses under the Development Agreement and had waived its defenses 
under the Bond Agreement. Such an argument, however, is not persuasive, 
as it asks the Court to ignore some of the specific terms in each of 
these theoretical questions. As to SVF Section I, Question 2, the jury 
would have to ignore the language "and/or Bond Agreements" and in essence 
read out the jury finding that Tooele City had waived claims and defenses 
under the Bond Agreement. Further, in proposed SVF Section I, Question 
2, the Court would have to ignore the words "it claims," "as stated in 
Question 2," "materially," and "Development Agreement and/or...." Both 
parties have argued to the Court the general rule that a Court cannot 
simply ignore findings of fact.determined by the jury. See, Atwood v. 
Harry Brandt Booking Office, Inc., 850 F.2d 884, 890-91 (2nd Cir. 1988) 
("...proper defense to the parties' Seventh Amendment rights to a jury 
trial precludes entry of a judgment that disregards any material jury 
finding.") In order to accept Tooele Associates7 attempt to provide a 
consistent result from the findings on this argument would be to ignore 
the jury's findings. This the Court cannot do. 
As part of this discussion Tooele Associates further asserts that 
SVF Section II, Question 8 does not preserve the defense Tooele City 
asserts under the Bond Agreement as the question is limited solely to 
Tooele City's "right to claim." Tooele Associates argues that the right 
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to claim is a noun, i.e., claims, and as such does not preserve a 
defense. Thus, Tooele Associates would conclude that SVF Section II, 
Question 8 preserves only Tooele City's affirmative claims for relief 
under the Bond Agreements, and therefore renders SVF Section I, Question 
3 and Section II, Question 8 consistent, as SVF Section I, Question 3 
waives all Tooele City's claims under the Development Agreement and all 
defenses under the Bond Agreement, preserving only Tooele City's "claims" 
under the Bond Agreement. Thus, Tooele Associates argues "the jury could 
determine that Tooele City's defenses under the Bond Agreement were 
waived, but, as expressed in SVF Section II, Question 8, not the right 
to make the very specific claim that Tooele Associates did not complete 
public improvements." (Tooele Associates' Memorandum in Support of 
Harmonizing All Answers in the Special Verdict Form, p. 5.) Tooele 
Associates concludes that such an interpretation would comport with the 
jury's findings of damages to both parties, because it preserves Tooele 
City's claims, but waives its defenses, under the Bond Agreement. 
Such an argument would require the Court again to ignore the plain 
language of these two questions posed to the jury. Furthermore, Tooele 
City argues that "right to claim" is a verb as used in SVF Section II, 
Question 8, not a noun, and that it preserves both the "sword and shield" 
effect of the nature of a claim. The definition of a "claim" is defined 
in Black's Law Dictionary is "to demand as one's own or as one's right; 
to assert; to urge; to insist.... This definition lends support to the 
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conclusion that Tooele City's * right to claim" as used in SVF Section II, 
Question 8 is both a defense and a claim. Accordingly, the better 
argument for a finding of consistency between these two questions is that 
SVF Section II, Question 8 includes both claims and defenses cf Tooele 
City. 
(vi) SVF section II, Question 8 is More Specific Than SVF 
Section I, Question 3. SVF Section II, Question 8 is more specific than 
SVF Section I, Question 3, and on this issue both litigants seem to 
agree. SVF Section II, Question 8 asks the jury solely to determine 
whether "Tooble Associates has proved that Tooele City waived its rights 
to claim that Tooele Associates did not complete public improvements in 
Overlake required by the Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements?" 
This question deals solely with the limited issue of Tooele City's public 
improvement claims under both the Development Agreement and the Bond 
Agreements. 
SVF Section I, Question 3 asks a much broader question which 
includes whether Tooele City waived both claims and defenses to at least 
six claims under the Development Agreement and unspecified claims and 
defenses under the Bond Agreement. As part of the Court's questions 
placed to the litigants, each was asked whether SVF Section I, Question 
3 or SVF Section II, Question 8 was more specific. Tooele City responded 
that SVF Section II, Question 8 was more specific. Tooele Associates 
originally noted in its briefing that SVF Section II, Question 8 was "a 
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very specific question but altered -its argument :i i i the 1 ast < : i 11: t 
hearing. It is the Court's conclusion that SVF Section II, Question 8 
is more specific than SVF Section I, Question 3. 
The Court makes this observation only as it relates t<:> the 
harmonizing of potentially conflicting provisions of the SVF. While not 
directly on point, principles of contract construction and statutory 
interpretation generally suggest that general terms of a contract are 
given less weight than more specific terms. See, Wood v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co. , 19 P.3d 392, 395-96 (Utah App. 2001) ; see also, Williams 
v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988) ("In 
resolving the conflict between the two statutes, we are guided by the 
principle that when two statutory provisions conflict, the more specific 
provision will prevail over the more general provision.") Further, and 
more on point is this same general principle as expressed by the Utah 
Court of Appeals' discussion of reconciliation >f verdict 
inconsistencies. In Wright v. West side Nursery , 787 P. 2d at 516, the 
Court notes that '. . .where the two cannot be reconciled, as in this case, 
the more specific finding must govern the outcome." See also, (Knape v. 
Livingston Oil Co. , 193 Kan. 278, 392 P.2d 842, 844 (1964) (If special 
findings cannot be reconciled with the general verdict and are 
sufficiently;; full and complete in themselves, and are not inconsistent 
in themselves, judgment must follow the special findings.") 
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The Court draws the following conclusions from these general 
observations. 
The only reading of the SVF that comes close to harmonizing the 
apparent inconsistencies discussed above is one which results in !:ite 
conclusion that the jury's findings in response to SVF Section I, 
Question 3 waive Tooele City's claims and defenses under the Development 
Agreement, but do not waive Tooele City's claims and defenses under the 
Bond Agreement. As both parties point out, the jury found that Tooele 
City had materially breached the Development Agreement. SVF Section I, 
Questions (a)- (1) set forth with specificity the breach claims under the 
Development Agreement which Tooele Associates proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence. The jury's findings expressly exempt from such a 
conclusion that Tooele City materially breached the Development Agreement 
as it related to public improvements required to be performed by Tooele 
Associates. . Those exemptions are evidenced by the jury findings that 
Tooele Associates had failed to prove a material breach to SVF Section 
I, Questions (a), (d) , (j) and (k) . These findings include Tooele 
Associates' claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
The jury's response to SVF Section I, Question 2 does not disrupt 
this harmonization, as this question narrowed the ji iry's findings on 
public improvements to two specific sections of the Development Agreement 
as referenced in SVF Section I, Question 2(a). Thus, the conclusion 
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holds that the jury found that Tooele Associates had failed to prove a 
material breach of the Development Agreement by Tooele City, and further 
that Tooele City had failed to prove that Tooele Associates had 
materially breached the Development Agreement's specific Sections VII.2 
and VIII. 3. Thereafter, the jury found in SVF Section I, Question 3 that 
Tooele City had waived its claims and its defenses under the Development 
Agreement, thus prohibiting Tooele City from a recovery or a defense 
under the terms of the Development Agreement. 
Thereafter, the jury moved to Tooele City's claims and found that 
non-material breaches of the Bond Agreement by Tooele Associates' failure 
to complete public improvements, SVF Section II, Question 6. The jury 
further found that Tooele City had proven non-material breaches of the 
Development Agreement, by failing to complete public improvements, SVF 
Section II, Question 7(d), but these non-material breaches are waived by 
the operation of the jury's finding to SVF Section I, Question 3. 
Finally, as it relates to this discussion of inconsistent provisions 
of the SVF, the jury found in SVF Section II, Question 8 that Tooele City 
had proven that non-material breaches of both the Development Agreement 
and the Bond Agreement had been incurred by Tooele Associates. However, 
the operation of the jury's response to SVF Section I, Question 3 lost 
al 1 right of Tooele City to proceed on such claims under the Development 
Agreement. The jury thereafter worked through Tooele City's claims 
associated with the breach of this Agreement and concluded in response 
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to SVF Section II, Question 10 that damages of $1,7C i ^ as reflective 
of the injury sustained by Tooele City by Tooele Associates' non-
completion of the public improvements. 
3. Irreconcilable Inconsistencies in the SVF 
Notwithstanding this Court's attempt to reconcile the apparent 
inconsistencies in the SVF; this analysis comes short of accomplishing 
that purpose for the following reasons: 
A. Jury Conclusions Concerning Awards. Several inconsistencies 
still remain as the Court examines the SVF's findings of damages to the 
theory that the jury viewed the obligations of the parties from both the 
position of duties, claims and defenses under the respective Development 
Agreement and the Bond Agreement. 
(i) Section I of the SVF includes the Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing The jury was asked in SVF Section I to determine 
whether Tooele Associates had proven Tooele City intentionally breached 
the Development Agreement, uincluding its implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing The jury found as part of SVF Section I material 
breaches the following: 
• The City actively interfered with Tooele Associates' ability 
to complete the public improvements (SVF, Section I, Question 
1(e), (f) & (g); 
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• The City's failure to approve additional subdivisions is a 
material breach of the Development Agreement (SVF, Section I, 
Question 1 (i)); 
• The City's refusal to extend the term of the Development 
Agreement was a material breach (SVF, Section 1, Question 
1(c)). 
Each of, these findings have some connection, either directly as in 
SVF Section I, Question 1(e), (f) , (g) and (i) , or indirectly with public 
improvements. The City's argument that a consistent reading of SVF 
Section I, Question 3 and SVF Section II, Question 8 leaves Tooele City's 
claims for breach under the Bond Agreement still viable, vitiates any 
jury finding on these specific issues related to the public improvements. 
The jury was instructed in Jury Instruction No. 33 that "Tooele City 
cannot by a willful act or omission make it difficult or impossible for 
Tooele Associates to perform under the terms of the Development Agreement 
or the Bond ..Agreement... ." Tooele City cannot actively interfere with 
Tooele Associates' ability to complete the public improvements as these 
findings in Section I clearly seem to indicate, and then receive the 
benefit of a such breach, or a defense, under the Bond Agreement that 
failure to complete public improvements is a breach by Tooele Associates. 
Such a result is inequitable and contrary t the obligations of parties 
under covenants of good faith and fair dealing. 
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The practical effect of the harmonization of SVF Section I, Question 
3 and SVF Section II, Question 8 Tooele City argues, is that paragraph 
18 of the Bond Agreement, as argued by Tooele City, would preclude the 
recovery of damages by Tooele Associates by this breach. Thus, the 
application of the most persuasive of the arguments by the parties to the 
Court to harmonize the jury's findings in the SVF, still renders a 
fundamental and practical inconsistency to the result. This 
inconsistency appears to the Court to be irreconcilable. 
Some argument is made by Tooele City that the jury "found that the 
City did not interfere with TA's ability to follow TA's own public 
improvement construction plans." (Tooele City's Supplemental Memorandum 
Regarding Special Verdict Form p 14.) Tooele City asserts that Jury 
Instruction No. 33 instructed the jury that Tooele Associates would be 
excused from its performance under the Development Agreement and the Bond 
Agreement u[i]f you decide that Tooele Associates was willing and able 
to perform its obligation, but that it could not perform that obligation 
because of spmething that the other party purposefully did or failed to 
do." Tooele City concludes that the jury's finding 11:lat: Tooele 
Associates breached the Development and Bond Agreements indicates that 
Tooele Associates was either not willing and able to complete the public 
improvements or that Tooele City did not: purposefully prevent Tooele 
Associates from completing those improvements. 
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This argument is undercut, however, by t1le ji lry's specific findings 
in SVF Section I, Questions (e) , (f) , (g) and (i) that Tooele City 
materially breached the Development Agreement by such activity, although 
no direct question was asked of the jury. Clearly, this argument 
highlights the irreconcilable inconsistency in the SVF. The Court cannot 
discern from this review of these questions in SVF Section I any 
explanation that would render consistent those provisions with the jury's 
conclusion that Tooele Associates breached the Development Agreement (SVF 
Section II, Question 7) and the Bond Agreement (SVF Section I, Question 
6). 
(ii) Completion of Public Improvements is an Obligation of 
both the Development and Bond Agreements As i t relates to public 
improvements, the Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements are 
similar in nature. Each requires Tooele Associates to complete public 
improvements in accordance with approved construction drawings and 
specifications, as well as the City's subdivision and building 
regulations.' The Development Agreement sets forth Tooele Associates' 
obligations on public improvements, which include the obligations for 
street and infrastructure for transportation. (Trial Ex. 100; Section 
VII. 2.) These obligations are specific in their nature and require 
performance consistent with uthe preliminary and final subdivision plats 
and all site plan approvals." (See, Trial Ex. 100, Section VII.2.E.) 
The Bond Agreement similarly requires completion of public improvements, 
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with the express purpose to "guarantee the proper completion of the 
improvements...." (Trial Ex. 220, p. 3.) 
While the Court and the parties have agreed in the Pretrial Order 
that a breach of one of these two Agreements may not be a breach of the 
other, the public improvement obligations are common to both. Thus, 
while the Court has strived to find a consistent explanation for the 
jury's inconsistent verdict based on distinguishing the two, the issue 
of public improvements is common to both. 
The best example of this is the inconsistent nature of the jury's 
findings to SVF Section I, Question 2 and SVF Section II, Questions 6 and 
7. While the Court has tried to distinguish the two by a materiality 
requirement, the fact remains they each arrive at an inconsistent 
conclusion of breach on public improvements. Thus, since the obligations 
are similar in nature, to reach the conclusion that the jury made a 
distinction- between the two when it comes to the obligation of 
performance or breach is a difficult and tenuous distinction. While it 
may very well be a distinction with a difference, public improvements, 
and their completion are common to both the Development Agreement and the 
Bond Agreement. Such a commonality makes it difficult for the Court to 
have any confidence that the jury was able to distinguish between the two 
in the contested fashion that would render the jury's findings 
consistent. -? 
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(iii) The Distinction Between the Development Agreement and the Bond 
Agreement are Fundamental and Important to the Result. The Development 
Agreement delineates the obligations of each of the parties as it relates 
to the development of Overlake. As recognized in the Development 
Agreement, Tooele City "may enter into a Development Agreement in 
appropriate circumstances in order to promote the orderly and appropriate 
development of property, and to provide public facilities, amenities, and 
other benefits in connection with the proposed development." (Trial Ex. 
100, p. 3.) As party to this Development Agreement, Tooele Associates 
was required1 to present a Development Plan for Overlake, which Tooele 
Associates did. A general reading of the Development Agreement indicates 
that it contains no contractual rights or obligations in the event of 
default by either of the parties; in short, the Development Agreement is 
a recitation of what each party undertakes to see through in the 
development of Overlake. (Pretrial Order, IV, para. 48.) 
The Bond Agreement is substantially different from the Development 
Agreement as it sets forth not only the obligations of Tooele Associates 
as it relates to public improvements, but remedies for default. Tooele 
Associates' ^ obligations under the Bond Agreement require completion of 
public improvements and set forth definitions associated with "failure 
to perform." Tooele City argues that non-completion of these required 
public improvements is a material breach of the Bond Agreements, and it 
allows Tooele City to withhold approval of new phases of development of 
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Overlake, and to recover damages. Thus, Tooele City argues that since 
Tooele Associates' damages are based upon its ability to develop and sell 
additional lots in units in Overlake, and since the finding of breach of 
the Bond Agreement by the jury would preclude such development, no 
damages are properly awarded to Tooele Associates. In short, Tooele City 
argues that Tooele Associates would be entitled to no Judgment for breach 
of the Development Agreement by Tooele City, and Tooele City would be 
entitled to a recovery of $1.7 million for Tooele Associates' breach of 
the Bond Agreement. 
Without addressing the effect of the jury's findings on this 
entirely legal issue, the fact that such a result hangs upon such a 
strained reading of whether claims under the Development Agreement, Bond 
Agreement or both Development Agreement and Bond Agreements have been 
waived, carries too much of legal and financial consequence to be decided 
by this Court's attempt to make an inconsistent verdict consistent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court, after reading the pleadings and listening to the 
respective arguments on how to interpret the SVF to render its findings 
internally consistent, set out specifically to draft a Decision that 
would conclude that the findings were consistent. The Court's efforts 
are reflected in the first portion of this Decision, and admittedly to 
do it the Court had to strain to find an interpretation that would so 
conclude. Much to this Court's genuine disappointment, it cannot reach 
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such a conclusion. The findings of the jury as reflected in the SVF are 
irreconcilably inconsistent, both as to each other and to the ultimate 
conclusions one must draw to support such an argument. 
ORDER 
Accordingly, this Court finds that the findings of the jury are 
irreconcilably inconsistent and strikes the jury's Special Verdict and 
declares the trial a mistrial. 
Counsel are instructed to contact the Court's clerk to schedule a 
Scheduling Conference. 
( 
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JUN 1 9 2009 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT a y _ _ U ~ ~ - ~ — — o ^ m ^ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE ASSOCIATES, L.P., et al., 
Plaintiffs, JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
vs. 
Case No. 060919737 
TOOELE CITY, a municipal corporation, 
et al., 
Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendants. 
TOOELE CITY, a municipal corporation, 
et al., 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FORSGREN ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
Members of the Jury: Attached are instructions numbered 1 through 23; given to you 
at the beginning of this trial, and read to you at various points during the trial, and 
instructions 2rfr through \p \ , which were presented to you at a later time in the 
proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your conduct and deliberations 
during the trial of this case and must be carefully considered and followed. 
DATED this 3 day of June, 2009. ^ 0 * ^ _ 
BY THE C O U R ^ f e ^ 9 ^ ? ^ 
RANDALI 
DISTRICT JUp©&; 
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Jury Instruction No. _J : 
General Instruction. 
There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll explain them to you from 
time to time in order to give you the information that you need to fulfill your role as jurors 
at each stage of the trial. I will give you the first set of instructions at this point. You will 
receive further instructions before evidence is presented and the final set of instructions after 
the close of evidence. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has been given a copy of 
these instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to you, you may 
follow along on your copy, or not, as you wish. Keep in mind the following points: 
Obey the Instructions. You must obey the instructions. Some of these instructions give 
you information about how the trial will proceed, the rules that govern this process, and the 
roles of the participants, including your role as jurors. Other instructions tell you what the 
law is that you are to apply in reaching your verdict in this case. You must not reach 
decisions that go against the law. If any attorney makes statements of the law that differ 
from the instructions on the law that I give to you, you should disregard such statements and 
rely entirely on these instructions. 
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are important. Don't pick out 
one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context of all the others. 
Gender-Singular/Plural. In these instructions, any references to "she" or "her" also include 
"he" or "him," or vice versa, as appropriate to this case; and the singular, such as "defendant" 
includes the plural "defendants," when appropriate. 
Note Taking. The Bailiff has provided you with notepads and pens. You may take notes 
during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it distract you from following the evidence. 
The lawyers will review the evidence in their closing arguments and help you focus on what 
is most relevant to your decision. I also caution that notes are not evidence. Use them only 
to aid personal memory or concentration. Keep in mind that you must each arrive at a verdict 
independently, and one juror's memory of the evidence or opinion should not be given 
excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes. 
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form an opinion about the ultimate issues in this case until you 
have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the final instructions 
on the law. Keep an open mind until your deliberations are completed. 
-2-
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Jury Instruction No. «*• 
What Rules Apply to Recesses 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break, 
overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not family, 
friends or even each other. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as 
a juror so that people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle with the 
lawyers, the parties, the witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You may say 
"hello", or exchange similar greetings or civilities with these persons, but don't engage in any 
conversations. Don't accept from or give to any of these persons any favors, however slight, 
such as rides or food. The lawyers and parties are naturally concerned to avoid any hint of 
improper contact with you, so don't think that they are being purposely rude if they avoid any 
interaction with you during the course of this trial. Don't read about this case in the 
newspaper or listen to any reports on television or radio, if there are any. Finally, don't form 
or express an opinion regarding any subject of the trial until you are sent out for deliberation 
at the end of the trial. These restraints are necessary for a fair trial. 
-3-
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Jury Instruction No. ° 
The Roles of the Judge, the Jury and the Lawyers 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important roles in 
the trial. 
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and instruct the jury 
on the LAW that it must apply. 
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual issues. Factual 
issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things 
concerning which evidence will be presented. 
An alternate juror has the same responsibilities as any other juror, as he may be required to 
take the place of one of the jurors in the panel in the event an original juror is unable to 
complete his service. Any alternate juror selected will be identified as such once the case has 
been presented and the jury is ready to retire to deliberate on a verdict. 
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and 
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. It is the responsibility of each of the lawyers 
to be an advocate, and each will try to persuade you to accept her version of the facts and to 
decide the case in favor of her client. 
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that is your role. 
Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case 
based upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court. 
-4-
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Jury Instruction No. " 
Outline of the Trial 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and indicate what they 
think the evidence will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by the 
defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and seeing 
the exhibits offered by the other side. 
Additional Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will give 
you additional instructions on the law that applies to this case. 
Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will share 
with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and how they think 
you should decide the case. 
Jury Deliberation. ?The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and deliberate until 
you reach a verdict. You will be given additional instructions about how you are to do that 
later. 
-5-
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Jury Instruction No. D 
What Is the Role of the Jury in this Case? 
This is a civil trial, which means there is a disagreement between individuals or entities about 
their respective rights or obligations and what they owe each other, if anything. You must 
decide these questions in this case. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must 
be based only on the evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on 
speculation. Don't guess about any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or 
arrive at reasonable conclusions from the evidence presented. 
-6-
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Jury Instruction No. 
What Is Evidence? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. It can 
be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or certain qualified 
opinions, or any combination of these things. Some times the lawyers may agree that certain 
facts exist, this is called a stipulation. You should accept any stipulated facts as having been 
proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. If this 
happens, I will explain how you should treat it. 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Instruction No. l 
Opinion Testimony 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A person who by 
education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, may 
give her opinion and the reason for it. A layperson (that is, a non-expert) is also allowed to 
express an opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to understanding 
his testimony or the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you 
would any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
-8-
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Jury Instruction No. & 
Conflicting Testimony of Experts 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of witnesses called to offer expert 
opinions, you may compare and weigh the opinion of one against that of another. In doing 
this, you may consider the qualifications and credibility of each, as well as the reasons for 
each opinion and the facts on which the opinions are based. 
-9-
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Jury Instruction No. T 
What Is Not to Be Considered or Used as Evidence? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now M tell you about some things which do not 
qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not consider in 
reaching your verdict. 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give you a 
preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the evidence from their viewpoint. 
If a lawyer makes a statement about the evidence which is different from your own 
recollection of the evidence, you should rely on your own memory. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. You should not 
make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make personal inspections, 
observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or articles not produced in court. 
Don't let anyone else do anything like that for you. Don't look for information on the 
internet, in law books, dictionaries, public or private records, or any other sources which are 
not produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or read about this 
case in the media or by word of mouth or any other out-of-court communication from any 
source. You must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court. 
-10-
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Jury Instruction No. ±_ 
The Judge Decides What Evidence Is Admissible 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for the jury to 
consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an 
objection is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it, nor should 
you guess as to what the evidence might have been or as to the reason for the objection. If 
an objection is OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence 
which you have heard or seen is STRICKEN you must ignore it. 
My decisions regarding the admission of evidence involve issues of law, and I am not giving 
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief or as to which party should 
prevail in the case. Don't be concerned about the reasons for my rulings, and don't try to 
infer anything about the case from those rulings. 
Further, if I do or say anything during the course of this trial that suggests to you that I favor 
the position of either party, whether in my rulings or otherwise, it is entirely unintentional; 
and you must not be influenced by that in any way. 
-11-
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Jury Instruction No. // 
How to Make Decisions about the Evidence 
It will be your duty to determine your verdict relying solely on the evidence presented during 
the trial. For that purpose you should consider all of the evidence together, fairly, impartially 
and conscientiously, putting aside any bias, prejudice, or preconceptions. 
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it should be 
believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it. An inference is 
a conclusion that logic, reason, or common sense leads you to draw from a fact or group of 
facts that the evidence has established. 
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. Review and 
consider all the evidence. Don't imagine things which have no evidence to back them up. 
Consider the evidence fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side. 
Where there is conflicting evidence, you should try to reconcile the conflict so far as you 
reasonably can. Where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must 
determine from the evidence what the facts are. 
-12-
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Jury Instruction No. >3-
Deciding Whether to Believe a Witness 
You are the sole judges of the importance of the evidence, the believability of the witnesses 
and the facts. There is no firm rule that I can give you for determining whether a witness is 
truthful. As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is and what 
weight to give it, using your own good judgment and experience in life. In evaluating 
testimony, it may help you to ask yourself questions such as these: 
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial comes out? 
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain way? 
Demeanor. What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct while 
answering questions? 
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other evidence? 
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and the 
ability to remember them? 
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience? 
You may also apply any other common sense yardstick to the testimony you hear and the 
other evidence you receive. You are not required to believe any witness or all that a witness 
says. You are entitled to believe one witness as against many or many as against one, in 
accordance with your honest convictions. 
43-
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Jury Instruction No. H 
Depositions. 
Depositions may be received in evidence. Depositions contain sworn testimony of a witness 
that was given previously, outside of court, with the lawyer for each party being entitled to 
ask questions. Testimony provided in a deposition may be read to you in court or may be 
seen on a video monitor. You should consider deposition testimony the same way that you 
would consider the testimony of a witness testifying in court. 
Utah court rules allow a witness to make corrections to his or her deposition testimony, 
provided that the witness signs a written statement reciting the reasons for making them. 
-14-
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Jury Instruction No. '^ 
Who Is Responsible to Convince the Jury? 
In a civil trial, the party making a claim is responsible to prove it. This responsibility is 
sometimes called a "burden" or a "burden of proof." 
45-
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Jury Instruction No. /& 
Stipulated and Otherwise Established Facts. 
A stipulation is an agreement. Unless I instruct you otherwise, when the lawyers on both 
sides stipulate or agree to a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that 
fact as proved. 
-16-
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Instruction No. l^: Instructions on the Law that Applies to This Case. 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages 
which contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this 
case. These additional instructions begin with instruction number If, We will 
read those after completing our review of the following instructions which relate 
essentially to the procedure that you should follow. 
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Jury Instruction No. }2 
STIPULATED FACTS 
A stipulation is an agreement. Unless I instruct you otherwise, when the lawyers on 
both sides stipulate or agree to a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and 
regard that fact as proved. 
The following facts are stipulated: 
1. Plaintiff Tooele Associates Limited Partnership (Tooele Associates") is a 
Washington limited partnership that owns property and does business in the 
Overtake Development in Tooele, Utah. 
2. Defendant Tooele City (the "City") is a municipality and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah. 
3. On November 15, 1995, Tooele City and Tooele Associates entered into an 
"Annexation Agreement". 
4. On December 18, 1997, Tooele Associates and the City entered into the 
"Development Agreement for Overtake Project Area Tooele City, Tooele County, 
Utah by and between: Tooele City, Utah and Tooele Associates, Limited 
Partnership, a Washington Limited Partnership" (the "Development Agreement"). 
5. The Development Agreement was amended five times in writing: 
O On April 21, 1998, the City approved Amendment No. 1 to the 
Development Agreement. 
D On July 1, 1998, the City and Tooele Associates entered into 
Amendment No. 2 to the Development Agreement. 
n On October 6, 1999, the City and Tooele Associates entered into 
Amendment No. 3 to the Development Agreement. 
D On November 15T 2001, the City and Tooele Associates entered into 
Amendment No. 4 to the Development Agreement 
a On January 9, 2002, the City Council approved the Corrected and 
Restated Amendment No. 4 to the Development Agreement. 
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O On July 3, 2007, the City and Tooele Associates entered into 
Amendment No. 5 to the Development Agreement. 
To date, Tooele Associates has recorded and developed several plats within the 
Overtake Project Area, including Overtake 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E, 1G, 1F and U . 
The Overtake Golf Course Plat was approved by Tooele City on September 16, 
1998 and was recorded by the Tooele County Recorder on October 9,1998. 
After Tooele City's approval, and the recordation of the Overtake Golf Course Plat, 
more real property was added to the golf course for the clubhouse, parking lot and 
associated facilities. 
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Instruction No. I? : How Convinced Should the Jury be Before Making a Decision? 
The party making a claim is responsible to prove the claim by a preponderance of 
evidence. This means that, after considering and comparing all the evidence 
presented in court, the convincing weight thereof must be in favor of the party 
making the claim. If the evidence is evenly balanced or if the balance is not in 
favor of the claimant, then the claimant has not met its burden as to that claim. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Instruction No. }h Jurors Must Follow the Instructions. 
The instructions that I give you are the law, and your oath requires you to follow 
my instructions even if you disagree with them. 
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Instruction No. ^ l: What to Take With You Into the Jury Room. 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to 
discuss this case: 
a. All exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. Your notes (if any); 
c. Your copy of these instructions; 
d. Your trial binder; and 
e. The verdict form or forms that will be given to you. 
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Instruction No.^jj What to Do in the Jury Room. 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. 
This person is called the "Foreperson." The Foreperson's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b. To represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
c. To sign your verdict form and bring it back into court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Foreperson has no 
more power than any other juror. 
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Instruction N o . ^ : Consider Each Other's Opinions, Then Reach Your Own Decision 
Based Upon Honest Deliberation. 
It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a 
certain verdict. When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may 
block appropriate consideration of the case. Use your common memory, your 
common understanding and your common sense. Talk about the case with each 
other as you ponder and deliberate. 
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with 
everyone else. However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the 
other jurors. If you are persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, 
don't hesitate to change your mind. Help each other arrive at the truth. In an 
attempt to reach a decision, you may not resort to chance or any form of decision-
making other than honest deliberation. 
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Instruction No. ^ 3: If You Have Questions During Deliberation. 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it 
to the bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question 
whenever appropriate. However, these instructions should contain all the 
information you need to reach a verdict based upon the evidence that has been 
presented to you. You should understand that no further evidence can be 
provided to you. 
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Instruction No.^-i: Focus on This Case Alone. 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case 
as a forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of 
expressing individual or collective views about anything other than the issues you 
are called upon to decide. Your verdict should reflect the facts as found by you 
applied to the law as explained in these instructions and should not be distorted by 
any outside factors or objectives. 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You 
will make an important contribution to justice and your community if you focus 
exclusively on this case and return a just and proper verdict. 
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Instruction No. _ : How to Report Your Verdict. 
When you have reached a verdict, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict 
form which corresponds to your decision. Then, notify the bailiff that you are 
ready to return to court. 
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Instruction No. ^ : What Happens After the Verdict Has Been Reported? 
After you have given your verdict to the Judge, he or the clerk may ask each of 
you about it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the 
jury box and you may leave at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if 
you wish, to watch the rest of the proceedings, which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you 
are not required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case 
when you don't want to do that, please tell the Court Clerk. Finally, if you do 
decide to discuss the case with anyone, keep in mind that your fellow jurors freely 
stated their opinions in the jury room with the understanding that they were 
speaking in confidence. Please respect the privacy of the views of your fellow 
jurors. 
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Instruction No. *^: Tooele City's Breach of Contract Claims Against Tooele Associates. 
Tooele City claims that Tooele Associates breached the Development Agreement 
and its amendments, the Annexation Agreement, and the Bond Agreements and 
their amendments by not performing its obligations as follows: 
1. By failing to complete the public improvements in each phase of the Overtake 
development, except for Phase 1 A, in accordance with the terms of the 
Annexation Agreement, the Development Agreement and its amendments, and 
the Bond Agreements and their amendments; 
2. By selling most of the undeveloped property in Overlake to third parties 
and partially assigning the Development Agreement without Tooele City's 
prior written consent; 
3. By failing to set aside 97 acres for public schools and sell land to the 
Tooele County School District at negotiated prices; 
4. By failing to pay amounts owed for the water used to irrigate the Overlake 
Golf Course; and 
5. By failing to comply with the Development Agreement's golf course size 
specifications. 
Tooele City claims that it has been damaged as a result and wants Tooele 
Associates to pay it money to compensate it for the damages it claims to have 
suffered. 
Tooele Associates denies Tooele City's claims and in its defense claims that (1) 
Tooele City waived, or should be estopped from asserting, its claims; (2) Tooele 
Associates substantially performed the Development Agreement and Bond 
Agreements and committed no material breach of those Agreements; (3) Tooele 
Associates did not cause any damages incurred by Tooele City; (4) Tooele City 
did not comply with the Development Agreement's requirements for secondary 
water billing; (5) any breach regarding the size of the Links at Overlake Golf 
Course was not material; (6) Tooele City consented to, or ratified, Tooele 
Associates' performance of the Development Agreement; and (7) Tooele City 
failed to mitigate its damages. 
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Instruction No. ^i Breach of Contract. 
A party to a contract breaches the contract if it fails to do what it promised to do 
in the contract. 
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Instruction N o . ^ : Elements for Breach of Contract. 
In order to recover damages, the party claiming breach of contract must prove 
each of these four things: 
(1) that there was a contract between the party claiming breach and 
the party that allegedly breached the contract; 
(2) that the party claiming breach did what the contract required it 
to do, or that it was excused from performing its contract 
obligations; 
(3) that the other party breached the contract by not performing its 
obligations; and 
(4) that the party claiming breach was damaged because the other 
party breached the contract. 
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Instruction No.3D: Material Breach. 
You must decide whether there was a material breach of the Development 
Agreement. A breach is material if a party fails to perform an obligation that was 
important to fulfilling the purpose of the contract. A breach is not material if the 
party's failure was minor and could be fixed without difficulty. 
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Instruction No. ^ l : Partial Breach. 
If one of the parties to a contract did some but not all of the things it promised to 
do under that contract, then the other party may recover damages related only to 
what the party failed to do under the contract. 
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Instruction No3^: Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
All contracts contain an unwritten or implied promise that the parties will deal 
with each other fairly and in good faith. This means that the parties have 
promised not to intentionally do anything to injure each other's right to receive 
the benefits of the contract. To decide if one party violated this unwritten 
promise, you should consider whether its actions were consistent with the agreed 
common purpose and justified expectations of the other party in light of the 
contract language and the dealings between and conduct of the parties. 
There are some limits to this unwritten promise that you need to keep in mind. 
First, this unwritten promise between the parties to deal fairly with each other and 
in good faith does not establish new, independent rights or duties that the parties 
did not agree to. 
Second, this unwritten promise does not create rights and duties that are 
inconsistent with the actual terms of the contract. 
Third, this unwritten promise does not require either party to use a contract right 
in a way that will be harmful to themselves simply to benefit the other party. 
Finally, you cannot use this unwritten promise to achieve an outcome that you 
believe is fair but is inconsistent with the actual terms of the contract. 
If you find that a party violated this unwritten promise to deal fairly and in good 
faith, then that party breached the contract. 
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Jury Instruction No. zl 
When Performance Is Not Excused by Other Party's Non-performance. 
Tooele Associates or Tooele City cannot by a willful act or omission make it difficult 
or impossible for Tooele Associates to perform under the terms of the Development 
Agreement or the Bond Agreements and then be excused from performing their obligation 
because the other party did not perform. 
If you decide that Tooele Associates or Tooele City was willing and able to perform 
its obligation, but that it could not perform the obligation because of something that the 
other party purposely did or failed to do, then its was excused from performing its 
obligation. 
CleanSetWoutCUes.wpd2 
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Instruction No. Vfj Integrated Contracts. 
The Development Agreement is an integrated contract. That means that when 
you interpret the Development Agreement, you cannot consider conversations, 
representations, or statements made before or at the time the Development 
Agreement was made that would vary or add to the terms of the Development 
Agreement. 
In addition, the fact that the Development Agreement is an integrated contract 
obviates any expectation a party may now assert that it expected under the 
Development Agreement unless that expectation is an express term of that 
Agreement. 
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Instruction N o . ^ : Substantial Performance. 
Tooele Associates claims that even though it did not do everything exactly as the 
Development Agreement required, it substantially performed the Development 
Agreement and, therefore, is entitled to a ten-year extension of the Development 
Agreement's term and to recover from Tooele City because, Tooele Associates 
claims, Tooele City breached the Development Agreement. Tooele Associates 
can only recover under the Development Agreement if it substantially performed 
all of its obligations under the terms of that Agreement. 
Tooele Associates' failure to do everything exactly as promised under the 
Development Agreement does not prevent it from recovering damages unless (1) 
it willfully departed from the terms of the Development Agreement; (2) it acted in 
bad faith; or (3) its variance from the strict and literal performance of the 
Development Agreement involved more than technical or unimportant omissions 
or defects. 
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Instruction N o . ^ : Burden of Proof for Substantial Performance. 
Tooele Associates bears the burden of proving that it substantially performed its 
obligations under the Development Agreement. 
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Instruction No.^7: Assignment. 
An assignment transfers a party's rights and obligations under a contract to 
another. 
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Instruction No.Vh Nonsignatory. 
No signature is required for a person or entity to become party to a contract. 
Performance may bind a party to a contract that it has not signed. 
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Instruction No. 3?: Development Discretion. 
Tooele City, by virtue of its municipal powers granted to it by the State of Utah, 
has great latitude and discretion in effectuating its services to the public and to 
propose and enforce plans affecting Tooele City and its citizens. If the discretion 
Tooele City enjoys in regulating growth in its community is not expressly 
proscribed by the terms of the Development Agreement, then you cannot interject 
implied covenants to limit the exercise of such discretion. 
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Instruction No. ^ : Damages - Reasonable Certainty. 
Damages are only recoverable for loss in an amount that the evidence proves with 
reasonable certainty, although the actual amount of damages need not be proved 
with precision. Any alleged damages which are only remote, possible or a matter 
of guess work are not recoverable. 
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Instruction No. Wj Mitigation and Avoidance. 
Tooele Associates and Tooele City each claim that the breach of contract claims 
against them fail because the party claiming breach of contract against them failed 
to mitigate its damages. 
The party claiming breach had a duty to mitigate, that is, to minimize or avoid, the 
damages caused by the breach. The party claiming breach may not recover 
damages that it could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation. 
Likewise, the party claiming breach may not recover the damages for losses that 
were caused by or made worse by its own action or inaction. 
The party claiming breach has a right to recover damages if it has made a 
reasonable but unsuccessful effort to avoid loss. 
The party claiming breach had no obligation to mitigate its damages by taking 
action that the other party refused to take. If the other party had the primary 
responsibility to perform obligations under the contract and had the same 
opportunity to perform those obligations and the same knowledge of the 
consequences as the party claiming breach, the other party cannot succeed in a 
claim that the party claiming breach failed to perform those obligations. 
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Instruction No.H%: Enforcing Traffic Laws on Private Streets. 
Tooele City may not regulate traffic on private roads, and may only regulate 
traffic on public roads or streets within its jurisdiction. 
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Instruction N o / ^ : Definition of Public Improvements. 
Public improvements are all public utility infrastructure improvements, whether 
on or off-site, and including all sewer, storm water, culinary water, publicly-
owned secondary water, street lights and associated electrical, streets, curbs, 
gutters, sidewalks, alleys, easements and rights-of-way, street signs, monuments 
and markers, regulatory signs, landscaping (including park strip and trees), and 
other improvements considered public utility infrastructure improvements in the 
construction trade which are found within typical subdivision and site plan 
construction documents. 
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Jury Instruction No. H¥ 
Tooele City Code & Ordinances 
Certain portions of the Tooele City Code and Tooele City Ordinances are attached 
to this instruction. These portions of the City's Code and Ordinances may have some 
relevance to the issues presented by this case and are provided for your reference. 
City Code §7-19-35; 
City Code §7-19-37; 
City Code § 1-6-9; and 
City Code §7-19-12. 
REos&duroo feH^Trah^^ 
Procedures for Accepting Public Improvements 
CleanSetWouOes.wpd7 
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The Assistant shall, with the approval of the 
Mayor, appoint all employees and members of the City 
departments and fix their salaries within any adopted 
salary schedules, except as otherwise provided. (Ord. 
67-3,08-14-67) 
1-6-9. Sign for city. 
The Mayor shall sign all contracts, leases, deeds 
and other writings on the part of the City as authorized 
by resolution of the Council or as required by law. 
Notwithstanding, the Mayor shall have authority to sign 
all contracts on the part of tlie City which are 
administrative in nature and which are for less than 
$8,000.00, without further City Council authorization. 
He shall appoint all committees authorized by 
ordinance or resolution of the Council. 
He may grant such privileges and fee licenses as 
are authorized by the provisions of this Code. 
(Ord. 2000-17,08-16-2000); (Ord. 67-3,08-14-67) 
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If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or 
portion of this ordinance is for any reason held invalid or 
unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, 
such portion shall be deemed a separate, distinct and 
independent provision and such holding shall not affect 
the validity of the remaining portions thereof. (Ord. 77-
18,10-19-77) 
7-19-5. Rules or Interpretation. 
(1) Words used in the present tense shall includethe 
future; and words used in the singular shall include the 
plural number, and the plural the singular. 
(2) "Shall" is mandatory and not discretionary. 
(3) "May" is permissive, 
(4) "Lot" shall include the words "plot, piece and 
parcer. 
(5) "Used for" shall include the phrases "arranged 
for, designated for, intended for, maintained for and 
occupied for". (Ord, 77-18, 10-19-77) 
7-19-6. Repealed, (Ord. 94-26,05-12-94) 
7-19-7* Applicability of this chapter. 
The procedures and requirements of this Chapter 
must be followed; 
(1) By every person creating a subdivision as 
defined herein, 
(2) By every person who desires to dedicate any 
street, alley or other land for public use, even though said 
dedication is not a subdivision as defined herein. 
(3) By every person who desires to divide a tract or 
parcel of land into two (2) parts for the purpose, whether 
immediate or future, of sale or of building development, 
when In the discretion of the Planning Commission the 
circumstances surrounding said division of land are such 
that the public interests would not be protected otherwise. 
For the purpose of this paragraph (3), the Building 
Inspector shall refer any such proposed division of land to 
the Planning Commission which he feels comes within 
whatever informal guidelines the Planning Commission 
shall issue. The Planning Commission shall then 
determine whether the procedures and requirements of 
this Chapter should apply. 
(Ord. 81-24,06-11-81) 
7-19-8* Procedure for approval of preliminary plan* 
(1) Prior to the submission of any preliminary plan, 
the applicant shall confer with the Building Official of (he 
City and such other City officials as he shall request, 
including the Planning and Zoning Commission when 
convened. The purpose of such preapplication conference 
is to permit the applicant and the City to review the 
proposed land development activity and its use, the site, 
area of potential conformity or conflict with the City's 
development policy, and the process by which die 
proponent may proceed to seek a permit for the proposed 
land development activity sought by the applicant. The 
preapplication conference shall concern, but need not be 
limited to a discussion of the following: 
(a) The site: Its size, location and accessibility; 
land use and development in the neighboring area; and 
(March 29,2006) 
policy constraints and opportunities. 
(b) The proposed use or land development 
activity: The type of development proposed and the 
placement of buildings or other improvements on the site; 
the density or intensity of use of the development; the type 
and amount of public facilities likely to he required by the 
development, and method of providing the same; existing 
public improvements which are anticipated to benefit the 
proposed use or land development activity, and which, 
pursuant to Section 7-19-13 of this Code, subject the 
applicant to a reimbursement requirement; the capital 
improvements program, the location, type and method of 
maintenance of open space, public Improvements, 
common areas and facilities; proposed contouring and 
landscaping; proposed internal vehicular circulation 
system and parking. 
(c) Policy consideration: The policy plan or 
master plan of the City to the extent the same is 
articulated in writing shall be adhered to in the 
preliminary plan to be submitted by the applicant. 
Discussion of the City*s master plan or policy plan, impact 
statement requirements, submission requirements and 
other applicable provisions of the City Code, County 
regulations and State law will also be discussed. 
The preapplication conference shall be held by the 
applicant and the City at a mutually agreeable time during 
normal working hours* unless an additional conference 
with the Planning and Zoning Commission is requested, 
which conference may be in the evening at a time when 
the Planning and Zoning Commission shall be convened, 
(2) The subdivider will then cause to be prepared 
twelve (12) copies of the preliminary plan which shall 
include all of the property to be subdivided by the 
applicant as well as all other property owned or controlled 
by the applicant which is adjacent to or considered 
contiguous to the portion to be subdivided. The 
subdivider shall also prepare such other supplementary 
material as was specified by the City in the preapplication 
conference, as well as a written application for approval 
of the preliminary plan, Said written application shall 
contain lines for the signatures of the members of the 
Planning and Zoning Commission, Tooele City Fire Chief, 
Tooele City Police Chief, Tooele Postmaster, City 
Attorney, Building Official, Superintendent of Tooele 
County Schools, and the Tooele City Health Officer. 
(3) At least fifteen (15) days prior to a regular 
meeting of the Planning and Zoning Commission, the 
Building Official shall refer five (5) copies of the 
preliminary plan to the members of the Commission, one 
(1) copy each to the Postmaster, Fire Chief, Police Chief, 
Attorney, Superintendent of Schools> Accessibility 
Committee member, and Health Officer. Said individuals 
shall submit their opinions regarding the proposed 
development to the Building Official prior to the 
convening of the Commission or at the said meeting if 
they attend in person. At said meeting, the applicant and 
the Commission shall review the preliminary plan for 
compliance with these regulation, and other ordinances of 
the City and shall, within two (2) months from the first 
7-69 
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regular meeting following the said meeting: 
(a) Approve or disapprove the proposed 
preliminary subdivision plan and submit its written 
recommendations of the City Engineer to the City 
Council An application shall not be approved until 
receiving all the signatures listed in subsection (2) above. 
(b) If the Planning and Zoning Commission 
finds that changes, additions or corrections are required 
on the preliminary plan, the Commission shall so advise 
the subdlvider in writing. The subdivider may resubmit 
the preliminary plan to the Commission without paying an 
additional fee, for its consideration at the next regular 
meeting of said Commission. The Commission shall, at 
said meeting, approve or disapprove the preliminary plan 
and submit its recommendations in writing to the City 
Council. 
(4) If the plat is approved by the Commission, the 
City Council shall accept or reject said plan within one (1) 
month after Its next regular meeting following the action 
of the Planning and Zoning Commission. The applicant 
and the Council may mutually agree to extend the one (1) 
month period. 
(5) The following qualifications shall govern 
approval of the preliminary plan: 
(a) Approval of the preliminary plan by the 
Planning and Zoning Commission is tentative only, 
involving merely the general acceptability of the layout as 
submitted, 
(b) Approval of the preliminary plan shall be 
effective for a maximum period of one (1) year unless, 
prior to the one-year period lapsing,, the Council grants an 
extension, not to exceed six (6) months, upon written 
request of the developer. The request for said extension 
shall not require an additional fee, or the submittal of 
additional copies of the preliminary plan of the 
subdivision. If the final plat is not submitted to the 
Building Official prior to the expiration of said one (1) 
year period which begins to run from the date that the 
preliminary plan is approved by the Council, the approval 
of the said preliminary plan automatically lapses and is 
void and of no further force or effect. Thereafter, the 
developer must recommence the application process as 
then in effect. (Ord, 2005-06,05-18*2005); (Ord. 98-35, 
10-07-98); (Ord.9847,07-01-98; Ord 7748,1049-77) 
749*9. Plats and data for approval of preliminary 
plan. 
The following data and plats are required for 
approval of the preliminary plan; 
(I) Topographic data required as a basis for the 
preliminary plat, in subsection (B) below, shall include 
existing conditions as follows, except when otherwise 
specified by the Planning and Zoning Commission: 
(a) Boundary line: Bearing and distances of all 
boundary lines of the subdivision as proposed. 
(b) Easements: The location, width and purpose 
of all easements of the subdivision, 
(c) Streets on and adjacent to the tract: Name 
and right-of-way width and location of all streets of the 
proposed subdivision; type, width and elevation of 
surfacing; any legally established centerKne elevations, 
walks, curbs, gutters, culverts, etc, 
(d) Utilities on and adjacent to the tract: 
Location, size of sanitary sewers on or adjacent to the 
tract; location and size of all water mains on or adjacent 
to the tract; if water mains and sewers are not on or 
adjacent to the tract, indicate the direction and distance to, 
and the size of nearest facilities. 
(e) The preliminary plan of thesubdiviskm shall 
be accompanied by: 
(1) either a preliminary plan for sewer and 
water lines, or a written statement setting forth the general 
plans for such improvements and indicating the method to 
be used to overcome particular problems thai may be 
encountered with the development of the proposed 
system. 
(2) where the sanitary sewage facilities are 
proposed to be provided by individual septic systems, 
percolation tests shall be made on the property and a 
report on these tests prepared by a professional engineer 
licensed to practice in the State of Utah, These tests shall 
be made at a frequency of one (1) test hole for each five 
(5) lots or each three (3) acres, whichever requires the 
greater number of test borings. 
(3) a letter from each utility company 
involved in the subdivision, addressed to the Planning and 
Zoning Commission stating that the preliminary plan has 
been reviewed and setting forth the utility company's 
comments regarding the utility service design and 
easements. 
(4) an exact copy of a preliminary report of 
a title insurance company, a title insurance policy or an 
attorney's opinion brought to date of the application, 
setting forth the names of all property owners of property 
included in the subdivision as shown on the preliminary 
plat, as well as all mortgages, judgments, liens, easements, 
contracts and other clouds affecting title to said premises. 
The City may require all persons having an interest in the 
premises, as disclosed by the report, policy or opinion, to 
join In and approve of the subdivision application, 
(5) when a proposed street will intersect a 
state or county highway or a railroad, written consent of 
the appropriate authorities having jurisdiction over said 
highway or railroad shall be submitted. 
(6) all information required by the FHA 
when the subdivision will be submitted to that agency for 
feasibility and approval under a federal program, 
(7) a written statement outlining any existing 
public improvements which are anticipated to benefit the 
proposed use or land development activity, and which, 
pursuant to Section 7-19-13 of this Code, subject the 
applicant to a reimbursement requirement. 
(f) Other conditions on the tract: Water 
courses, marshes, rock outcropping, wooded areas, 
isolated preservable trees one (1) foot or more in caliper 
at one (I) foot above ground level, houses, barns, shacks 
and other significant features. 
(g) Other conditions on adjacent land: 
Approximate direction and gradient of ground slope, 
including any embankments or retaining walls, character 
and location of buildings, railroads, power lines, towers 
and other nearby nonresidential land uses or adverse 
influences and ownerahip of adjacent unplatted land (for 
adjacent platted land, refer to the subdivision plats by 
(March 29, 2006) 7-70 
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for approval by submitting the same to the City Recorder 
at least fifteen (15) days before a regular meeting of the 
Council. 
(b) Action must be taken by the Council within 
two (2) months after the meeting at which the final plat and 
all drawings, maps and other documents regarding the 
development have been submitted for its approval The 
Council may extend the two (2) month period upon a two-
thirds (2/3) vote of its members, 
(6) Recordation. Tooele city will record the final plat 
with the Tooele County Recorder pursuant to Section 7-19-
39, below. 
(Ord, 2005-06, 05-18-2005); (Ord. 2004-02, 01-07-04); 
(Ord.98-35,10-07-98); (Ord. 98-16,07«01-98;OrcL 78-28, 
11-21-78; Ord. 77-18,10-19-77) 
7-19-11, Plats and data for final approval, 
(I) The final plat shall be drawn in ink on tracing 
cloth on sheets not to exceed thirty-six (36) inches by 
forty-eight (48) inches and shall be at a scale of one 
hundred (100) feet to one (1) Inch, Where necessary, the 
plat may be on several sheets accompanied by an index 
sheet showing the entire subdivision. For large 
subdivisions, the fmai plat may be submitted for approval 
progressively in contiguous sections satisfactory to the 
Planning and Zoning Commission. The final plat shall 
show the following: 
(a) Primary control points, approved by the City 
Engineer, or descriptions and "ties" to such control points, 
to which all dimensions, angles, bearings and similar data 
on the plat ahall be referred* 
(b) Tract boundary lines, right-of-way lines of 
streets, easements and other rights-of-way and property 
lines of residential lots and other sites, with accurate 
dimensions, bearings and deflection angles and radii, arcs 
and central angles of all curves, 
(c) Name and right-of-way width of each street 
or other right-of-way, 
(d) Location, dimensions and purpose-of any 
easements, 
(e) Number to Identify each lot or site and block, 
(i) Purpose for which sites, other than residential 
lots, are dedicated or reserved* 
(g) Proposed building set-back lines on all lots 
and other sites. 
(h) Location and description of monuments. 
(i) Certification by a registered land surveyor 
licensed by the State of Utah certifying to the accuracy of 
the survey and plat. 
(j) Certification of the County Treasurer 
showing that all taxes and special assessments due on the 
property to be subdivided have been paid in full. 
(k) Dedication by the owners, of the tract of all 
streets, easements and rights-of-way to the public, and 
other proposed public way or space shown on the plat. 
(1) Certification of title showing that the 
applicant is the owner of the agent of the owner, 
(m) Proper form, for the approval of the Council, 
with space for the signatures of the Council members. 
(n) Approval by signatures of the Council, 
Planning and Zoning Commission, Health Officer, City 
Attorney and such other persons concerned with the 
approval thereof or the specifications for utility 
installations. 
(o) Name of the subdivision. 
(p) Location by section, township and range. 
(q) Title, scale, north arrow and date. 
(2) Cross sections and profiles of streets showing 
grades. The scales and elevations shall be based on the 
U.S.G.S. Datum Plane. 
(3) Protective covenants in form for recording. 
(Ord, 2005-06, 05-18-2005); (Ord. 98-35, 10-07-98); 
(Formerly Repealed by Ord.93*04, 05-04-93) 
7-19-12. Public improvements; bonds and bond 
agreements. 
Public improvements shall be completed pursuant to the 
following procedure: 
(1) After approval of the preliminary plan, the 
subdivider shall present plans and specifications for all 
public improvements to the city Engineer for review and 
approval. 
(a) If engineering plans require substantial" 
changes from the approved preliminary plan, the 
subdivider shall-revise and re-submlt the public 
improvements plans and specifications* 
(b) Re-submissions shall not require the 
payment of additional fees to the City. The City, 
however, shall not be responsible for the cost of any 
revisions or for any costs incurred due to delays caused by 
requiring the revisions. 
(c) No public improvements may be constructed 
prior to final plat approval. 
(2) Upon approval of the plans and specifications by 
the City Engineer, the fmai plat shall be submitted to the 
City Council for approval, modification, or disapproval. 
(3) All public improvements shall be completed 
within one (1) year from the date of final plat approval. 
The City Council may grant a maximum of two six (6)-
month extensions upon receipt of a written petition and 
upon a finding of unusual circumstances. Petitions for 
extension must be filed with the City Recorder prior to 
expiration of the applicable one (1 )-year period or six (6)-
month extension, 
(4) Within ninety (90) days of fmai plat approval, 
the subdivider shall submit and execute a bond and bond 
agreement compliant with this Section. The purpose of 
the bond and bond agreement is to insure completion of 
all public improvements required to be installed in the 
subdivision and to warrant the quality of their 
construction. No final plat may be recorded prior to the 
execution of a bond agreement. Failure to provide the 
required bond and fully execute the required bond 
agreement within the specified ninety (90) days shall 
result in the automatic revocation of, and shall void, the 
final plat approval. 
(5) Bond agreements shall be in the form and contain 
the provisions approved by the City Attorney. The 
agreement shall be signed by the Mayor* the City 
Attorney, and the City Engineer. The agreement shall 
include, without limitation, the following: 
(a) Incorporation by reference of the final plat, 
final plat documents, public improvements plans and 
specifications, and ail data required by this Chapter which 
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is used by the City Engineer to estimate the cost of the 
specific public improvements, 
(b) Incorporation by exhibit of the City 
Engineer's estimate of the cost of the specific public 
improvements. 
(c) Completion of the public improvements 
within the period of time described in subsection (3), 
above. 
(d) Completion of the public improvements to the 
satisfaction of City inspectors and according to City 
standards, as established by the Tooele City Code and City 
policies. 
(©) Establishment of the bond amount* which 
shall be equal to the subdivided estimated cost of the 
public improvements to be installed, as reviewed an 
approved by the City Engineer or designee, plus twenty 
percent (20%) of the estimated costs as a reasonable 
contingency. 
(f) The City shall have exclusive control over the 
bond proceeds, which may be released to the subdivider 
only upon "written approval of the City Attorney. 
(g) The bond proceeds may be reduced upon 
written request of the subdivider as the improvements are 
installed and upon approval by City inspectors on a City 
inspection report form. The amount of the reduction shall 
be determined by reference to the City Engineer's estimate 
attached to the bond agreement, with assistance from the 
City Engineer, as necessary. Such requests may be made 
only once every thirty (30) days. All reductions shall be by 
the written authorization of the City Attorney. 
(h) Bond proceeds may be reduced by no more 
than eighty percent (80%) of the total bond amount, the 
remaining twenty percent (20%) being retained to 
guarantee the warranty and maintenance of the 
improvements as provided in Sections 7-19-12(7) and 7-
19-35, herein, 
(i) If the bond proceeds are Inadequate to pay the 
cost of the completion of the improvements according to 
City standards for whatever reason, including previous 
reductions, then the subdivider shall be responsible for the 
deficiency and no further building permits shall be issued 
in thesubdivision until the improvements are completed or, 
with City Council approval, a new bond and bond 
agreement have been executed to insure completion of the 
remaining improvements, 
0) If» after expiration of the bond agreement 
time period, the bond proceeds are not transferred to the 
City within thirty days (30) of the City's written demand, 
then the City's costs of obtaining the proceeds, including 
the City Attorney's Office costs and any outside attorney' s 
fees and costs, shall be deducted from the bond proceeds, 
(k) The subdivider agrees to hold the City 
harmless from any and all liability which may arise as a 
result of those public improvements which are installed 
until such time as theCity accepts the public improvements 
as provided in this Chapter. 
(6) Bond agreements shall be one of the following 
types: 
(a) An irrevocable letterof credit with a financial 
institution federally or state insured, upon a current 
standard letter of credit form, or including alt information 
contained in the current standard letter of credit form.* 
(b) A cashier's check or a money market 
certificate made payable only to Tooele City Corporation. 
(c) A guaranteed escrow account from a 
federally or state insured financial Institution, containing 
an institution guarantee. 
(7) Warranty. The Subdivider shall warrant and be 
responsible for the maintenance of all Improvements for 
one (1) year following their acceptance by Resolution of 
the City Council, and shall guarantee such warranty and 
maintenance in the above-described bond agreements. 
(8) In addition to other fees, the subdivider shall pay 
a $250.00 administrative fee to Tooele City.to administer 
the bonds and bond agreements. 
(Ord. 2004-02, 01-07-04); (Ord. 2000-24, 12-06-2000); 
(Ord. 98-21,07-01-98); (Ord, 96-26,12-04-96); (Ord. 77-
IB, 10-19-77) 
7-19-13, Applications for Reimbursement, 
(1) Definitions. All words and phrases in this 
Section beginning in capital letters shall have the 
meanings given them in Tooele City Code Section 74-5. 
(2) Application for Reimbursement Developers 
required to install Eligible Public Improvements may be 
entitled to reimbursement pursuant to this Section, 
provided that: 
(a) the Construction Costs of the Eligible Public 
Improvements required by the City as a condition of 
development approval exceeds the Construction Cost of 
the City's required minimum standards and specifications 
for the Eligible Public Improvements by ten percent (10%) 
or more; and, 
(b) the Cost Differentia! exceeds $5,000; and 
(c) the Eligible Public Improvements are 
constructed within the Tooele City Corporate Limit; and 
(d) the Subsequent Developer's development 
receives City approval within eight (8) years from the date 
of City approval of the development forwhich the Eligible 
Public Improvements were required; and, 
(e) the Prior Developer files an Application for 
Reimbursement In the office of the Director of Public 
Works or City Engineer. 
(3) Application for Reimbursement 
(a) Developers satisfying the above criteria may 
apply for reimbursement for recovery of a pro-rata share 
of the Cost Differential, minus the Depreciation Value, 
from a Subsequent Developer to 1he extent that the 
Subsequent Developer did not share in the Construction 
Cost of the Eligible Public Improvements. 
(b) Notwithstanding other provisions of this 
Section to the contrary, subdivisions often (10) lots or 
less, or single-lot developments, that are required by the 
City to fully improve a road right-of-way (Le. road base, 
road surface, curb, gutter) are eligible to apply for and 
receive reimbursement for iht Construction Cost of that 
portion of the road improvements that direcdy benefit 
subsequent development located adjacent to the road 
improvements, minus the Depreciation Value. 
(4) The Application for Reimbursement shall be 
made on a form approved by the City Attorney, and shall 
include the following information: 
(a) a brief description of the Eligible Public 
Improvements which may directly benefit future 
development; and, 
(b) an engineer's written estimate of the 
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W.'-te U'royisions of Section 7-19-12, Tooele City Code, m the 
ft" ' amointof$200per required park strip tree; or 
• ' (2) wake, a non-refundable payment to Tooele 
PI City in the amount of $200,00 per required tree, which 
-• .
J
 shaft be used by the Director of Parks and recreation to 
I plant trees within the park strips of the subdivision. 
U':. (3) Protective screen planting may be required 
:V • to secure a reasonably effective physical barrier between 
H : residential propcrticsand adjoining uses which minimizes 
• ' Adverse visual, auditoiy, and other conditions. The screen 
*'; planting plan shall be approved by the Planning 
Commission and the City Council upon the 
| | recommendation of the Community Development Director 
• and Director of Parks and Recreation, 
™ (Ord. 2005-03, 02*02-05); (Ord. 2000-10, 06-21-2000); 
(Ord. 98-26,08-05-98); (Ord, 87-24,01-02-88); ( Ord. 77-
• 18,10-19-77) (Ord 87-24,01-02-88); (Ord 77-18,10-19-
• 77) 
^ 7-19-30, Sanitary sewers 
• Sanitary sewers and service laterals shall be installed 
• to serve all properties and lots In the subdivision, including 
properties reserved for public use or purchase. The 
m provisions of Title 8, Chapter 2, Tooele City Code, shall 
I apply to the installation design and construction of ail 
sanitary sewers and service lalerals.in subdivisions. (Ord. 
87-24,01-02-88; Ord. 77-18, 10-19-77) 
| 7-19-31. Engineering specifications. 
The owner or subdivlder shall install sanitary sewers, 
water supply system, street grading and pavement, alleys, 
^ crosswalks, public utilities and street lighting in accordance 
J with applicable ordinances and standards of construction in 
the City. (Ord. 77-18,10-19-77) 
• 7-19-32* Water service. 
* (1) The provisions ofTitle 9, Chapter 4. Tooele City 
Code, shall apply regarding all pipes, service laterals and 
M appurtenances provided in a subdivision. 
jB (2) All lots and properties including property reserved 
for public use or purchase shall be supplied with water 
service sufficient to meet the future anticipated uses of said 
M property. (Ord. 87-24,01-01-88; Ord. 77-18,10-19-77) 
7-19-33. Trench backfill, 
—
 All trench work shall conform to the provisions of 
• Title 4, Chapter % Tooele City Code. (Ord, 87-24,01 -02-
M 88; Ord. 77-19,10-19-77) 
M 7-19-34, Filing of engineering plans and review fee, 
H (l) Four (4) complete sets of engineering plans and 
^ specifications or required land improvements together with 
an estimate of the cost of improvements, said plans and 
•
specifications to bear the seal of a Utah registered 
professional engineer along with a signed statement to the 
effect that such plans and specifications have been 
•
prepared in compliance with this Chapter and pursuant to 
good engineering practices shall be submitted to the 
iN Building Official prior to the approval ofthe final plat by 
\ the Planning and Zoning Commission. Said plans shall 
(March 29,2006) 
be drawn to a minimum horizontal scale of five feet (5*) to 
the inch. Plans shall show profiles of all utility and street 
improvements with elevations referring to the U.S.O.S. 
Datum. 
(2) A plan review fee, based upon the following 
percentages of total land improvements costs, as estimated 
by the design engineer and approved by the City Engineer 
shall be submitted with the plans and specifications 
required above; 
(a) One and one-half percent of the construction 
cost ofthe improvements when such cost is fifty thousand 
dollars or less* 
(b) One percent ofthe construction cost ofthe 
Improvements when such cost is over fifty thousand 
dollars but less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars. 
(c) Three quarters of one percent of the 
construction cost ofthe improvements when such cost is 
over two hundred fifty thousand dollars. (Ord. 77-18,10-
19-77) 
7-19-35. Acceptance of required land improvements 
by the city. 
Upon the completion of the construction of all 
required public improvements, in conformance with City 
standards and the approved engineering plans and 
specifications, the design engineer engaged by the 
subdivlder, builder or land developer shall prepare and 
submit three certified sets of as-built plans and 
verification by the City Engineer or Public Works 
Director that all public improvements have been 
satisfactorily completed in accordance with the approved 
engineering plans and specifications, The City Council 
will approve a resolution accepting the public 
improvements and the same shall not be accepted by the 
City as City-owned and maintained improvements until 
the approval of said resolution. The one-year warranty 
period described in Section 7-19-12, above, shall 
commence on the date the resolution is approved. 
(Ord 2004-02,01-01-07-04); (Ord. 77-1B, 10-19-77) 
7-19-36. Repealed. (Ord. 2004-02,01-07-04). 
(Ord. 77-18,10-19-77) 
7-19-37. Building permits, 
(1) No building permit shall be issued for the 
construction of any residential building, structure, or 
improvement to the land or any lot within a residential 
subdivision as defined herein, which has been approved 
for platting or reptattlng, until all requirements of this 
Chapter have been complied with. The Building Official 
may issue building permits for noncombusiibie residential 
construction when his/her justification is entered into the 
City address file, after the developer increases any 
required bonds for one (I) additional yeara and after the 
finished street, curb and gutter, and all public utilities 
under the street are installed and havebeen approved by 
a qualified City inspector. Notwithstanding Chapter 7-22 
herein, under no circumstances shall a Certificate of 
Occupancy be issued until all requirements of this Chapter 
have been complied with. 
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(2) A building permit may be issued for 
noncombustible commercial construction prior, to all 
requirements of this Chapter being completed after all of 
the following conditions are met: 
(a) all public utilities required to be within the 
road right-of-way have been completed, compacted, tested, 
inspected, and certified; and, 
(b) the complete width and depth of required 
road base has been installed, compacted, tested, inspected, 
and certified to grade, with all test results turned into the 
City Engineer or Community development Director; and, 
(o) allrequiredbondingshalibeextendedforone 
<1) additional year; and 
(d) the developer shall make available lire 
cleaning areas where the road is accessed; and, 
(e) a road width of not less than 28 feet shall be 
maintained throughout the project until the finished road 
surface is in place. 
(3) Prior to the finished surface being added to the 
road, a certified geotechnlcal report shall be obtained from 
a qualified engineer and turned in to the City Engineer or 
Community Development Director. The report shall 
stipulate that the minimum road base is in place, is 
compacted, is free of contamination, and will support the 
load for which it was designed, 
(4) Notwithstanding Chapter 7-22, herein, under no 
circumstances will any Certificate of Occupancy be issued 
for any building, structure, or improvement until all 
requirements of this Chapter have been complied with, 
(Ord. 2005-17, 06-15-2005); (Ord. 77-18,10-19-77) 
7-19-38. Repealed. (Ord. 2000-22,10-18-2000). 
(Ord. 77-18,10-19-77) 
7-19-39. Final plat execution, delivery, and recordation. 
(1) The subdivider shall deliver to the City the fully 
executed final plat within ninety (90) days of final plat 
approval. Failure to fully execute the final plat, or to 
deliver the fully executed final plat to the City, within the 
specified ninety (90) days, shall result in the automatic 
revocation of, and shall void, the final plat approval. 
(2) Tooele City shall record all final plats with the 
Tooele County Recorder. 
(Ord. 2004-02,01-07-2004); (Ord. 77-18,10-19-77) 
7-19-40. Repealed. 
(Ord. 91-08, 12-12-91) 
7-19-41. Repealed, 
(Ord. 80-13,04-10-80) 
7-19-42. Repealed. 
(Ord. 94-56,01-31-95); (Ord. 88-18,07-06-88) 
7-19-43. Repealed. 
(Ord, 94-56,01-31-95); (Ord, 88-18,07-06-88) 
7-19-44, Exemptions from plat requirement. 
(1) In subdivisions of less than ten lots, land may be 
sold by metes and bounds, without the necessity of 
recording a plat if: 
(a) a reoommendation has been received from 
the planning commission; 
(b) the subdivision has been approved by the 
city council; 
(o) the subdivision is not traversed by the 
mapped lines of a proposed street as shown in the general 
plan and does not require the dedication of any land for 
street or other public purposes; and 
(d) if the subdivision is located in a zoned area, 
each lot in the subdivision meets the frontage, width, and 
area requirements of the zoning ordinance or has been 
granted a variance from those requirements by the board 
of adjustment. 
7-19-45. Effect of revocation and voiding. 
Any preliminary or final subdivision plat approval 
revoked or rendered void pursuant to the provisions of this 
Chapter 7-19 shall cause any new application of approval 
to be subject to the laws, ordinance, and policies of • 
Tooele City current as of the date of the completed new 
application. 
(Ord. 2004-02,01-07-04) 
NOTE: (This chapter renumbered from 7-19-13 thru 
7-19-44 per Ordinance 97-13,04-02-97) 
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AN ORDlNANCEdFTOOELE CITY AMENDING TOOELE GITY CQQEM9-18 AND 4 ^ 
2 REGARDING STREET DESIGN IN NEWSUBDIVISI0NS 
WHEREAS, the^Tobeie^ityC^uncil^^d Ordinance S&-25 regarding requiring the 
construction and improvement of ^ ^ adjacent to, and leading to all 
new subdivisions and dev&loprrfents; and;, 
WHEREAS, several developers objected^ the severe burdens placed upon them by 
virtue of Ordinance 98-25, pleading the impossibility of compliance; and, 
WHEREAS, th;6iGity Gouncilrequested thatt the City Attorney prepare an amendment 
aGixSmiriodating those developers, which received subdivision approval pnbr to the 
passageof Ordinance of Q&^.and mftigatingthe burden of havingto.devetep. full street 
widths on streets leading to and,adjacent to a subdivision where the develppendoes not 
. own the property required fo^ City does notyet^now the 
location of future Intefeeding streets public improvements; and, 
WHEREAS, the proposed amended ordinance, listed below, provides for such 
accommodations; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE TOOELE CITY COUNCIL that Tooele 
City Code 7-19-18 is hereby amended to read in Its entirety as follows, that Tooele City 
Code 4-8^2(12) is hereby repealed* and replaced with Tooele City Code 4-8-2a to read in 
its entirety as follows: 
7-19-18. Streets. 
(1) General rule, Theanangementof streets .in a 
new development.shall providefor. fte-cpn^uatiqn of 
existing streets in adjoining area&atthe saj^^or;^eater 
widfbsvunJess al^ed^ythePibnning (^niihissiontipon 
recommendation of the Tooele City piiblic Works 
Director; Partial streets shall not be.peimitted within a 
development, adjacent to a development, leading to a 
development or otherwise. All developments shall be 
adjacent to a dedicated street. All streets shall comply 
with the provisions of Title 4, Chapter 8, Tooele Gity 
Code, and the current Tooele City transportation master 
plan. 
(2) Exceptions to the general rule. An exception to 
the general rale stated in this-Section may be granted by 
the City Council, upon written regue^tsubiiiitted to the 
City Recorder, at least 15 days;pri6r to :ttie;date upon 
wnichme City Council will Gonsidettthe requesti to the 
following: 
(a) Those subdivisions which have received 
preliminary or final plat approval prior to September 16, 
1998; 
(b) Those.developments which have received 
site plan approval prior to September 16,1998, 
(c) Those planned developments which have 
received City Council approval prior to September 16> 
1998, and which set forth with specificity a development 
pha sing schedule, a transportation developmentplaii, and 
any otiier information required by the City, in a 
development agreement duly executed by the.Mayor, 
(d). Those non-residential developments 
consisting of a-'isingle building or group of buildings, the 
iisfe of which will Benefit the City while not unduly 
t#ung.Gity resources in.providing CS^services, &&, 
police protection, fire protection, .sn^w pjougjtrinfe 
utilitiesmaintenance. Benefits whichxnay.be cphsjdered 
by the City Council include, but are'notfimited to, the 
following: 
(i) employment generatedby tbeproposed 
development; 
(ii) property and sales tax revenue 
generated by (be proposed development; 
(iii) water supply demanded by the 
proposed development; and/or 
; (iv) iion-cphimercial and non-govemrnental 
services offered to be provided, by the proposed 
development to; Tooele City residents by. not-for-profit 
:
 organizations, e>g., churches, schools; 
(3) Thestandardsgovemingdevejopmentsexcepted 
from the general rule stated.inftis Sebfibn are as follows: 
(a) Streets; witliixi a development Partial, 
streets ^ i lnotbepermi&ih areas of development not£ 
on the outer boundaries of me development. 
(b) Streets adjacent to a development The 
developer shall fully develop (he side of the street 
fronting the development and shall construct an adequate !;| 
travel surface and associated improvements as 
determined by the Planning Commission upon 
recommendation of the Public Works Director, whose 
re<Jomniendation shall be based in part upon 
TC037470 
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considerations of public health and safety. 
(c) Streets leading to a development For 
streets leading to a development, the developer shall 
construct an adequate travel surface and associated 
improvements as determined by the Planning 
Commission upon recommendation of the Public Works 
Director, whose recommendation shall be based in part 
upon considerations of public health and safety. Where, 
in the opinion of the Public Works Director, a travel 
surface and associated improvements become inadequate 
to protect the public health and safety because of a 
proposed new development, the developer of that 
proposed new development shall improve the travel 
surface so that it becomes an adequate travel surface in 
tht opinion of the Planning Commission upon 
recommendation of the Public Works Director. 
(4) Street standards and specifications. Except as 
pemiitted by this Section, developers shall adliere to the 
provisions of Title 4, Chapter 8, Tooele City Code, and 
the current Tooele City transportation master plan. 
4~8-2a, Street widths. 
Street widths shall conform to the provisions of 
Section 7-19-18 of this Code. Street design and 
construction standards and specifications shall conform 
to the provisions of this Title. 
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PROXY VOTE of EARL COLE 
City Councilman 
City Council Meeting 
September 2,1998 
Ordinance 98-32: An Ordinance of Tooele City Amending Tooele City Code 7-1948- and 4-8-2 
Regarding Street Design in New Subdivisions, 
Vote: Nay 
Resolution 98-50: A Resolution Creating the Tooele City, Utah, Vine Street Special Improvement 
District and Authorizing the City Officials to Proceed to Construct Improvements Witliin the 
District. 
Vote: Nay, to the District as proposed, OR 
Yay, to a modified District giving consideration to lawful protests 
^ > 
Signed: Earl Cole 
Notary 
iAalt ok (jt-uh ") 
Count/ fyTfoe/c) 
^ NOTARY PUBU0 
TOMLMENDONCA SO NORTHMAN 
* ^ ~ 
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Amended Tooele City Council Ordinance 98-32 
This Ordinance is necessary for the immediate preservation of the peace, health, and 
safety of Tooele City residents and shall take effect immediately upon passage. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Ordinance is passed by the Tooele City Council this 
7 day of Qchi?t#-^, 1998. 
(For) 
TOOELE CITY COUNCIL 
(Against) 
.<<&£. 
Q^y&yic^fit ^JU-mC. 
^-^C sc^.-sC*-\. 
P4-JU. DtU3-*l\ 
£A-~- // 171£C$K_J 
(7 
ABSTAINING: 
(Approved) 
MAYOR OF TOOELE CITY 
(Disapproved) 
Rogertvans Baker, Tooele City Attorney 
C:\Documents\ORD\Street widths.832 amended.wpd 
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ORDINANCE 94-56 
AN ORDINANCE 0F THE TOOELE CITY COUNCIL REIATING TO THE 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; JffiFEAlilfe IN THE 
TOOELE CITY COD^ i&ATING TO TfiPE BOARD'S POWERS AND DUTIES; 
REPEALING REFERENCES TO THE BOARD OF AD]raSTMENT IN THE 
SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE; ENACTING A REFERENCE IN TTHE ZONING 
ORDINANCE PERTAINING ICQ THE FUNCTIONS ( # THE BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND HOW TO-:*#&B APPLICATION THERETO; AND 
MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS 
PREAMBLE 
WHEREAS, a review of provisions in the Tooele City Code pertaining to the board of 
adjustment has discovered ^ cfhflicting law, .provisions that are contrary to state law, the 
heedfor a reference in the zonihg. ordinance of how to make application to the board of 
adjustment, and technical corrections that should, be made? and, 
WHEREAS, the establishment of the board-6f.adjustment, its powers and duties are 
correctly ^ eeified in TTooeleCitj?-Code Title 2 Chapter 4; and, 
WHEREAS, because this ordinance contemplates an amendment to the subdivision 
ordinance, theplanridng.cx>miXTisaon reviewed it at a public hearing.ori frgC. /*f > 
199% following 14-days published notice of the hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§=10-9-802, whereupon the commission.voted to recommend its approval to the city 
council; and,, 
WHEREAS, because*this ordinance also contemplates ^ ^endment to the zoning 
ordinance, this coundl published in the'Tooele Transaipt-E^t|n.l4-dJays notice of.the 
time, place, and purpbse at which the zoning and subdivision^aihendpients were to be 
considered and public comment heard, and thereafter held that public hearing on 
2kC0m£fk <&/. > 1994; and, 
WHEREAS, this Council finds this ordinance to be in the best interest, the peace and 
the welfare of Tooele City and the citizens thereof, and that it should adopted; 
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ORDAINING CLAUSE 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE TOOELE CITY COUNCIL THAT: 
Section L Section Amended. 
Section 1-&6, Tooele City Code, Officers, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 
67-3, is amended to read: 
1-6-6, Officers. 
The Mmayor shall appoint the following officers: ^treasurer, Pgublic Ssafety 
©director, Clerk of the Court; Pgoundkeeper, five <$} members of the Planning 
^commission? and all advisory boards7(l excepting <£he following officers whe shall be 
appointed by the eily Qeouncil: ^recorder, Aauditor, A&nnual {independent Aauditor, 
two {2} members of the Planning G£ommission4 and members of the Bboard of 
Aadjustment. The Mmayor, by and with the consent of the Gcouncil, shall appoint the 
Aattorney. 
Section 2, Section Amended, 
Section 4-8-2, Street design, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 91-04, is 
amended to read: 
4-8-2. Street design* 
(1) All streets shall be subject to topographical conditions, public convenience and 
safety, and the relation to the proposed uses of land to be served by such streets. Where 
such is not shown on the land use plan or other plat of the City, the arrangement of' 
streets in a subdivision and elsewhere shall either: 
(a) provide for the continuation or appropriate projection of existing principal 
streets in surrounding areas; or 
(b) oanfoim to a plan for the area or neighborhood approved or adopted by the 
planning commission to meet a particular situation where topographical and other 
conditions make continuance or conformance to existing streets impracticable, 
(2) Streets shall be laid out so as to intersect as nearly as possible at right angles and 
rio street shall intersect any other street at less than 60 degrees. 
(33) The following functional classifications, definitions, and cross sections shall 
apply to all streets, alleys, curbs, and gutters within Tooele City: 
(a) (i) Functional Classification -- Urban principal arterial system. 
(ii) Definition -- Streets and highways servicing major metropolitan 
activity centers and separate communities, the highest traffic volume corridors, the 
longest trip desires, and a high proportion of total urban area travel on a minimum of 
.milage mileage. Service to abutting land shall be subject to controlled access. This 
system carries the major portion of trips entering and leaving an urban area, as well as 
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the majority of through movements desiring to bypass the central portion of Tooele City, 
and normally will carry important intxa-urban as well as inter-city bus routes, 
(iii) Cross section — 
Property 
Line 
...lOg', 
-ML i? 
Property 
Line 
=c 51 
(b) (i) Functional Classification - Urban minor arterial street system. 
(ii) Definition: Streets and highways interconnecting with and 
augmenting the urban principal arterial system and providing service to trips of moderate 
length at a somewhat lower level of travel mobility. The system places more emphasis 
on land access and distributes travel to geographic areas smaller than those identified 
with the higher systems. It includes all arterial^ not classified as principal. There may 
or may not be controlled access. 
(iii) Cross Section — 
Property 
Line 
JUX8L 
ML 
Property 
Line 
Qb £T| 
(i) Classification — Urban collector street system, 
(ii) Definition ~ Streets penetrating neighborhoods, collecting traffic 
from local streets in the neighborhoods, and channeling it into the arterial systems. A 
minor amount of through traffic may be carried on collector streets, but tiKe system 
primarily provides land access service and carries'local traffic movements within 
residential neighborhoods, commercial, and industrial areas. It may also serve local bus 
routes. 
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(iii) Cross Section -
Property 
Line 
-80L 
12* J&. 17 
Property 
line 
& = x0~| 
(d) (i) Classification - Urban local street system. 
(ii) Definition - Streets not classified in a higher system, primarily 
providing direct access to abutting land and access to the higher system. They offer the 
lowest level of mobility and usually cany no bus routes; service to through traffic is 
deliberately discouraged. 
(iii) Cross section -
Property 
Line 
JS6L 
12' | J2L I 12' 
[Property 
Line 
nb £T) 
(e) (i) Classification - Alleys. 
(ii) Definition - Minor ways which are used primarily for the vehicular 
access to the back or the side of properties otherwise abutting on a street 
(iii) Cross section - The cross section of alleys must be determined by the 
city on a case by case basis. The hard surface travel way of an alley shall in no case be 
less than thirty 30 feet in width. 
(f) (i) Curb and gutter descriptions. All curbs shall be six inches high from 
the lowest point of the gutter and four inches high from the flag of the gutter. The curb 
and gutter shall be poured at one time with six bag cement. Behind the curb shall be 
a park strip, the width of which will vary according to the width of the dedicated street 
right-of-way. Hie park strip may be eliminated by the city council for good cause shown 
after consideration of recommendations of the city engineer. There shall be a minimum 
four-foot wide sidewalk with an additional one and one-half foot wide strip of property 
prior to the property line of the adjacent premises. The sidewalk shall be widened to five 
feet for a distance of five feet at least every two hundred 200 feet. All sidewalks in 
commercial districts and in areas of general public gathering such as at parks and in 
front of churches and schools, shall be a minimum of five feet wide, with an appropriate 
decrease in park strip width. 
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(ii) Cross section -
12' 
Propfli 
Lmfe 
jrty 
30° 
Gutter & Curb 
4' Variable 
Slope 1/4": 1' 
Park Strip Sidewalk 
18" 
(g) Variances may be granted by the board of adjustment from .the 
requirements of Subsection (2) in appropriate situations -where found to be beneficial 
and in order to promote the health, safety, welfare, and efficient and orderly 
development of Tooele City. The-procedure for obtaining-a-variance is provided in 
Tooele City Code 7 19-42,' 
(34) Dead end streets, if any, shall ordinarily be not more than 200 feet in 
length, with a minimum outside radius of 50 feet at the closed end, unless the street ends 
at a point where the subdivider or'developer intends to extend a street pursuant to his 
preliminary plan submitted and approved by the City, in which case the turn-around 
may be of a temporary nature. 
(45) No more than two cross streets shall intersect at any one intersection, 
(5-6) Street grades shall be more than five^tenths percent, but less than ten 
percent for local and minor streets and alleys and less than seven for secondary and 
major streets. 
(6Z) Streets shall be leveled, whenever possible, to a grade of less than four 
percent for a distance of at least 100 feet approaching all intersections, and at the 
intersection a grade of three percent shall be maximum. 
(£8) All crests and sags shall have a vertical curve of a minimum length pursuant 
to the following table: 
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II Design Speed, MPH 
II Stopping Sight Distance: 
II Stopping distance, feet 
|| K* value for: 
|| Crest vertical curve 
|| Sag vertical curve 
|| Passing Sight Distance; 
|j Passing distance, feet 
I 2-lane 
| K* value for:. 
| Crest vertical curve 
20 
150 
16 
24 
30 
200 
28 
35 
1,100 
365 
40 
275 
55 . 
55 
: 1,500 
686 
50~ 
350 
85 
75 
1,800 
985 
60 || 
475 
160 1 
105 II 
2,100 
1,340 
*K value is a coefficient by which the algebraic difference in grade may be multiplied to 
determine the length in feet of the vertical curve which will provide minimum sight 
distance, 
(&9) Minimum radii of curvature on the center line shall be: 
(a) 300 feet for major streets; 
(b) 200 feet for secondary streets; 
(c) 100 feet for local streets. 
(£10) Between reversed curves there shall be a tangent at least 100 feet long 
(•JrQJJL) Street, alley, and pavement intersections shall be rounded by an arc, the 
minimum radius of which shall be: 
(a) 20 feet for streets; 
(b) & five feet for streets and alleys; 
(c) 20 feet or the shortest distance from pavement to the nearest property line 
for street pavements. 
(44-12) Wherever a dedicated or platted half-street or street only one-half wide as 
is required to serve the area to be subdivided or developed, within a subdivision or 
contiguous thereto, exists, the subdivider or developer shall be responsible for the 
improvement of the entire street so as to meet the then existing standards for street 
design, for the distance said street is contiguous to the subdivision tract. No new half-
streets shall be permitted. If peripheral streets must be aeated, the subdivider or 
developer shall be responsible for the entire width. 
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Section 3, Section Amended. 
Section 7-4-5, Parldng lots, Tooele City Code, as last amended by Ordinance 84-16, 
is amended to read: 
7-4-5. Parking lots, 
Every parcel of land used as a public or private parldng lot shall be developed and 
maintained in accordance with the following requirements: 
(1) Surfacing: Each off street parldng lot shall be surfaced with a bituminous surface 
course, Portland cement concrete or other approved surface as to provide a dustless 
surface. The planning Gcommission must approve any surface that is not bituminous 
surface course or Portland cement concrete. 
(2) Screening; The sides and rear of any off-street parldng lot which face or adjoin 
a residential district shall be adequately screened from such district by a masonry wall 
or solid visual barrier fence not less than three •(£) or more than six {6} feet in height as 
measured from the high side. 
(3) Landscaping. Each parldng lot shall be adequately landscaped and permanently 
maintained. 
(4) lighting;- lighting used to tfluminate any parking lot shall be arranged to reflect 
the light away from adjoining premises and from street traffic. 
(5) Conditional use permit, Where not otherwise authorized by this Title, when in 
the best interests of the community as determined by the Pglanning Gcommission, said 
the Gcommission may grant temporary or permanent conditional use permits for the use 
of land in residential districts for a parking lot, provided that in all cases? the following 
conditions are met: 
(a) The lot is to be used only for parking e* of passenger automobiles of 
employees, customers, or guests of the person or firm controlling and operating the lot, 
who shall be responsible for its maintenance and upkeep. 
(b) No charges shall be made for parking on said the lot, 
(c) The lot is not shall not be used for sales, repair work, or servicing of any 
land, but shall be used for parldng of vehicles only. 
(d) Entrances to and exits from the lot are to shall be located so as to do the 
least harm to the residential district in an aesthetic context. 
(e) No advertising sign or material is to shall be located on the lot. 
(f) All parldng is to be kept back of the setback building lines by a barrier 
which will prevent the use of the premises in front of the setback lines for the parldng 
of automobiles-/unless otherwise specifically authorized by the Board of Adjustment 
(g) The parking lot and that portion of the driveway back of the building line 
is to be adequately saeened from the street and from adjoining property in a residential 
district by a hedge or sightly fence or wall not less than three {3} feet, nor more than six 
i€y feet in height, located back of the-setback building line*,. a& AU lighting is to be 
arranged so there will be no glare therefrom annoying to the occupants of adjoining 
property in a residential district and the The surface of the parldng lot is to be smoothly 
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graded, hard-surfaced? and adequately drained. 
(h) There may be imposed such, other conditions as may be deemed necessary 
by the Pglanning Gcommission to protect the character of the residential district. 
(i) Drainage shall be disposed of upon the premises of the parking lot, as per 
the requirement set by the Tooele City Engineer city engineer. 
(j) No private or public garage or parking lot for more than five -(5) motor 
vehicles shall have an entrance or exit in any district within one hundred fifty (150) feet 
of the entrance or exit of a public school, church, playground, or other public or semi-
public institution or facility. 
Section 4, Section Amended. 
Section 7-5-12, Lapsing of permit, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 88-18, 
is amended to read: 
7-5-12. Lapsing of permit. 
Where building or remodeling requiring a building permit is contemplated in 
connection with the use, the conditional use permit shall lapse 180 days after its issuance 
unless prior to that date a building permit has been issued and construction is 
commenced and diligently pursued, or unless otherwise specifically provided by the 
Pglarming ©commission. A request for renewal must be accompanied by a written 
statement, under oath, by the applicant or his an authorized agent, stating the reason the 
building permit has not been issued aad/or why no construction has been commenced. 
A conditional use permit may be renewed by the planning Gcommission for a period 
of 90 days. If renewal of the • conditional use permit is denied by-the Planning 
Goxnixuooionran- appeal may be taken to the Board of Adjustment within 30 days of such 
denial, The appeal shall be heard at the-next available regular meeting of the Board of 
Adjustment The Board-of-Adjustment shall render a decision on the denial of this 
renewal request within 30 days of the-hearing. However, if no •dedsion-by the Board of 
Adjustment is made within such period, the request for renewal shallbe deemed denied. 
In all other cases where the-use requested is not maintained for any-six month period? 
the-permit shall -lapse unless otherwise provided-for by the Planning Commission, or 
unless a- renewal is obtained-as provided above. 
Sections. Section Amended. 
Section 7-6-7, Scope of planning commission actions, Tooele City Code, as enacted 
by Ordinance 88-18, is amended to read: 
7-6-7, Scope of planning commission action. 
In carrying out the intent of this Chapter, the Pglanning Gcommission shall consider 
the following principles; 
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(1) It'is the intent of this Chapter that site and building plans for a planned unit 
development shall be prepared by a professional architect or engineer having professional 
competence in urban planning as proposed in the application. 
(2) It is not the intent of this Chapter that control of the design of a planned unit 
development by the planning ©commission be so rigidly exercised that individual 
initiative be stifled and substantial additional expense incurred; rather, it is the intent 
of this Chapter that the control exercised be the minimum necessary to achieve the 
purpose of this Chapter. 
(3) The planning Ggommission may approve or disapprove an application for a 
planned unit development In an approval, the Gcommission may attach such 
conditions as it may deem necessary to secure compliance with the purposes set forth 
heremrin this Chapter. The-'detision of the Planning Commission may be appealed to 
the Board of Adjustment 
Section 6, Section Amended, 
Section 7-9-4, Application, Tooele City Code, as last amended by Ordinance 88-18, 
is amended to read; 
7*9-4. Application^ Recreational vehicle park development application* 
(1) An overall plan for development of a recreational vehicle park shall be submitted 
to the planning Commission for review. The plan shall be drawn to a scale not smaller 
than one {4} inch to fifty (50) feet. At least six {6} copies of the plan shall be submitted, 
The plan shall show: 
(a) Tthe topography of the side site, when required by the ^planning 
Gcommission, represented by contours shown at not greater than two foot intervalsri 
(b) 3rthe proposed street and trailer or recreational vehicle space pad layout? 
, with cGonvenient means of vehicular and pedestrian access to recreational vehicles, 
parldng areas and accessory buildings, including access for firefighting equipment, 
delivery trucks, and garbage trucks, as well as occupant's automobiles; All roads shall be 
continuous; 
(c) ^tabulations showing the percent of area to be devoted to parks, 
playgrounds and open space, the number of trailer spaces and total area to be developed?; 
(d) proposed location, number, and design of parldng spaces and accessory 
buildings*; 
(e) a ©generalized landscaping and utility plan, including location of water, 
sewer, electricity, gas lines, and fire hydrantsr; 
(f) Aany other data the Gcity Bengineer or Pglanning Gcommission may 
require. 
(2) Applications for approval shall be in writing, submitted to the Pglanning 
Gcommission. at-its regular meeting and- shall- be-granted- or denied within-30 days? 
unless an extension of time is approved by the Planning Commission. An application 
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denied by the Planning Commission may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment, which 
appeal must be made in writing within 30 days after ouch denial. 
(3) City Engineer: It shall be the duty of the Gdty Eengineer to investigate and 
examine all such premises to determine that licenses or keepers thereof have complied 
with the provisions of this Code. 
(4) Register Required: Every licensee of such premises shall keep a daily register of 
all guests or tenants of such premises. saidThe register shall be available at all times and 
for one •£!} year thereafter for inspection by Tooele City. 
(5) Fee; Issuance: After the installation of all required improvements and service 
facilities in accordance with specifications as indicated by a statement from the € d t y 
^engineer, and upon the payment of a fee as per an adopted schedule, which fee shall be 
effective for the balance of the calendar year in which it is issued, the €£ity ^recorder 
shall issue a license to operate a recreational vehicle park or campground, 
(6) Revocation: Upon the recommendation of the € d t y Egngineer, and after a 
hearing and due cause shown at such hearing, the Gdty Scoundl may refuse to grant any 
license under this Chapter and may revoke any license theretofore lssuedrandA tft shall 
be unlawful for any person to operate any recreational vehicle park after the revocation 
of hie the license; provided, that all applicants or licensees shall be given a reasonable 
notice of any hearing as specified in this Chapter. 
(7) Rules and Regulations: The City is hereby authorized to make and to adopt such 
written regulations as may be necessary for the proper enforcement of the provisions of 
this Chapter provided, that such regulations shall not be in conflict with the provisions 
of this Chapter, and the penalty for violation of the provisions thereof shall be the same 
as the penalty for violation of any provisions of the Code. 
(8) RlopIay^The license to conduct or maintain a recreational vehicle park issued 
pursuant-to the provisions of this Chapter shall be properly framed and conspicuously 
displayed in the recreational park office located upon the premises. 
(9) Dimensions and SpcrificationsiThe dimensions and Improvement specifications 
of recreational vehicle paries shall be as follows: 
(a) Area. Each recreational vehicle space shall be not less than one thousand 
two hundred fifty {1,250} square feet in area and shall be at least fewenty-five-(25)- feet 
wide. All spaces shall be clearly marked and shall be accessible from all sides. Only one 
•ft} recreational vehicle shall be parked in one -(i) recreation vehicle space. 
(b) Spacing of recreational- vehicles;- The minimum spacing between 
recreational vehicles and between recreational vehicles and buildings shall be as follows: 
(i) Sside-to-side spacing, fifteen (15) feet; 
(ii) Bend-to-end spacing, ten £K)> feet^ 
jc}. -(Hi)- No recreational vehicle shall be located closer than twenty five (25) 
feet from the right-of-way line of a street or highway nor closer than ten {443} feet from 
the recreational vehicle park boundary. 
(ed) Interior roads. All roads within the recreational vehicle park shall be at 
least twenty-(20} feet wide, exclusive of parking space?, and shall be continuous. 
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(de) Parking space?- Each recreational vehicle space shall be provided with 
parking space of not less than two-hundred (200) square feet for at least one {^vehicle, 
exclusive of roadways, 
(ef) Walks. Walks of not less than three {&) feet in width shall be provided 
from the entrance? exclusive of roadways. 
(fg) Service buildings? In any recreational vehicle paric designed for, or licensed 
to permit, one •£!•) or more dependent recreational vehicles, service buildings shall be 
provided within two hundred (200) feet from any such recreational vehicle space as 
follows; 
(i) There shall be Sgeparate men's and women's toilet rooms, distinctly 
.marked and separated by a sound-resistant wall, A vestibule or screen shall be provided 
to prevent direct view into toilet rooms when exterior doors are open. 
(ii) For each ten (W) dependent recreational vehicles or? fraction thereof, 
there shall be: 
(a) ©one laundry tray or washing machineri 
(b) Ffor men, one water closet, but urinals may be substituted for 
one-third {4yS) of tht number of required water closets; one lavatory or wash basin; one 
bathtub or shower; one slot sink with hot and cold running waters 
(c) £for women, one water closet; one lavatory or wash basin; one 
bathtub or shower; one slop sink with hot and cold running water?; 
(iii) All water closets and bathtubs for women and water closets and 
bathtubs-for men shall be located in separate compartments. Gangtype shower 
compartments may be used for men. The room containing the laundry units shall be 
separated from the toilet rooms and have an exterior entrance only. 
(mw) Heating facilities capable of maintaining a temperature in the service 
buildings of seventy (70) degrees Fahrenheit in cold weather shall be provided. 
(gh) Hot water. Hot water facilities capable of maintaining a continuous supply 
of two -(3) to three ^ S) gallons of one hundred eighty (180) degrees hot water per trailer 
shall be provided. 
(hi) Laundry Facilities; Mechanical laundry drying equipment or laundry drying 
yards of at least fifty (50) square feet per recreational vehicle space shall be provided. 
(*j) Refuse-containersr Fly-tight and rodent-tight containers of not less than 
twenty (20) gallons capacity shall be provided and maintained for eaich recreational 
vehicle space, 
(10) Utilities* Utilities, including culinary water, sewage electricity, shall be 
available to each recreational vehicle space. 
Section 7 • Section Amended. 
Section 7-11-6, Approval, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 88-18, is 
amended to read: 
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7-11-6. Approval. 
The Planning Commission, or the Engineering ^department when authorized by 
the planning Gcommission, shall determine whether the proposed architectural and site 
development plans submitted are consistent with this Chapter and with the general 
objectives of this Title, and shall give or withhold approval accordingly. Denial or 
approval by the Engbneering Department may be-appealed to the Planning Commission,; 
and denial or-approval by the-Planning Commission may be appealed to the Board of 
Adjustment-
Section 8. Section Amended. 
Section 7-20-13, Tenant protest review, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 
88-18, is amended to read: 
7-20-13. Tenant protest review. 
(1) When a tenant of a residential dwelling has received written formal notice of 
eviction without cause and without at least 60 days notice of conversion and has reason 
to believe that notice was issued because of a proposed condominium project, the tenant 
may, within 30 15 days of the date of the notice of eviction, initiate an appeal regarding 
the issue of proper notice to the Bboard of Aadjustment on a form provided in the office 
of the ©building ©official. The filing of such a protest shall stay the issuance of any 
approval or issuance of any permits for the structure in question for a periods-ef not to 
exceed 30 days and the matter shall be set for hearing before the Bboard of Aadjustment. 
Subsequent appeals shall not act to further stay the issuance of approval of the 
condominium project 
(2) Upon filing, a copy of the appeal form shall be forwarded to the Tooele Housing 
Authority for relocation advice and assistance, That Authority shall within ten days 
forward to the Bboard of Aadjustment a statement of its report and recommendation. 
(3) Upon filing of an appeal, the Bbuiiding ©official shall institute an investigation 
to determine if the notice requirements set forth above were satisfied. He The building 
official shall then report his findings to the Bboard of Aadjustment within ten days of 
filing the appeal 
(4) The Bhoard Of Aadjustment shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of the 
appeal, give due notice to the appellant and to the owner/developer of the condominium 
project, and shall, at the hearing, review the appeal together with Agency and 
department reports, recommendations and related permit or subdivision applications and 
shall decide the same within 30 days from the date of filing of the appeal 
(5) The Bboard of Aadjustment, with regard to the hearing of the appeal, may. 
(a) Bgnforce the attendance of witnesses, the production of books and papers 
and administer oaths; 
(b) ©direct municipal resources, if necessary and appropriate, to alleviate 
relocation hardships; 
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(c) Hhear and dedde allegations of error in any order, requirement, dedsion 
or determination made by a munidpal officer in the performance of htb the officer's 
duties; 
(d) Ssee that the laws and ordinances are faithfully executed and direct 
investigations accordingly; 
(e) inst i tute any appropriate actions or proceedings to prevent or punish 
persons from or for performing any acts contrary to the building and zoning ordinances 
of Tooele City; 
(f) Jimpose reasonable conditions relating to the terms and conditions upon 
which the project will be approved^ which may indude suspension of approval pending 
preparation and implementation of a reasonable relocation plan or services for tenants 
who have not been given proper notice, or denial of the application in which event the 
owner/developer may not re-apply for 18 months from the date of denial 
Section 9. Section Enacted. 
Section 7-1 -9, Appeals, spedal exceptions and variances, Tooele City Code, is enacted 
to read: 
7-1-9, Appeals, special exceptions and variances, 
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and dedde: 
(a) appeals from zoning dedsions applying the zoning ordinance; 
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance; and 
(c) variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) A person desiring to appeal a zoning dedsion, apply for a spedal exception from 
the zoning ordinance where authorized, or apply for a variance from the zoning 
ordinance shall file the appropriate application obtained from the Tooele City 
engineering department, with the Tooele City building offidaL Any applicable fee shall 
be paid to the Tooele City finance department at the time of filing. The building offidal 
shall review the application for completeness and fee payment and forward it to the d ty 
recorder who shall set a hearing with the board of adjustment, The d t y recorder shall 
notify the applicant of the date and time of the hearing. 
(3) The powers and duties of the board of adjustment and the standards of review 
it must follow in dedding appeals, spedal exceptions and variances are identified in 
Tooele City Code Title 2 Chapter 4. 
Section 10, Repealer, 
Section 7-5-8, Variances from design and improvement standards, Tooele City Code, 
as enacted by Ordinance 83-05; 
Section 7-5-10, Appeal, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 88-18; 
Section 7-5-11, Effective date, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 88-18; 
Section 7-19-41, Appeal, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 88-18; 
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Tooele City Council Ordinance 94-56. 
Section 7-19-42, Adjustment, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 88-18; and 
Section 8-1-20, Review, Tooele City Code, as enacted by Ordinance 75-17, are 
repealed. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
This Ordinance is necessary for the immediate preservation of the welfare of the City 
and shall become effective on the date of publication. 
IN WETNESS WHEREOF, this Ordinance is passed by the Tooele City Council this 
c2/ day of /jg&£vr>yfetl994. 
TOOELE CITY COUNCIL 
(AGAINST) (FOR) 
Hb* 
ii^uS^ 
ABSTAINING: 
MAYOR OF TOOELE CITY 
(AGAINST) • (FOR) 
11/8/94 VpV>rd\t7cl9sub 14 TC060867 
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Instruction No//£: Procedures for Final Subdivision Plat Approval. 
Before a real estate developer, such as Tooele Associates, may sell subdivided 
lots to home builders or other purchasers, the developer must get approval from 
Tooele City to subdivide its property into lots through a final subdivision plat. 
Tooele City ordinances are among the sources of requirements for a final 
subdivision plat. In this case, the Development Agreement and Bond Agreements 
also provide requirements. Tooele City ordinances obligate real estate developers 
to satisfy the following requirements to obtain City approval of a final subdivision 
plat: 
1. The developer shall participate in a pre-application or pre-development 
conference with Tooele City representatives to review the proposed land 
development activity land uses, the configuration of the site, potential 
conformity or conflict with the City's development policy, and the process 
by which the developer may proceed to such subdivision plat approval. 
2. The developer will then cause to be prepared the preliminary subdivision 
plan, which shall include all of the property to be subdivided by the 
developer as well as all other property owned or controlled by the 
developer that is adjacent to the portion to be subdivided. The preliminary 
subdivision plan must be accompanied by, among other things, a 
preliminary plan for sewer and waterlines and other public improvements, 
a letter from each utility company involved in the subdivision addressed to 
the Planning Commission stating that the preliminary subdivision plan has 
been reviewed and setting forth the utility company's comments regarding 
the utility service design and easements, a copy of a preliminary report of 
a title insurance company, and a title insurance policy or an attorney's 
opinion brought to date of the application setting forth the names of all 
property owners of property included in the proposed subdivision, as well 
as all mortgages, judgments, liens, easements, contracts and other clouds 
affecting title to said premises. The developer shall also prepare such 
other supplementary material as was specified by the City in the pre-
application process, as well as a written application for approval of the 
preliminary plan. 
3. Thereafter, copies of the preliminary plan shall be distributed to City 
officials for their review and comment. 
4. The City officials' review and comment shall be presented during a 
meeting of the Tooele City Planning Commission. Also during that 
meeting, the developer and the Planning Commission shall review the 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
preliminary plan for compliance with City ordinances or other applicable 
requirements, such as those in bond agreements or a development 
agreement. The Planning Commission shall recommend approval or 
disapproval of the preliminary subdivision plan and submits its and the 
City Engineer's recommendations to the City Council. 
5. The City Council shall then consider the preliminary subdivision plan and 
render the final decision of the City approving or disapproving the plan. 
6. If the City Council approves the preliminary subdivision plan, within one 
year of such approval, the developer must submit a proposed final plat, 
which shall conform substantially to the preliminary plan, as approved. 
7. The developer's submission of the final plat application must be 
accompanied by all engineering drawings for review by the City Engineer. 
During a Planning Commission Meeting, the Planning Commission will 
review the proposed final plat during a meeting and adopt a positive or 
negative recommendation to the City Council. 
8. Thereafter, the City Council shall consider the proposed final plat during a 
City Council Meeting and either approve or disapprove the proposed final 
plat. If approved by the City Council, the final plat will be recorded with 
the Tooele County Recorder. 
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Instruction No. *_^\ Procedures for Accepting Public Improvements. 
Before Tooele City can accept public improvements, Tooele Associates must 
satisfy the following procedures: 
1. Tooele Associates must provide four complete sets of engineering plans 
and specifications or required land improvements to the Tooele City 
Building Official. The plans and specification must bear the seal of a Utah 
registered professional engineer along with a signed statement to the effect 
that the plans and specifications comply with the Tooele City Code and 
with good engineering practices. The plans must show profiles of all 
utility and street improvements. 
2. Execute a Bond Agreement to ensure the completion of all public 
improvements required to be installed in the subdivision and provide a 
Bond to secure the obligations contained in the Bond Agreement. 
3. The final plat must be approved by the Tooele City Council, after a 
recommendation from the Tooele City Planning Commission. 
4. Construction of all required public improvements must be completed in 
conformance with Tooele City standards and the approved engineering 
plans and specifications. 
5. The design engineer engaged by Tooele Associates must then prepare and 
submit three certified sets of as-built plans reflecting the public 
improvements actually built/installed. 
6. The Tooele City Engineer or Public Works Director must verify that all 
public improvements have been satisfactorily completed in accordance 
with the approved engineering plans and specifications. 
7. The Tooele City Council will then approve a resolution accepting the 
public improvements. 
After acceptance by the City Council, a one-year warranty 
period commences before the end of which any defects or damage must be 
corrected. 
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Instruction No.^7: Tooele City Code Regarding Installation on Both Sides of Street. 
Tooele City Code § 4-8-2(12) does not impose the duty to install gutters, curbs, 
and sidewalks on both sides of the streets as soon as each road is laid, nor does it 
specifically permit Tooele City to withhold permits as a result of any delay in 
completing the roads. It may reasonably be interpreted to allow a developer to 
fulfill its duty within a reasonable time. 
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Instruction No.tyf: Tooele City Code Regarding Incomplete Improvements in Prior 
Subdivisions. 
Tooele City Code § 7-19-16 "phase development" does not vest Tooele City with 
discretion to deny the creation of further subdivisions on the basis of incomplete 
improvements in prior subdivisions nor does it apply to Master Community 
Development Agreements, such as the one in this case. 
Tooele City Code § 7-19-37 likewise does not vest Tooele City with discretion to 
deny the creation of further subdivisions on the basis of incomplete improvements 
in prior subdivisions. 
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Jury Instruction No. #f: Types of Business Entities 
This case involves different types of business entities. Tooele Associates is a 
limited partnership or "LP." A limited partnership is a legal entity made up of 
general and limited partners. Tooele Associates' limited partners are not 
personally liable for Tooele Associates' obligations, while Tooele Associates' 
general partners are generally personally liable for Tooele Associates' obligations. 
Perry/Tooele Associates is a limited liability company or "LLC." A limited 
liability company is a legal entity distinct from its members. Among other things, 
this means that no organizer, member, manager, or employee of Perry/Tooele 
Associates is personally liable under a judgment, decree, or court order for a debt, 
obligation, or liability of Perry/Tooele Associates or for the acts or omissions of 
Perry/Tooele Associates. 
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Instruction No.#>: Inconsistent Statements. 
You may believe that a witness, on another occasion, made a statement 
inconsistent with that witness's testimony given here. That doesn't mean that you 
are required to disregard the testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe 
the witness. 
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Instruction No. 5jj Effect of Willfully False Testimony. 
If you believe any witness has intentionally testified falsely about any important 
matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, or you may 
disregard only the intentionally false testimony. 
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Jury Instruction No. 5 ^ 
Authority of City Attorneys 
Absent limitations, a city attorney may bind a municipality to the same extent that 
any attorney may bind a client. 
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<} \> v / ^ / \ r Hsitk* K vV • * ^ 
OVERLAKE PLATS ARE SUBDIVISIONS 
A subdivision is a parcel of land in a larger development. Each plat 
of the Overlake development is a subdivision. 
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Jury Instruction No.£# 
Waiver 
A "waiver" is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, benefit or advantage. 
To decide whether a party has waived a contract right, benefit or advantage you must 
determine that all the following have been proved: 
• a party has a contract right, benefit or advantage; 
• the party knew of the right, benefit or advantage; and, 
• the party intended to release that right, benefit or advantage. 
The intent to release a right, benefit or advantage may be express or implied and may be 
determined by considering all relevant circumstances. 
Tooele Associates contends that acts, statements or admissions of the Tooele City 
and/or its officials and employees constituted a waiver of the City's known rights, benefits 
or advantages relating to Tooele Associates' completion of the public improvements in 
Overlake under the Development Agreement. The City denies that it waived such rights, 
benefits or advantages. 
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Instruction No.^_: Closing Arguments. 
In a moment you will hear the lawyers give their closing arguments. Remember 
that the lawyers trying this case are not on trial. Any feelings you may have about 
them should not influence your decision in this case. They are advocates doing 
their best to represent their clients' interests as they explain their view of the case. 
If in their closing arguments the lawyers say anything about the evidence that 
conflicts with what you remember, you are to rely on your memory of the 
evidence. If they say anything about the law that conflicts with these instructions, 
you are to rely on these instructions. 
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Instruction No5& : Selection of Foreperson and Return of Verdict. 
This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a general verdict as is 
sometimes done, but it will be your function in this case to make findings as to 
special questions which are submitted to you. In making your findings, you 
should bear in mind that to answer an interrogatory, you must find that the answer 
to the interrogatory has been proven by the burden of proof. It requires the 
agreement of six of the jurors to answer any interrogatory, but it is not necessary 
that the same six jurors agree to the answer to each interrogatory. 
Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of your number to act as 
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which 
you agree. The foreperson should not dominate the jury, but the foreperson's 
opinion should be given the same weight as the opinions of the other members of 
the jury. This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a 
verdict. As soon as six or more of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, you shall 
have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then shall return it to this room. 
You may take these Instructions with you to the jury room and return them with 
your verdict. The Court will hand you blank forms of verdict. When you have 
agreed upon your verdict, notify the Bailiff having you in charge, and he will 
conduct you into the Court. 
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Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.$2j Tooele Associates' Breach of 
Contract Claims Against Tooele City. 
Tooele Associates claims that Tooele City breached the Development 
Agreement and its amendments by not performing its obligations as 
follows: 
1. By failing to consent to assignments of the Development Agreement's 
rights and obligations to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, Perry Homes, Inc., 
L.H. Perry Investments, LLC, and Overlake Golf, LLC pursuant to Section 
XVIII; 
2. By refusing the 10 year extension of the Development Agreement 
pursuant to Section XXIII; 
3. By refusing to approve, and threatening refusal of, applications for the 
creation of new subdivisions within the Overlake Project Area; 
5. By refusing to recognize and accept as complete the public improvements 
in the Overlake Project Area subdivisions Overlake Estates Phases 1B, 
1C, 1D, 1E, 1Fand 1G; 
6. By creating arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for the public 
improvements constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project 
Area's subdivisions; 
7. By slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the public improvements 
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's 
subdivisions; 
8. By requiring Tooele Associates to complete the same remedial work within 
the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions multiple times; 
9. By requiring that Tooele Associates complete public improvements that 
were not initially required as a part of the construction of certain 
subdivisions; 
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10. By misinterpreting and misapplying its own public improvement 
ordinances in relation to the Overtake Project Area's subdivisions; 
11. By refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions that public 
improvements within the Overtake Project Area's subdivisions were 
complete; 
12. By requiring Tooele Associates to complete public improvements to 
standards that are not found within the Development Agreement, the 
approved construction drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City's 
Ordinances and/or that are not required of other similarly situated 
developers; 
13. By finding and asserting that Tooele Associates had materially breached 
the Development Agreement; 
14. By finding and asserting that it is not required to comply with its obligations 
under the Development Agreement; 
17. By asserting meritless, trivial and frivolous claims against Tooele 
Associates; 
18. By failing to commence site design and site improvements within 180 days 
of Tooele Associates' transfer to the City of land donations provided 
earlier than final plat or final site plan approval; 
19. Tooele Associates claims that it has been damaged as a result and wants 
Tooele City to pay it money to compensate it for the damages it claims to 
have suffered. 
Tooele City denies Tooele Associates' claims and in its defense claims 
primarily that it did not breach the Development Agreement and its 
amendments mostly because the Development Agreement and its 
amendments impose no obligation on Tooele City to act or not act in the 
manner alleged; and Tooele Associates' claim fails due to the non-
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occurrence of a condition to Tooele City's performance: Tooele 
Associates' own performance of the Development Agreement. 
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Jury Instruction No. 5$ 
Ordinance Enforcement and Duties of City Officials 
Ordinarily, the prior non-enforcement of an ordinance by Tooele City officers would 
not preclude Tooele City from later enforcing that ordinance. 
Likewise, Tooele City employees are bound by ordinances and are not at liberty to 
waive or alter the effect of City Ordinances. 
However, where exceptional circumstances exist and where an injustice of sufficient 
gravity may be avoided, the government may be estopped from enforcing an ordinance 
against a citizen. 
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Jury Instruction No. 
Class B & C Road Funds 
Pursuant to Utah law, Class B and Class C roads are public highways, roads or 
streets that are traveled ways under the jurisdiction of, and maintained to a minimum 
standard or higher by a county or incorporated city or town, over which a conventional two-
wheel drive vehicle may travel. 
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Instruction No.^° : Expectation Damages - General. 
Tooele Associates claims that it is entitled to recover damages based on its 
expectation that Tooele City would perform Tooele City's obligations under the 
Development Agreement and its amendments. If Tooele Associates is damaged 
by a breach of the Development Agreement and its amendments, then it has a 
right to recover damages that follow naturally from the breach as follows: 
(1) the loss of the benefits from the Development Agreement caused by Tooele 
City's breach; minus, 
(2) any cost or other loss that Tooele Associates has avoided by not having to 
perform. 
Tooele Associates has the burden of proving these damages. 
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Instruction No£*_: Authority of Tooele City Council and Knowledge Imputed to 
Developers. 
A city through its agents should not so act as to mislead a developer into making 
commitments and incurring expenses which will result in unfairness and injustice 
to him. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the developer, as a responsible individual 
engaged in an important business undertaking, is obliged to know the law and the 
ordinances governing the creation of subdivisions. 
It is so plain as to leave no room for misunderstanding that the prerogative and 
responsibility for making the final and controlling decisions as to the growth and 
management of the city is vested in the city council; and that what is done by the 
city engineer and by the planning and zoning commission are but preliminary to 
and are to be regarded as advisory to that governing body. 
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Jury Instruction No. u 
Mini II iifv In lliifii'il.ri'ki11 I iitiIii" A i l s ' . 
The law does not require that any party undertake futile or useless measures that 
wo i 11 d s e rve in o i i s eft 11 p u rpo s e. 
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Instruction No.^_: Performance Excused by Material Breach. 
Tooele City contends that it was excused from performing its remaining 
obligations under the Development Agreement because of Tooele Associates' 
conduct in failing to complete public improvements. In order to establish this as a 
justification for not performing Tooele City's remaining obligations under the 
contract, Tooele City must prove that Tooele Associates breached an important 
part of what Tooele Associates had promised to do. An action or duty is an 
important part of a party's performance under a contract if a reasonable person 
would not have made the contract unless a promise regarding that action or duty 
had been included. That is, Tooele City would be excused from performing if the 
Tooele Associates' conduct in failing to complete public improvements related to 
an essential part of the Development Agreement. On the other hand, if Tooele 
Associates breached only a minor or unimportant part of the Development 
Agreement, Tooele City would not be excused from performing. 
Consequently, if you find that Tooele Associates' conduct was the type of breach 
that had something to do with an essential part of the Development Agreement, 
you must find that Tooele City was excused from further performance under the 
contract. If you find that Tooele Associates' conduct was unimportant in relation 
to what the*defcndant,had promised to perform, you must find Tooele City was 
required to continue/fo perform, although Tooele City may still be entitled to 
compensation for tWe breach. 
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Instruction N o . ^ j City Employees are Bound by Ordinances and Contract 
Requirements. 
Tooele City employees do not have the authority to waive requirements of the 
Development Agreement, the Annexation Agreement, or the Bond Agreements. 
Likewise, Tooele City employees and officials have no authority to waive or 
otherwise alter the effect of City ordinances. 
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Instruction N o . ^ : Running with the Land. 
The Development Agreement does not run with land that Tooele Associates 
transfers unless the recipient of the land has received an assignment of the 
Development Agreement to which Tooele City gave prior written consent. 
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Instruction No. _ : Written Change Orders. 
The requirement for written change orders is binding on the parties. 
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Instruction No. : Causation. 
Any damages you award must be caused by the wrongs complained of. 
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Instruction No. ™j Nominal Damages. 
A party damaged by the other party's breach of the contract has a right to recover 
the damages caused by the breach. However, if the party claiming breach has not 
proved any actual or substantial damages caused by the breach, or if it has not 
proved the amount of damages, then you may award as damages a small or 
nominal sum such as One Dollar. 
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Instruction No.^j\ Agreement on Special Verdict. 
I am going to give you a form called the Special Verdict that contains several 
questions. You must answer the questions based upon the evidence you have seen 
and heard during this trial. 
Because this is not a criminal case, your verdict does not have to be unanimous. 
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they do not have 
to be the same six jurors on each question. 
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to each question, the 
foreperson should sign and date the verdict form and tell the bailiff you have 
finished. The bailiff will escort you back to this courtroom; you should bring the 
completed Special Verdict with you. 
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FILED BISTRO SOUEi 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 9 2009 
SALT 
BV. Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE ASSOCIATES L.P., et al.; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOOELE CITY, et al.; 
Defendants. 
TOOELE CITY; 
Third-Part)' Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FORSGREN ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.; 
Third-Party Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 060919737 
Judge Randall Skanchy 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
At least six of the eight of you must agree to the answers to the questions below, but they 
need not be the same six on each question. Unless at least six of you agree, you may not return 
an answer to any question. 
We, the jury, find as follows: 
Section I: fooele Associates' Claims. 
1. Has Tooele Associates proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele City 
materially breached the Development Agreement, including its implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing? 
YES: \ NO: 
• If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section II. 
• If you answered "YES" to this Question, identify how Tooele City breached the 
Development Agreement: 
By refusing to recognize and accept as complete the public improvements in the 
Overlake Project Area subdivisions Overlake Estates Phases IB, 1C, ID, IE, IF 
or 1G? 
NO: X 
By refusing to recognize and approve assignments of the Development 
Agreement to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, Perry Homes, Inc., L.H. Perry 
Investments, LLC and Overlake Golf, LLC? 
NO: 
By failing and refusing to extend the term of the Development Agreement 
pursuant to Section XXIII of the Development Agreement? 
NO: 
YES: 
b. 
YES JL 
YES X 
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d. By creating arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for the public improvements 
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions? 
YES: NO: 
>± 
;:X 
.=x 
4 
e. By slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the public improvements 
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions? 
YES: V NO: 
f. By misinterpreting and misapplying its own public improvement ordinances in 
relation to the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions? 
YES: X NO: 
g. By refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions that public improvements 
within the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions were complete? 
YES: Y NO: 
h. By requiring Tooele Associates to complete public improvements to standards 
that are not found within the Development Agreement, the approved construction 
drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City's Ordinances and/or that are not 
required of other similarly situated developers? 
YES: K NO: 
i. By refusing to approve, and threatening refusal of, applications for the creation of 
new subdivisions within the Overlake Project Area? 
YES: 1 NO: 
j . By finding and asserting that Tooele Associates had materially breached the 
Development Agreement? 
YES: NO:_ 
k. By asserting meritless, trivial and frivolous claims against Tooele Associates? 
YES: NO: K 
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By failing to commence site design and site improvements within 180 days of 
Tooele Associates' transfer to the City of land donations provided earlier than 
final plat or final site plan approval? 
;4 YES: Y NO: 
Has Tooele City proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele Associates 
materially breached the Development Agreement? 
x YES: *Y NO: 
If you answered "NO" to this Question, skip to Question 4. 
If you answered "YES" to this Question, identify how Tooele Associates breached the 
Development Agreement: 
a. By failing to complete public improvements in Overlake pursuant to Sections 
VII.2 and VIII.2 of the Development Agreement? 
YES: NO 4 
b. By failing to comply with the requirements for the approval of subdivision plats 
and site plans and all other applicable ordinances, resolutions, policies, and 
procedures of Tooele City, pursuant to Sections III.G and XVII of the 
Development Agreement? 
a 
YES: Y NO: 
c. By failing to set aside and provide land in Overlake for public uses, including for 
public schools, pursuant to Sections IX.2, X.2, and XI.2 of the Development 
Agreement? 
YES: NO: x d. By assigning portions of the Development Agreement to one or more parties 
without the prior written consent of Tooele City pursuant to Section XVIII of the 
Development Agreement? 
YES: NO: 
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e. By failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf 
Course pursuant to Section 8 of Amendment #4 to the Development Agreement? 
YES: V NO: 
By failing to construct a golf course on approximately 258 acres of land in 
Overlake pursuant to Section X.B of the Development Agreement? 
Yes: No: 
3. Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its claims and its defenses, as 
stated in Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially breached the Development 
Agreement and/or Bond Agreements? 
YES: K NO: 
• If you answered "YES'' to this Question, continue on to Question 4. 
• If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section II. 
Has Tooele Associates proven to a reasonable certainty: 
a. the amount of losses Tooele Associates has suffered as a result of Tooele City's 
breach of the Development Agreement from 2003 to May 15, 2009? 
*x YES: K NO: 
b. the amount of losses Tooele Associates will suffer as a result of Tooele City's 
breach of the Development Agreement from May 15, 2009, to 2017? 
YES: / \ NO: 
If you answered "YES" to either portion of this Question, continue on to Question 5. 
If you answered "NO" to both portions of this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY 
MORE QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section II. 
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5. Identify the amount of Tooele Associates' historic and future losses: 
a. Historic loss: What losses has Tooele Associates proven that it has suffered as a 
result of Tooele City's breach of the Development Agreement from 2003 to May 
15,2009? 
$ ^9 \ \ \ \ \ \ \5lMl (do not enter any amount if you answered "NO" to Question 4.a) 
b. Future loss: What future losses has Tooele Associates proven that it will suffer as 
a result of Tooele City's breach of the Development Agreement from May 15, 
2009, to 2017? 
$ ) / « o (i\i\f\6reQQ not enter any amount if you answered "NO" to Question 4.b) 
Section II: The City's Claims. 
6. Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached the Bond Agreements and Bond 
Agreement amendments by failing to complete public improvements in Overlake? 
YES: \ NO: 4 
7. Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached Sections IILG, VII.2, VIII.2, 
and XVII of the Development Agreement by failing to complete public improvements in 
Overlake? 
0, YES: K NO: 
If you answered "YES" to this Question or Question 6, continue on to Question 8. 
If you answered "NO" to this Question and Question 6, skip to Question 11. 
8. Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its rights to claim that Tooele 
Associates did not complete public improvements in Overlake required by the 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements? 
YES: NO: ^ 
If you answered "NO" to this Question, continue on to Question 9. 
If you answered "YES" to this Question, skip to Question 11. 
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9. Has Tooele City proven to a reasonable certainty the amount of costs that it will have to 
incur to complete public improvements in Overlake required by the Development 
Agreement and the Bond Agreements? 
YES: \ NO: 4. 
If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 10. 
If you answered ;;NO" to this Question, please skip to Question 11. 
10. What is the amount of damages Tooele City suffered, if any, from Tooele Associates' 
breach of the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreements based upon Tooele 
Associates' failure to complete public improvements in Overlake? 
s yi^.fW) 
11. Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached Section 8 of Amendment #4 to 
the Development Agreement by failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate 
the Overlake Golf Course? 
4 YES: K NO: 
If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 12. 
If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS. Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict 
Form and alert the courtroom deputy that you have arrived at a verdict. 
12. Has Tooele City proven to a reasonable certainty the amounts owed by Tooele Associates 
for water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf Course? 
YES: K^ NO: 
• If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 13. 
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13. 
If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS. Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict 
Form and alert the courtroom deputy that you have arrived at a verdict. 
What is the amount of damages Tooele City suffered, if any, from Tooele Associates' 
failure to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overtake'Golf Course? 
t iD.prD 
Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict and alert the courtroom 
deputy that you have arrived at a verdict. 
DATED this _H_ day of June, 2009. 
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RELEVANT UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 49.. SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES 
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the 
form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may 
submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of categorical or other brief answer 
or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might properly be 
made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting 
the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The 
court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus 
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If 
in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, 
each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury 
retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand 
the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a 
finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The court may submit 
to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories 
upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court 
shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to 
make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall 
direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the 
general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the 
verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A. When the answers are 
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, 
judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A in accordance with the answers, 
notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for further 
consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are 
inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general 
verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further 
consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial. 
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Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury 
shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no 
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of 
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
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